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Editorial
u
VyOLLONGPNG
On October 30 this year the Communist Party of Australia 
will have been in existence for 50 years.
So far the study of its history has merely scratched the sur­
face, and apart from a few early pamphlets, some unpublished 
theses, and the pioneering work of Dr. Alastair Davidson, 
there is not a great deal of literature on the subject.
In this enlarged issue of ALR we publish a number of articles 
from a variety of contributors dealing with various aspects 
of CPA history.
There has been no attempt at systematic coverage, the 
opinions expressed are those of the individual authors, and, 
as Dr. Davidson points out in his article the problem of 
how to write history, especially the history of a Communist 
Party, is itself open to a variety of approaches.
As far as possible the articles have been arranged in the 
chronological order in which the events dealt with occurred. 
The first is the report of W. Earsman to the Party from the 
Communist International, here published in full for the first 
time.
We hope that our readers will be stimulated by the material 
appearing here into contributing further articles and com­
ments on the subject for later issues.
The Earsman Report
INTRODUCTION
The document which follows is a report to the Central 
Executive of the Communist Party on the activities of the 
Third Congress of the Communist International which met 
in Moscow in June-July 1921. W. P. Earsman, who com­
piled the report, was a central figure, if not the central 
figure, in the formation of the originally united Communist 
Party. He was appointed the party secretary at the founding 
conference.
After the secession of the Australian Socialist Party in 
December 1920 and the adoption by it of the name of Com­
munist Parly, a principal preoccupation of Australian 
communists was the division in the Australian revolutionary 
movement. Both sets of communists were represented at 
the Third Congress with the aim of securing the recognition 
of the Comintern. Earsman went as the representative of 
the official party.
Earsman was an Edinburgh Scot who had been in Australasia 
for about ten years, first in New Zealand then in Aus­
tralia. An engineering tradesman, he had been active for 
several years in the socialist and industrial movements. 
During the First World War he had been secretary of the 
Melbourne District of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. 
Later, he started the Victorian Labor College; in this, and in 
his general activities, he worked with other radicals including 
a few left-wing intellectuals. In 1919, he shifted to Sydney 
with Christian Jollie-Smith and collaborated with J. S. (Jock) 
Garden, the radical secretary of the N.S.W. Labor Council, 
in forming the N.S.W. Labor College. From this activity 
came one strand of the three pronged movement to form a 
communist party; the other two were the Socialist Party and 
a section of the I.W.W. (Industrial Workers of the World.)
The report is the most important document on the early 
history of the Communist Party. Probably the most remark-
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able aspect is the light it throws on the concern Trotsky 
showed for the interests of the communists of far-off Aus­
tralia and his role in seeing their particular problems were 
recognised and looked after.
The unity proposals of the Small Bureau were complied 
with in February 1922. Although one or two groups attended 
the conference and merged, the A.S. P. refused to comply 
with the Comintern instructions. So the United Communist 
Party which emerged from this conference did not have the 
support it was intended to have. The unity question was fin­
ally disposed of later in 1922 when a significant section of 
the A.S.P. joined the C.P. leaving a rump of the A.S.P. 
which had little further significance.
Roger Coates
REPORT OF W. P. EARSMAN TO CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 
ON 3rd CONGRESS OF COMINTERN'
— December, 1921
Dear Comrades,
In this report I am presenting to you there is everything con­
tained in it which is of any importance; therefore I ask all comrades 
to treat it as confidential at this time. In fact at no time should 
it be discussed outside of the Central Executive.
I arrived in Moscow on the 13th of June, 1921, after eleven 
weeks very difficult travelling. I am leaving out all the preliminaries 
which had to be gone through before I could get to work.
While in England I had got letters from friends to Comrade 
Bell, leader of the English Delegation. Comrade Bell I saw the 
day of my arrival and, after a short talk, he suggested that I should 
see the Executive Committee. This I readily agreed with and it was 
decided that I should accompany Bell the following day, the 14th. 
In the meantime I found out whether anybody else had been doing
i  T h e  Com intern,  C om m unist International or T h ird  International was formed 
in 1919. D u e to the failure o f the Second International, Lenin had proposed  
the form ation of a new  revolutionary socialist in ternational in  the April Theses 
(1917) and the R ussian Com m unist Party in itia ted  the m oves to im plem ent 
this proposal.
Roger Coates is a secondary school teacher. Besides th e  introduction  he has 
supp lied  th e  annotations to the  report.
3
any work, but found so far that nothing had been done. Comrade 
Rees- of the ASP had been here two days before me and I had 
not forgotten the conduct of Comrade Freeman3 while he had been 
in Australia. Comrade Rees informed me that he did not ijitend to 
do anything and that he would be prepared to work with me. Just 
then I did not take any notice of the suggestion until I had found 
out the lay of the land. I had made up my mind to make a fight 
for full recognition. 1 might add here that Comrade Quinton was 
really the credentialed delegate of the ASP who had power to act. 
But he had been out of action by being arrested in England as a 
suspicious character found loitering around the Hull Docks. For this 
he had received three months in gaol.
On the 14th I accompanied Comrade Bell to the Comintern, 
where we learn that the E.C. were not meeting, but we met Com­
rade Skobetsky4, Secretary to the E.C.5. After listening to me he 
instructed me to write a full report of the position in Australia 
supported by any evidence that I might have; further that all the 
Commissions or Committees had been set up (about ten in all) and 
that I could select the ones I desired to sit on and help to draft 
the thesis. This I thought was good and set to work full of hope.
Women’s Congress
The Women’s Congress was in session at this time and I received 
an invitation to attend. This was a large order, but I put in an 
appearance and gave a report of the position of women in the 
revolutionary movement in Australia and the difficulties we were 
confronted with. This was acceptable to them and they already 
realised the failings of women’s movements in any of the Anglo 
Saxon countries. I promised that I would try and do what I could 
to get the interest of women in the country. Further than this I 
could not undertake. I also received copies of the different theses.
2 A representative o f the Australian Socialist Party or G oulburn Street com ­
m unists (after the location of the Sydney headquarters) .
3 Paul Freem an, whose death is described in the docum ent was one of the 
most en igm atic figures o f the Australian left. H is nationality  is in  doubt, but 
he belonged to the Australian IVVW during the First W orld W ar. Subsequently  
he was arrested and deported to the US where American im m igration officials 
refused him  adm ission. Returned to A ustralia on the Sonoma,  he becam e a 
cause celebre. Finally, he disembarked in Germ any and attended the Second 
Congress o f the C om intern, nom inally as an IW W  delegate. H e returned to 
A ustralia in  1920 to prom ote Australian trade union  representation in the 
Red International o f T rade U nions and then becam e an ASP delegate to the 
Third Congress, m eeting his death in the m anner described here, after m aking  
things very d ifficu lt for Earsman.
4 Skobetsky (Kobetsky), a Russian m em ber of the ECCI from the Second 
Congress.
s T h e  E xecutive C om m ittee o f the C om intern, com m only the ECCI.
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I might say that the women’s part of the organisation is a very 
important one in Europe and they have their own papers and carry 
out their own propaganda work, etc.
The Executive Committee
The E.C. met every evening or in the late afternoons and sat on 
as a rule to the early hours of the morning. The Commissions 
which had already been set up and which I decided to sit on were
—  The World’s Economic Situation: Trotsky Chairman; Tactics: 
Radeck Chairman; Tactics in Russia: Lenin Chairman; Organisa­
tion: Koenin8 Chairman; Trade Unions: Zinoviev Chairman.
These I attended and did my best to place the colonial position 
before these Comrades and by the way to place Australia on the 
Revolutionary map. This was not light work because everything 
had to be done in writing, and being alone I had to carry it out by 
myself.
During those few days I had been continually on the enquiry 
about Comrade Freeman because I was not at all satisfied about 
his position. This was done so that I could better judge what 
kind of man I had to contend with.
During this period I was able to make a little progress in getting 
some recognition of Australia and the Colonies generally from the 
International point, and when my papers were read they were 
surprised at the progress made in revolutionary tactics and in 
particular in the trade unions. I found also that the Germans were 
looked upon as the most important party in the world by the 
Russian Revolutionaries and the 3rd International because of the 
important position they had in relation to the Russian situation 
and also in the world situation. Recognising my own position I 
decided if possible to attach myself to the German Delegation 
instead of the English. I found this easier than I expected mainly 
because I was looked upon with favour because of the work I 
had done while in Germany. My objective, the recognition of our 
Party, had to be obtained at all costs and I was prepared to do 
anything to attain it. My attachment to the Germans was of great 
assistance in other directions in so far that it kept me well informed 
of all that was going on and when all meetings would be held. This 
was important because rarely anyone knew when the meetings 
were held till the last moment.
The executive meetings at this time were fully taken up with 
European affairs in attempting to straighten out the many difficulties
6 Koenin (Koenen, W .), a German delegate to the T h ird  Congress and a m ember
of the Small Bureau (p resid iu m ).
that they were confronted with. In Germany there were two parties 
that had recognition and one had to go. France had three or four 
parties all claiming allegiance to the revolutionary movement and 
none of them Communist parties. Italy was in a similar position, 
but here the masses were good, but they were tied up by a clever 
band of leaders, with Turatti and Serrati at their head, while the 
revolutionary leaders were an ordinary lot and really not leaders 
in the true sense of the word. Spain was in a similar position and 
the English movement was in a very unsatisfactory state. Then 
there were a host of the new European States all clamouring to 
have attention. It was all good for me, but tied up our affairs 
awfully. These things had all to be dealt with before the Congress 
could open so as that the Executive report could be complete and 
that they would have some concrete suggestions to lay before the 
Congress for the uplifting of the movement throughout the world.
On June 17 a public holiday was declared to celebrate the 
opening of the 3rd Congress of the 3rd International, and this 
gave me an opportunity to obtain the sympathy of Comrade Trotsky 
on behalf of Australia. I had met him on several occasions before 
this, but this day he seemed specially interested. It was at the parade 
of the Red Army in the Red Square where Trotsky and his staff 
had an inspection of the troops and an invitation had been issued 
for one member of each delegation to accompany the General Staff. 
I got the invitation for Australia and here Trotsky spoke with me 
about Australia and the position as a whole. On leaving he informed 
that if I struck any difficulties I had to come to him and that he 
would assist me. 1 mention this because it is important later. I 
also had a conversation with General Brussiloff this day.
June 20 it was decided by the E.C. that the official opening of 
the Congress should be held on June 22 in the Imperial Court 
Theatre. This was a public function because of its value as a 
propaganda display. Also at this meeting of the E.C. it was decided 
that all matters of all other countries would have to stand over 
and be attended to by the new E.C. I was opposed to this, but 
I was defeated in the vote.
The morning of June 22 arrived and with it Comrade Freeman 
who had travelled through the East, giving me no less than 10 days 
start from him. Still I had not been able to find out his position.
I soon found after this that he had friends somewhere about 
because in the issuing of the Mandates, which were of two kinds
—  Blue of Decisive vote and Orange a Consultative vote. I was 
given a Consultative vote, which made me furious, and immediately 
set about to demand the reason. T saw Comrade Radeck, Chairman
(i AU STR AL IA N  LEFT REVIEW— OCT.-NOV., 1970
of the Credentials Committee, but got little satisfaction from him. 
In fact we had some very hot words. I then went straight to Trotsky, 
who advised me to state my case in writing and supply each 
member of the Committee with a copy. This was done, but no 
results were forthcoming in the first 24 hours. Back I went to 
Trotsky, who then accompanied me to see Radeck, and on my 
behalf demanded why I was being treated in this manner. Radeck 
made some very weak reply, which Trotsky would not accept, but 
it finished by Radeck promising to have the matter rectified, which 
was within two hours. I got my Decisive vote, which meant full 
recognition of our Party.
I also learnt that Comrades Freeman and Rees had received 
decisive votes and I immediately lodged a protest and again asked 
for an enquiry. I got little satisfaction at the time, but kept worrying 
Radeck everyday. Several friends advised me to let the matter drop 
and not to push the objection too far in case that I might prejudice 
my own case. I accepted this advice after consulting with a few 
others. Freeman then learned of the trouble I was making and of 
some of my work, and asked me to discuss things with him. At 
the same time he was twitting me with being the leader of the 
Australian delegation. We started discussing matters there and then 
and he commenced by telling me of matters he had been informed 
of by our members in Australia. Such as that we were an IWW 
outfit and we were only camouflaging the real issue, that I was an 
anarchist, etc. I found that he had wormed himself into the con­
fidence of members in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. 
All this was rather astounding to me and I finished with him by 
saying that he was not telling, the truth. We had a few minutes hot 
at one another and then I fully realised what kind of man I had 
against me. Everything that he had picked up in Australia he was 
prepared to use against us. In fact it was a declaration of war. 
This was going to make my task very much more difficult, but that 
could not be helped.
The Congress
The first business of the Congress was the report of the Creden­
tials Committee, who reported that up to date they had examined 
the mandates of delegates from 50 different countries and that 
they had issued 293 Decisive votes, 218 Consultative votes and 
issued 150 visitors’ tickets. They graded the countries into five 
sections, each section carrying with it the number of votes which 
each delegation would be able to record. Australia was placed in 
the lowest section with five votes, which meant that they were 
divided equally between the others and myself. There was no 
occasion when it was necessary to split the vote, except on one
issue when a motion was moved to close the discussion on the 
Russian position. I was very much opposed to this, because I was 
down to speak and had been requested to do so by the Germian 
delegation, and I was keen on it. Anyhow, I was defeated, both 
Rees and Freeman voting against me.
The Congress proceeded daily after this and I was fully occupied 
on an average of 16 hours a day. This because of the number of 
Commissions I was on and then arrangements were being made 
for the Trade Union Congress. In this matter I agreed that Com­
rade Howie7 should be the responsible comrade, which would 
guarantee that all matters were being attended to, but I had always 
to remember that Comrade Howie was not a member of our Party, 
which meant that I had to keep a close watch on all that was being 
done.
About this time I was at the Comintern and while there I had a 
bundle of letters handed to me. I should here explain that each 
delegation has a leader in which all business is transacted, and all 
correspondence coming and going passes through his hands. Though 
I never was appointed as leader of the Australian delegation, never­
theless, I was accepted as such at Headquarters. This meant that 
all official announcements were made through me and all cor­
respondence passed through my hands. I received on the 23rd of 
June some letters, and amongst them one signed by Comrade T. 
Walsh8 of the Seamen’s Union, transferring the credentials of 
Comrade Quinton to Rees. I was amazed at this, because I had 
been doing everything to keep Rees out of the Trade Union Con­
gress, but this furnished him without doubt with credentials. I was 
simply sick to find that whatever I did it seemed that there was 
someone always undoing my work. I cannot find any justification 
for this act, especially when I realise the whole circumstances, that 
Comrade Howie and myself were more justified to have that 
credential than Rees because of the fact that both of us had been 
working for years in the trade union movement while Rees had 
never taken any part in it at all. Again the fact that Comrade 
Rees belonged to another party ought to have been sufficient to 
stop the transfer. The only reason that I can conceive why Comrade 
Walsh did this was that he fails to grasp that those who are not 
with us are against us, or that he thought it was not important.
J J. H ow ie, a leading NSW  trade unionist, president o f the NSW  Labor Council 
in  1019, elected  Australian delegate to the Red International o f T rade Unions' 
Congress h eld  in  Moscow concurrently w ith  the Com intern Congress. H e  
travelled w ith  Earsman to Moscow.
n T . W alsh, president of the Australian Seam en’s Union; a C om m unist but 
apparently here acting independently.
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These matters all will have to be dealt with later. It is to the credit 
of Comrade Rees that he refused to use this credential.
After this things went smoothly for a while, but my tactics I 
decided had to be ones of always acting first and committing Com­
rades Freeman and Rees or forcing them to repudiate what I  did 
or said. Further, that by these tactics I  was always compelling 
them to be on the defensive, defending their own position and thus 
stopping them from breaking any fresh ground. I should say that 
neither of them were ever present at any of the Commissions or 
lent any assistance to draft the theses.
I took part in the debates on the theses, but was very unfortunate 
to be always cut out by motions of closure. On July 4th I  got the 
floor on the question of The Relationship of the Trade Unions 
and the Communist International9. I agreed with the thesis which 
I had assisted to  draw up and gave a report of what had been done 
in Australia. The following day Comrade Rees informed me that 
he intended to speak on the question and repudiate the things I 
had said. I also learned that he was not in  favour of speaking, but 
that Freeman was pushing him. By this time they were both at 
loggerheads. On July 7th Rees spoke and repudiated my state­
ments and left a very bad impression on himself and his Party. 
The Congress proceeded daily and nothing particular happened. 
Very little alteration was made from the previous theses, except 
in that of The World Situation by Trotsky. Special attention should 
be given to this, because it is the base of all the other theses.
On July 12th the Communist Congress finished and it was voted 
on all sides that it was the most successful Congress which had' 
yet been held. A  number of important decisions had been arrived 
at, mainly dealing with the internal affairs of the European coun­
tries, but showing how our affairs would be dealt with when our 
turn came.
On tihis date an article of mine appeared in the Moscow which 
was simply a record of fact. Rees agreed with it, but informed me 
that Freeman was against it and had asked him to assist in replying 
to it. This Rees refused to do. On this date Comrade Lamb10 of 
the ASP turned up and he assisted Freeman to write a reply, 
but the editor of the Moscow informed me that he would not print 
it. Freeman performed over this and told me I had polluted all 
the channels against him.
» T h e  T heses on  the C om intern and the R IT U  were in troduced  at the C on­
gress on Ju ly  3, the sam e day the R IT U  Congress opened  — by Zinoviev.
i°  Pat Lamb, ASP delegate to T h ird  Congress.
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The Trade Union Congress
The Communist Congress being over I had now more time to 
attend to the T.U. Congress, which had commenced on July 3rd, 
1921. I had so far as I was able attended to the business ofi the 
T.U., but it was difficult because of the other work and I con­
sidered the Communist International more important than this. 
But the work had been in the safe hands of Comrade Howie. I 
attended the meetings of the Commissions on Aims and Objects, 
Workshop Control, Workshop Committees, Constitution, etc. In 
this Congress you had no homogeneous body to deal with, but ao 
awful collection of divergent views. There were the syndicalists of 
France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, etc., who stood definitely against 
any recognition of the political weapon and for absolute freedom 
of the trade unions. Then came the IWW element from the States, 
South America and Germany who were non-political or sat on the 
fence on this question. Then came the simple trade unionists who 
demanded no politics in the unions. Then the Italian group who 
believed in being affiliated to both the 2nd and the 3rd Inter­
nationals. With this conglomeration of views it was apparent the 
task before the Congress was a much bigger one than in the Com­
munist International, and for those who accepted the position as 
laid down by the 3rd International we would have to work hard to 
accomplish our mission.
The first business was the election of the Presidium of five, which 
had to be as representative as possible. Comrade Mann11 was 
elected to represent England along with the Colonies. Then came 
the election of the Council, which was composed of one delegate 
from each country. I agreed that Comrade Howie should be our 
representative, but this did not debar me from attending any of 
the meetings which I might desire to attend. Comrade Howie did 
the work well and his efforts brought fruit in so far that Australia 
had been placed in the 4th section with eight votes, and Comrade 
Howie, with the assistance of Comrade Bill Haywood12, was suc­
cessful in having Australia lifted to the 2nd section with 16 votes.
The Credential Committee reported that there were 38 coun­
tries represented with 380 delegates with decisive votes and 30 
with consultative votes along with 111 guests.
Then came the report of the Provincial Council which had been 
working for the past year in building up the International. This
li  T om  M ann, veteran English working class leader.
'2 Bill H ayw ood. American IW W  leader.
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report was submitted by Comrade Rosmer of France.15 The report 
in itself was of little importance but the discussion developed into 
one on tactics and principles. In this discussion Comrade Howie 
spoke and put the position of the Unions in Australia and endorsed 
the principles as laid down by the 3rd International that the unions 
would have absolute freedom but by the activities of the Commun­
ists they would be kept to those principles.
Then we passed to tactics in which discussion I took part and 
endorsed the thesis as drawn up.14 I showed that as far as Australia 
was concerned they were correct and that we had tested them.
By this time it was apparent to all that there was a better under­
standing existing and that only a few irreconcilables would be on 
the outside, such as KAPD of Germany who were pure industrialists. 
It also transpired that the IWW at its last convention had endorsed 
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat which was recognised as very im­
portant.
In looking over the work of the International and remembering 
that this was the 1 st Congress I feel well pleased with the work done 
and that this Internationl will succeed. I believe it would have 
been better if more time had been given to all sections for the dis­
cussions when we might have arrived at a more unanimous decision. 
In my opinion the theses were rushed through which gave the small 
minority ample opportunity of feeling aggrieved. They have now 
formed what is known as the 4th International.15
On July 14th Comrade Lamb ASP turned up too late for any of 
the congresses. That day I met him but we had nothing to say to 
one another but it gave the ASP three delegates while I was still on 
my own. Since my disagreement with Freeman I had absolutely 
refused to talk about my affairs. I was approached by an agent of 
the Small Bureau to hold a combined meeting but I refused until 
such time as the Executive or the Small Bureau took the matter up.
1 was still standing for the recognition of our party as the only party 
in Australia.
While attending to those matters I was continuing my enquiries 
about Freeman and the ASP. On July 14th I learned from Comrade
1:1 A. Rosmer, French m em ber of the ECCI from the Second Congress, a m ember 
of the Small Bureau at (he T h ird  Congress and a joint chairm an of the trade 
union com m ission.
' • Drafted by the R ussian delegation in  consultation  w ith  the German delega­
tion, and introduced by Radek. He argued in favour of agitation , organisation  
and mass activity. T h e  crucial m atter involved was the failure o f the March 1921 
insurrection in Germany.
'"> N ot the Fourth International o f Trotsky but the International m ovem ent of 
the syndicalists and anarchists w ho m et outside the Leninist framework o f the  
Com intern.
Skobetsky Secretary to the Comintern that the only party which had 
been recognised was the CP of A and the only correspondence ever 
received in Russia from Australia was my own letter asking for 
affiliation. I also found by an examination of the records of all 
papers received that, the only Australian revolutionary papers 
received were our own16 and The Proletariat.17 In fact they knew 
nothing of the ASP and its organ. This is absolutely authentic and 
at no time have the ASP been recognised or communicated with.
July 14th saw the opening of the Youth Congress which I was 
requested to attend and give a report. This I did being the only 
Australian delegate present. At this time I was anything but well. 
This was my fourth congress in 5 weeks and had only averaged 4 
hours sleep per night with practically no food. The inevitable collapse 
took place and I had to take to bed. With the doctor’s care I was 
soon about again and from this I was able to get food which agreed 
with me.
The Young Communist Congress was very interesting and it 
showed how the movement was being developed. To watch these 
youths of 18 to 25 years of age conducting unaided all the functions 
of an International organisation and one which is the largest in the 
world, was an amazing sight and would do the youth of Australia 
a wonderful lot of good and force them to recognise how backward 
they are in revolutionary political thought and action. There were 
31 countries with decisive votes, 7 with consultative votes making 
a total of 150 delegates.
The Congress lasted about 10 days. A similar program was gone 
through as at the other Congresses. The theses were good but few 
of them were applicable to Australia, because most of the immediate 
aims suggested with the object of training the youth for action were 
in being. Even on the question of education that is revolutionary 
education Britain and Australia are in advance having already estab­
lished schools for the purpose —  Labour Colleges.18 In the future the 
party must give very much more attention to this work and give 
assistance to persuading the unions to spend more money in the 
building up of Independent Working Class Educational Institutions.
While on this subject I might report that an attempt was made 
while I was in Moscow to build up an Educational International
'ii Australian Com m unis t  and Communist .
'7 Alm ost certainly Proletarian Review .
in Earsman had been a central figure in the form ation of Labor Colleges, fo llow ­
ing the British m odel, in both M elbourne and Sydney. H e is d istinguished, in 
the A ustralian context, by his concern for w orking class political education; in 
this respect h e  acted like a proto-com m unist, w ell before the C om m unist Party 
was thou gh t of.
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or Educational International Bureau which I assisted in but it was 
a miserable failure owing to the misunderstanding amongst advanced 
European Revolutionaries who have not been able to throw off their 
bourgeois conceptions regarding education.
This is an error I have noticed in the movement. They have a 
sound knowledge of fundamentals but don’t realise that they apply 
to every walk of life and all bourgeois institutions. The idea of 
independent working class education appears to them unnecessary, 
even Comrade Lunacharsky19 the Commissar for Education is weak 
on the point. Comrade Clunie of the Scottish Labour College agreed 
with me and we were forced to cross swords with Lunacharsky on 
the question. The attitude we took up was the means of stopping 
the Bureau as we decided to withdraw.
Returning to the Young Peoples movement I made all arrange­
ments for their literature to be forwarded to us, and that we would 
endeavour to do something with the young people. I did not forget 
to point out the many difficulties in our way and asked them to 
remember the apathy of the anglo saxon regards political thought. 
Britain is in a similar position and America is making big efforts 
to build up a strong youth movement. They are seriously handicap­
ped by the fact that their organisation is illegal.
The next incident I have to report is, that in the early morning of 
July 18th at 2.00 a.m. I was arrested while returning home in the 
motor car. I had just left the Kremlin where I had been in consulta­
tion with one of the Soviet Commissars on matters regarding the 
International position and was returning home when the car was 
suddenly stopped and a soldier stepped into the car, flashed a torch 
in my face and held a revolver at my head. I had to submit and was 
taken to the Vatcheka and held there for a few hours. Then I was 
released. Very soon afterwards an apology was forthcoming from 
th,e Government with an explanation attached. This incident I 
only give to show and try to convey to you how careful the Soviet 
Government have to be and how they have to take precautions 
against their enemies. I fully appreciate the position and believe 
they acted rightly in arresting me. The details I will give to you ver­
bally.
July 25th I was informed of an awful train accident which had 
occurred on July 24th about 70 miles from Moscow in which Com­
rades Freeman, Lamb and Rees of the ASP were in.20 The three
19 Lunacharsky, Soviet Commissar o f Education, and outstand ing m an-of-letters. 
Earsman had n o  com punction  in  taking him  to task. In fact, the lack of the 
later subm issivcness o f  foreign com m unists to the Russian party is noticeably  
evident throughout the  docum ent.
20 T h is is the fam ous crash of the experim ental train w hich  looked like a 
large bath ing  box on wheels. I t  was driven by an aeroplane engine, propeller
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were badly injured Freeman in particular. Later I learned that Rees 
and Lamb were able to return to their hotel and Freeman had to 
be taken to the hospital. There were 30 delegates in the train all 
being injured, 6 being killed outright: 2 Russians, 2 Germans, 1 
Englishman and 1 Rumanian. Freeman was by this time reported 
dead but it proved to be a rumour. He had had an operation per­
formed to amputate his leg and was suffering awful agony. On July 
28th at the funeral of the 6 victims I was officially informed that 
Freeman had died early that morning. Blood poisoning set in after 
the operation and he died in terrible agony which had lasted 3 days. 
Comrade Freeman died well standing up to it like a hero. His last 
words were a message of farewell to all Comrades in Australia. On 
July 30th he was buried with full military honours under the shade 
of the Kremlin walls. I acted as chief mourner, Comrades Rees and 
Lamb still being confined to bed. This accident is one of the most 
appalling I have ever known and draws the curtain over many 
things that my lips must be closed to.
On July 30th Comrades Smith, Casey and Kelly along with Com­
rade Marks from New Zealand arrived.21 They all reported fit and 
in good health. I decided that I would see Comrade Smith because 
I knew him to be a member of our party and he confirmed it.22 I 
asked him why he had not got credentials before leaving and he 
informed me that he had not the time or he would have done so. 
I asked him his opinion on several matters and finding him alright 
and believing that he would be of some use to me I granted his 
request and issued credentials to him. I reported the matter to 
the Secretary of the Comintern and he approved of my action. I 
gave Smith strict instructions that all matters were confidential and 
that he must treat as such.
Comrade Marks then requested me to endorse him as a member 
of the CP of NZ.
This I refused to do because I did not know him and he had no 
credentials with him. Casey, Kelly and Marks were accepted by 
the Red Trade Union and given permission to attend the Transport 
Workers International.
On August 2nd I learned the true position of Freeman. He had 
turned up in 1920 in time for the 2nd Congress and stated that he
and all. T h e  m ost im portant person killed  was F. A. Sergeiv (Artem), a leading  
Bolshevik w ho had spent several years in ex ile  in  Australia. A lthough there is 
little d irect evidence (it is striking that Earsman does not m ention him ), circum ­
stantia lly  there seems to be a strong link betw een Sergeiv and the ASP of which  
he had been a m ember for five years.
2' Some, if not all. trade union representatives: Casey, probably W . (B ill) Casey 
o f the Seam en's U nion.
22 It is d oubtfu l if  Sm ith was actually a CPA m em ber.
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had come to represent the IWW of Australia. I denounced this 
and stated this was an absolute falsehood because the IWW had 
died in 1917. After the 2nd Congress he worried several of the 
Russian party officials for recognition but he was refused because 
he belonged to no party which claimed to be Communist. His next 
move was to turn to the Red Trade Unions and persuaded them 
to give him money to return to Australia so as he might act as their 
agent to invite the workers of this country to send one or two 
delegates to the Congress at Moscow. He had no special credentials 
but simply had to try to get a couple of delegates for the Red Trade 
Union International. He had no authority whatever to invite as 
many delegates as possible and that all their expenses would be 
paid. His real reason for coming to Australia was that he might 
join one of the parties there and by that means he would be able 
to join to the Russian CP.2:i
On August 3rd I interviewed the Small Bureau and they agreed 
that they would have our affairs dealt with as soon as possible. At 
that meeting I was requested to remain in Russia. I then placed 
my position before them and the mission that I had come for and 
asked them to decide what I should do. If I thought I should then 
I would be quite prepared to do so. After hearing what I had to 
say they decided that I should have a free hand and I decided to 
return.
On August 4th the Small Bureau informed me that a sub- 
Commission had been appointed to deal with the preliminaries of 
our affair and that the meeting would take place the next day.
Comrades Lamb, Rees, Smith and myself attended and Comrade 
Borodean24 opened the meeting by stating that it was a preliminary 
meeting to find out the cause of the trouble. I put up Comrade 
Smith to tell our story believing that it would be better for me to 
sit back and watch. Comrade Smith carried out this work very 
well. Lamb stated that he had very little to say because he did not 
know all the facts but had always believed that the ASP were affili­
ated. Rees followed and stated that he was not concerned about 
any of the bickering but that he was prepared to assist in any way 
that would bring about unity. Comrade Borodean then asked if 
there were any fundamental differences. To this I replied and there 
were serious differences in the fact that the ASP did not carry out 
the principles of the 3rd and were actually opposed to the theory of 
the mass party. In reality they were a sect who surrounded them­
23 Freeman's acceptability  in  M oscow and h is m ission to A ustralia in 1920-21 
was probably underw ritten  by Sergeiv.
24 Borodin, a prom inent Com intern official w ho is m ost fam ous for his work 
in  China.
selves with a halo arising from the Marxian platitudes which they 
give lip service to.
Comrade Borodean then moved the following resolution: “In 
view of the fact that there is no difference in principles, program or 
tactics, except differences arising out of local troubles this meeting 
today proposes to the Commission of the Small Bureau to recom­
mend an immediate unity of the two parties to take effect before the 
end of January 1922. This unity to take place at a general conference 
representing the two parties:”25 Smith and myself opposed this 
resolution and stated that we were out for the recognition of one 
party and that the other party should be compelled to join it. 
This the Commission refused to entertain. Lamb stated that he 
had no instructions therefore was not in a position to act. Rees stated 
that the resolution suited him, then Smith and myself withdrew 
our opposition and accepted the resolution which was carried by 3-1 
Lamb voting against.
The next resolution was: “In order to facilitate the business of 
unity in Australia the two delegations agree to unite and to submit 
to the Small Bureau of the Executive Committee the following 
requests on: Communications, Literature, Unity with Britain, Rep­
resentation and Finance.”
This was carried unanimously and it was agreed that we meet on 
August 5th to draft our requests.
On August 5th Comrades Lamb, Rees, Smith and myself met 
with the object of completing our task. We had a general talk for 
some time in which Lamb informed us that he would not do any­
thing because he had always been of the opinion that the ASP were 
affiliated and now they were receiving no consideration. The 
first question was representation at the Unity Conference. In this 
matter I insisted on equal representation. Smith, Rees and myself 
agreed to this, Lamb refusing to do anything. Communications 
and Literature we decided to fix up later. Next it was decided to 
ask £ 5 0 0  for unity expenses. I was opposed to this but Lamb moved 
it so I agreed. This finished our business and it was agreed that 
I should draft the resolutions and submit them to the Small Bureau, 
along with a minority report from Lamb.
This is the draft of Lamb’s report: “That the parties in Australia 
draft the scheme for unity, and they failing to agree that the Comin­
tern scheme be put into operation.” signed Lamb.
-3 A lthough Earsman opposed B orodin’s resolution , the CPA on his return  
accepted the Com intern directive on unity and a conference held  in  February 
1922 formed the U nited  C om m unist Party w hich was notew orthy for the 
acceptance o f  the Industrial U nion Propaganda League as an affiliated body. 
T h e ASP, how ever, refused to participate.
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These discussions were very bitter between Smith and Lamb but 
Rees and I got on very well together.
I submitted our proposals to the Secretary of the Small Bureau 
the same afternoon. Late that evening I received a telephone 
message from the Small Bureau requesting me to attend a meeting 
at once. I did so and was asked to give the reasons for our proposals. 
After hearing me they decided that they could not accept them 
especially on the representation proposal. They believed that by 
the experience they had had in England, America and other countries 
that if they accepted our suggestions that only failure would be 
the result. The Small Bureau then drew up suggestions and requested 
me to place them before my other Comrades. See copy of official 
letter attached. The financial question was then sent along to  the 
finance committee.
On August 6th I called a meeting of the others and informed 
them of what had taken place and laid before them the proposals 
of the Small Bureau for confirmation.
All Comrades Lamb, Rees, Smith and myself signed the proposals 
as drawn up and the same day I returned them to the Small Bureau 
for confirmation. I might mention here that it was also decided 
that in all future conferences the representation from Australia 
should be 3 delegates from the CP and 1 for the Red Trade Union.
At this time the famine26 was beginning to make itself felt and we 
all had to lend what aid we could by doing the necessary propaganda 
work. I was also requested to think about remaining in Russia for 
some little time but this I thought was unfair to the movement 
here. I therefore placed the matter before the S.M. and requested 
them to decide. They decided that I should have a free hand and 
I thought it was better to return as soon as possible.
I then turned my attention to the RTUI to see what had to be done 
there. The first thing was the procuring of money to carry on the 
propaganda work. This was difficult because all monies were being 
used to assist in the famine area. I agreed that Comrade Howie 
should be the representative of the RTUI in Australia and that I 
would act as advisor. The sum of £ 2 2 0  was made available for 
that purpose.
My business being completed I made the necessary arrangements 
for my return. Before leaving I was given a Commission to carry 
out in Germany which required my attendance at this party’s con­
ference. I may say that I was successful in the commission which I 
was given.
26 Follow ing the end  of the civil war, there was a severe fam ine in  Russia 
in  1921.
I arrived in Berlin on the 22nd of August and the next day travel­
led to Jena to attend the Germany party congress.
On September 2nd I left Germany for London arriving there on 
September 3rd. On reporting to the party in London I was informed 
that Lamb had been arrested on his arrival and been put through 
the third degree for two days by about 40 detectives. He had some 
very suspicious documents in his possession and one in particular 
which was in Rees’ hand writing. After he had sailed Comrade 
McManus27 brought me a bundle of letters addressed to Lamb but 
I refused to touch them.
The party then decided to open those letters. On this being done 
the reason for Lamb’s arrest was not hard to find. One of the letters 
from Broken Hill was stating the number of rifles etc. that they had 
been able to procure, along with a lot more rubbish of that kind. 
The contents of those letters was enough to hang him let alone being 
arrested.
After this it was decided that I should keep out of the way for 
awhile until such time as this might blow over. Later I did propa­
ganda work in most of the main industrial centres. '
Then I met Rees and because of the developments we decided 
that we would destroy all official documents.
The rest of my time was fully taken up in doing party work. 
I made all arrangements for all papers and literature to be sent here 
from the different countries I was in. I sailed from England on 
the 21st of October. While in South Africa I met the leaders of 
the party there and arranged for all exchanges.
I have only one recommendation to make and that is that in 
future that no one should be allowed to leave for Russia on workers 
business unless they are members of the party. I worked with 
Comrade Howie a good deal but there was business that I could 
not consult him on and it was often difficult for me to get him 
passed through.
I am glad to be home again though the journey was rough the 
experience has been of great service to me. I now place myself in 
the hands of the party to act and work as they think fit for me to do.
M cM anus, a prom inent founder of the C om m unist Party o f  Great Britain.
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Richard Dixon
Industrial Policy in the 30s
THE DECADE 1930-40 was a very significant and creative period 
for the Communist Party of Australia. During these years our 
influence among the working people grew rapidly, and the political 
consolidation of the Party, of its political line, tactics and organisa­
tion took place. The Communist Party had been founded, October 
30, 1920, in the aftermath of the socialist revolution in Russia and 
the creation of the Communist International. But for the next ten 
years the Party was unable to consolidate its position, overcome 
internal differences and provide answers to the many political prob­
lems before it.
Reformism, which permeated the whole of the Labor movement, 
Labor Party, trade unions and Left alike, was a powerful barrier 
to revolutionary advance. It exercised a strong, muting influence 
on the radicalism that spread among the working people following 
the Russian revolution and the conclusion of the First World War, 
when it strove to divert support for socialism into safe Labor 
Party channels. Socialist organisation that had preceded the Com­
munist Party —  the Australian Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor 
Party, Industrial Workers of the World, etc., had never succeeded 
in breaking through the reformist barrier and winning mass support. 
They remained small sectarian organisations largely removed from 
the main stream of political struggle and the life of the people.
For the newly founded Communist Party, therefore, clarification 
of the role of the revolutionary Marxist party in the struggle against 
capitalism, together with an elaboration of the theoretical, tactical 
and organisational approach of the Party to the Labor Party and
Richard D ixon  is President o f the C om m unist Party o f  Australia, and a 
m ember of the E ditorial Board o f A L R .
19
reformist trade union movement, was of crucial importance. 
Some Party members could see no future for the Communist Party 
and proposed that it should disband and call upon its members to 
join the Labor Party in order to strengthen Labor’s Left Wing. 
Others saw the Party as something of a ‘ginger up’ group that 
by its criticisms and activities impelled the Labor Party to more 
militant policies.
The differences within the Party on these issues became very 
acute in 1929, when the downturn in the economic situation began 
and the class struggle sharpened. The Conference of the Communist 
Party held at the end of 1929 declared against subordination of the 
Party to the Labor Party. It called for an independent Communist 
party and for vigorous measures to improve the work and leadership 
of the Party in the struggles of the people, and it elected a new 
Central Committee to implement these decisions. The changes that 
came over the Party during the 1930s can be shown in one aspect 
by membership figures. At the beginning of 1930 there were about 
300 Party members, by 1934 just on 3,000, and in 1939, 5,000. The 
first big move forward came during the economic crisis 1930-33, 
which brought into the forefront the main contradictions and worst 
features of the capitalist system.
The economic crisis was a shattering experience, the number of 
unemployed exceeding one-third of the workforce, with great num­
bers working only three or four days a week. The extent and 
degree of poverty in Australia was without parallel. The crisis 
succeeded, in a way that no propaganda of ours could have done, 
in exposing the sham and illusions of parliamentary politics and 
the bankruptcy of the policies of the Conservative and Labor 
parties. In those pre-Keynesian days, banks, economists and con­
servative governments alike had only one answer to economic crises
—  slashing government expenditures, closing down public works 
and reducing wages, salaries and social services. Such measures 
simply compounded the chaos.
Initially the people, in landslide proportions, turned to the Labor 
Party. A t the Federal Elections in November, 1929, the Scullin 
Labor Government was elected with a record majority, and in quick 
time Labor Governments were formed in Victoria, New South 
Wales and South Australia. Labor, however, had no answer to the 
crisis. Their policy was not to end capitalism, but to obtain reforms 
that made it more palatable. With the economic system in a state 
of collapse it was now not a matter of improvement of capitalism 
by reform, but of saving it. The Scullin Government turned its back 
on Labor policy, which had been to develop public works and to
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finance a variety of other Government activities with the aim of 
relieving unemployment. Instead of this, responsibility for economic 
policy was virtually handed over to a group of bankers and bourgeois 
economists who dictated recessive policies which increased the 
burdens of the working people.
New South Wales Premier, J. T. Lang, took up a different stand 
from that of his Federal Labor colleagues. The economic crisis, in 
his view, was not the product of contradictions within the capitalist 
system, but the result of a conspiracy of international bankers, who, 
for some obscure reason, had brought the capitalist system to a 
standstill. Lang waged an incessant campaign against international 
finance. He attacked the Scullin Government and split the Labor 
Party, breaking the New South Wales branch away from the Federal 
organisation. In terms of actual policy he advocated negotiations 
for the reduction of overseas interest payments and, failing agree­
ment, the suspension of all payments until overseas bondholders 
agreed to reduce. He also made vague proposals that the national 
currency, instead of being based on gold, should have a goods basis.
Disillusionment of the working people with Labor was rapid, as 
the bankruptcy of its policy and leadership became apparent. Before 
1932 was out the backlash came, and each of the Labor Govern­
ments were defeated and removed from office. Except for New 
South Wales, where Lang’s demagogic attacks against international 
finance continued to influence large sections of workers, Labor 
was heavily discredited and at its lowest ebb.
From the inception of the crisis the Communist Party set out 
to explain the capitalist crisis and popularise socialism. We worked 
for the establishment of the unemployed workers’ movement, based 
on committees of the unemployed in all suburbs and towns, comr 
mittees which became very popular. They took up the struggle for 
the demands of the unemployed and developed a great variety of 
activities, including cultural and educational work. They were 
democratically controlled by the unemployed themselves and many 
talented organisers and leaders were thrown up by them.
The Communist Party was also in the thick of many other 
activities. The struggles against evictions; campaigns to increase 
the dole and for Government relief works to provide jobs for the 
unemployed; demonstrations, and the hunger marches from the 
Northern coalfields, Newcastle, the South Coast and Lithgow, to 
press the claims of the unemployed; the organisation of legal 
defence and assistance for thousands of workers, arrested and gaoled 
or beaten up by police. The Party also had to defend its legality 
and combat constant police repression against our meetings and
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members, and the organisation of workers’ defence was initiated 
to fight against the New Guard.
These struggles and activities provided rich experiences for the 
Communist Party and was the basis for its rapid numerical growth 
and political development. Thousands joined the Party during those 
years, but we lacked the organisation and the experienced political 
activists to properly initiate them into the Party and consolidate 
their membership. Nevertheless, by 1934 membership had increased 
ten times over and a large proportion of these were already mass 
leaders who had won the support and confidence of men and 
women they worked amongst in the movement and struggles of the 
unemployed. The days of the small socialist sect now were behind 
us. We had broken down the barriers of isolation and had won 
widespread support.
Our relationship to the Labor Party also had changed. There 
were no longer suggestions that our aims could be realised only as 
a Left Wing of the Labor Party, or that our role was that of a 
‘ginger group’. We had decisively differentiated the Party from the 
Labor Party; some think too decisively, reformism having become 
almost a dirty word. But the political independence and revolution­
ary role of the Communist Party was now something more than a 
name —  it was recognised and seen as a fact.
The Party was growing and learning, but, naturally enough, 
there were many mistakes. Here I will only refer, in brief, to mis­
takes in propaganda. The situation we were faced with called for 
vigorous exposure of reformism, and this was certainly forth­
coming. There were common mistakes such as failure to distinguish 
between the rank-and-file and supporters of the Labor Party and 
reformist leaders; personal abuse instead of concrete examples and 
analysis of reformist decisions and activities directed against the 
working people; neglect of fundamental political and class issues 
and too much attention to trivialities, etc. If not entirely, these 
mistakes were associated with the immaturity and inexperience of 
Party members.
More serious was our characterisation of the reformist leaders 
as ‘social fascists’. This term had its origin in the Comintern at a 
time when the fight against fascism and war was already high on 
the agenda. It entered into our propaganda without proper con­
sideration of its political implications and therefore its effect on 
our tactics and mass work. The term ‘social fascism’ incorrectly 
characterised the reformist leaders, directly linking them with 
fascism. It was to confuse our political estimation of the Labor 
Party and its possible positive role in the struggles against fascism
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and war, and therefore complicated the problem of the united 
front.
After the Depression
The second phase of Party development in the 1930s began about 
the second half of 1933, as the economic crisis began to recede 
and more jobs became available. The economy remained unstable 
and the rate of recovery was slow; at the end of 1936 there were still 
112,000 unemployed in New South Wales alone. But conditions 
were changing and new problems and tasks were arising.
A  most important indicator of these came in January, 1934, 
when W. Orr, member of the Central Committee of the Com­
munist Party, was elected General Secretary of the Miners’ Federa­
tion. Bill Orr came to Australia from Scotland soon after the First 
World War. He worked for a short time in the Lithgow Steel 
Works and then transferred to coal mining. During the 15 months 
(March, 1929, to June, 1930) lockout of the Northern miners, 
following the coal owners’ demand for a 12i per cent wage reduc­
tion which the miners refused to accept, Orr had campaigned on 
Party policy and won considerable support for an ‘all out’ stoppage 
in the coal industry to compel withdrawal of the coal-owners’ 
ultimatum. The policy of the reformist officials, to confine the 
dispute to the Northern fields, was to lead to defeat for the miners 
because sufficient coal for all national needs was produced in the 
other coalfields.
The election of Orr as Miners’ General Secretary was not a 
fortuitous event. In September, 1934, another Communist, C. 
Nelson, was elected General President. From then on the swing 
to the Left was rapid. Seamen, waterside workers, iron workers, 
railway workers, sheet metal, building workers and various groups 
of unionists elected Communists and other militants to trade union 
positions. By the beginning of 1937 there were more than 20 Com­
munist trade union officials and upwards of 1,000 Communists hold­
ing executive or local union positions throughout Australia.
The radicalism that was a feature of the unemployed movement 
was manifesting itself in the industries and a new militant spirit 
was evident among the industrial workers. The old reformist trade 
union leadership was discredited, having played a capitulatory and 
defeatist role in the big strikes of 1928-29-30, when the capitalist 
offensive on living standards that presaged the economic crisis was 
in full swing. They gave no leadership during the economic crisis 
and were incapable of responding to the tasks of the trade unions 
in the new conditions that arose as the economic crisis receded.
W. Orr’s election as Miners’ Secretary was the starting point of 
a new trend that was to radically influence and change the Aus­
tralian trade union movement. Reformist trade union domination 
could no longer be maintained in face of the militancy of the workers 
and the challenge implicit in the revolutionary ideas, trade union 
tactics and activities of the Communists and their supporters. For 
the Communist Party the changes in the trade union movement 
compelled re-examination of established policies and ideas, the 
scrapping of some and readjusting of others; but, most importantly, 
the working out and elaboration of revolutionary tactics as distinct 
from those of reformism.
Tactical and organisational ideas of the Comintern, which were 
largely based upon European experiences, had proved very helpful 
in developing the unemployed workers’ movement which had its 
beginnings in 1930, but it was a different matter in the trade 
unions. Here, while the general Marxist principles and approach 
were valid, and the European experiences were important, it was 
essential to develop tactical and organisational methods suited to 
the conditions in Australia, where reformist domination was firmly 
established and traditions of craft unionism were strong.
In 1928 the Militant Minority Movement had been established, 
following the example of the trade union Left in Britain. It made 
very little progress until 1930, when MMM organisation was 
established in the mining industry and groups were formed in 
various other industries. With those developments the MMM be­
came the main organising centre for the Left in the trade unions. 
However, the question arose even in the early stages: was the 
objective of the Left simply a minority movement? Success in the 
Miners’ Union elections quickly disposed of this issue, making it 
clear that the Left should strive to win the support of the majority.
Originally, the concept of the MMM was that it should become 
an alternative revolutionary trade union centre and movement as 
opposed to that of the reformists. (In Europe the trade union 
movement had divided and revolutionary trade unions existed side 
by side with reformist unions). While accepting the fact that there 
were fundamental differences between revolutionary and reformist 
trade union policies and tactics, the Party reached the conclusion 
that the perspective for the Left in this country should not be a 
divided, but an organisationally united trade union movement, and 
this meant that the revolutionary forces should direct their efforts 
toward maintaining and strengthening national trade union unity, 
while working within the reformist trade union structure to win the 
support of the workers and, thereby, to transform the unions. With
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this idea as our starting point there was obviously little future for 
the MMM as an alternative trade union centre, and its phasing out 
began. More importantly, however, this approach opened up new 
perspectives for developing the .united front.
We had also to consider whether the revolutionary movement 
could be content simply with militant trade unionism, as the name 
Militant Minority Movement seemed to imply. Miners, shearers and 
other sections of workers waged militant economic struggles, but 
politically they supported reformism. The workers live and work in 
an atmosphere polluted by the anti-socialist ideas of the capitalist 
class, ideas which reformism reinforces. Marx and Lenin had 
stressed the need for the trade unions to have a revolutionary out­
look and objective. They showed that economic struggles give rise 
to trade union consciousness, but not to socialist consciousness, 
and that this latter has to be brought into the working-class move­
ment. The question we had to find the answer to in our trade union 
work was: how to raise the understanding of the workers from the 
level of trade union consciousness up to the level of socialist 
consciousness. This is a recurring problem for the Party and has 
to be re-examined at every stage of development. It occupies a 
central place in the present Party debate when we are faced with a 
widening gap between the growth, breadth and intensity of the 
economic struggles and the development of socialist understanding 
among the workers.
The emphasis in our approach to this problem in the 1930s was 
to raise and discuss, from a class and socialist standpoint, the 
political issues that inevitably arose in the course of industrial 
disputes and trade union activities. The then current phrase for 
this approach was ‘to politicalise’ the struggles of the workers. The 
reformists tried to keep politics, or rather class politics, out of the 
union activities. The fact that Communists discussed the issues that 
concerned the workers from a class political standpoint was very 
advantageous for the Left. The large army of unemployed, strike 
breaking, the open line-up of employers, government, state forces 
and arbitration courts against the workers, as well as questions of 
fascism and war, provided facts and arguments for expounding 
political and socialist ideas.
In the mining industry an unrelenting series of guerrilla strikes 
were being waged by the miners against the coal owners, but they 
added little or nothing to the political development of the mine- 
workers. The problem of strike tactics and organisation had to be 
tackled immediately by the Communists in the Federation. Prior 
to 1934 the Party had urged the setting up of ‘independent leader­
ship’ of strikes and other forms of struggle by workers in industry
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or unemployed. One of our objectives was to prevent the reformist 
leaders from gaining control, since they had been largely respon­
sible for the serious defeats suffered by the unions in the 1928-30 
strikes. During the economic crisis they spread defeatist moods 
among the workers, discouraged strikes and constantly tried to 
divert industrial disputes into arbitration channels. However, with 
Communists in the leadership of a union, it was patently absurd 
to exclude them from participating in strike leadership, so tactical 
changes became necessary.
The positive feature of ‘independent leadership’ was that the 
control and conduct of strikes struggles resided with the workers 
engaged in them. The aim was to seek the democratic participation 
of all those involved, in mass activities and in the direction of the 
struggles. This form of strike organisation ran into difficulties in 
the industries, where the reformist trade union officials opposed it, 
but it proved eminently successful among the unemployed. With 
the election of communist trade union leaders, although the prin­
ciple of ‘independent leadership’ had to be modified, it was essential 
to continue to press for mass participation in the conduct and 
control of strikes.
Very shortly after Orr’s election as General Secretary of the 
Miners’ Federation a strike broke out in a government-owned mine 
in the small mining centre of Wonthaggi, Victoria. The miners had 
been resisting moves to reduce their wages and worsen working 
conditions, when the mine management dismissed a number of 
workers precipitating an all-out stoppage. The strike lasted for 
about five months before the miners were successful in achieving 
their demands. The most important feature of this strike was the 
mass involvement of the workers in the activities and conduct of 
the struggle and the organisation that was thrown up. The union 
Board of Management was widened to include active strikers and 
this body was responsible to the members for organisation and 
leadership of the strike. Various committees were set up for 
picketing, propaganda, organisation and relief, etc. Speakers were 
developed and sent throughout Victoria and interstate; others were 
detailed for rabbit trapping, fishing, collecting vegetables, boot 
repairing, hairdressing and a variety of other activities. General 
publicity explaining the miners’ case issued by the Federal Officers 
and the Wonthaggi strike leadership was outstanding, and public 
sympathy for the strike grew. It was estimated that more than 450 
workers were active in the strike. Women were also involved and 
a Miners Women’s Auxiliary was formed.
The Wonthaggi strike, although it involved only a few hundred 
workers, was a new experience for the trade union movement. The
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strike activity built up the confidence and unity of the miners in 
Wonthaggi and throughout the Federation. For the Left in the 
trade unions the strike was an invaluable experience and set the 
pattern for strike organisation and tactics. Politically the results 
were also excellent, and socialist understanding among the workers 
increased. This was reflected in the growth of the Communist Party 
and the establishment of a strong Party branch in Wonthaggi.
From 1933 onwards the pressures for uniting the working class 
for the struggle against capitalism increased, influenced by both 
international and national processes. Internationally, in Germany 
which had the most advanced Labor movement in Western Europe, 
the working class had failed to unite to fight against Fascism and 
Hitler had taken power. The German Social Democratic Party had 
contributed to the Nazi victory by its support for the capitalist 
democratic regime, by its policy of compromise with the monopolies, 
its support for measures to stabilise capitalism during the economic 
crisis, and its opposition to a working-class united front against 
Fascism. The German Communist Party also made serious mis­
takes. It underestimated the Fascist danger and held the view that 
Germany was not Italy, and that the German working class could 
contain and defeat Fascism. It pursued a sectarian policy toward 
social democracy and was unable to draw Social Democratic 
workers into a common battle against Hitler.
Having taken over political power Hitler proceeded to uproot 
and destroy both the Communist and Social Democratic parties and 
the trade union movement. As the facts of the terrible disaster that 
had overwhelmed the German Labor movement became known the 
search for reasons and for measures to prevent a repetition of such 
a defeat was undertaken. In 1934 the French working people, faced 
with the imminent danger of a Fascist seizure of power, responded 
to the call for unity against Fascism. The Paris working class took 
over the streets of the city in mighty demonstrations with the 
Communist and Socialist Party leaders at their head and working- 
class unity was forged. The road to Fascism was barred and the 
French people’s front arose.
The international experiences gave a new emphasis on the need 
for working-class unity. Here in Australia the Communist Party 
gave close attention to the experiences and discussions in Europe, 
and there were internal developments which strengthened the trend 
towards unity. Unemployed workers returning to industry carried 
with them their experiences of united action. In the mining industry 
the successes resulting from united action by the workers, and the 
effectiveness of the tactics and leadership given by the Communist
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officials, made a big impact on district officers. Most of these 
swung over to support the new leadership, as did many lodge 
officers. The same processes developed in other unions where 
Communists succeeded to leadership. These developments demon­
strated the possibilities of trade union unity and the importance 
of correct methods of work with reformist officials in the unions.
Events were also shaping in such a way as to improve the 
possibilities of unity in action with the Labor Party. Lang had 
split the Labor Party in 1931 and in NSW had carried the over­
whelming majority of Labor Party members and supporters with 
him, Federal Labor being nearly wiped out. Politically Lang be­
longed to the extreme Right-wing of the Labor Party, although 
this was not apparent to his supporters in 1930-32. At the State 
Election in 1932 Lang was defeated and from then on his position 
began to weaken. The victory of Orr and Nelson in the Miners’ 
Federation and the trend to the Left in other unions was a clear 
indication of this. But Lang needed the support of the reformist 
trade union leaders —  the unions having provided most of the 
lunds for the Labor Daily Newspaper, which Lang had gained 
control of. with the Miners' Federation holding the biggest parcel 
of shares.
To maintain his hold over the Labor movement and the Labor 
Party machine Lang set out to consolidate his position in the 
Labor Daily and to get control of the Labor Council’s radio station 
2KY. Defeat of Orr and Nelson and the election of Lang sup­
porters to the main official positions in the Miners’ Federation was 
crucial if these plans were to succeed, and Lang set out to encom­
pass this. Intervening in the Miners’ Federation elections at the 
end of 1934 he addressed a series of public meetings in the coal­
fields and made emotional appeals to the miners to ‘treat the Com­
munists as enemies of the Labor movement’ and to reject Orr and 
Nelson. If there is a likelihood of any union electing members 
of the Communist Party to a controlling position in that union,” 
Lang said, it is my bounden duty, as the Labor leader in this 
State, to urge the rejection of the members of the Communist 
Party."
Things did not turn out as Lang expected, and Orr and Nelson 
were re-elected with big majorities. For the General Secretary’s 
position Orr received 7,515 votes, Logan (Lang Labor) 2,919,- 
Teece (former General Secretary) 2,446. The figures for Nelson 
were about the same. The writing was on the wall for J. T. Lang. 
His influence and that of his Right-wing supporters had declined, 
while support for the Left was growing.
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The implications of the miners’ election was not lost on the 
reformist trade union officials, as events were to show. Following 
his rejection by the miners Lang moved quickly through supporters 
on the Labor Council to try to get control of radio station 2KY. 
Apart from its value as a publicity medium, 2KY was very profit­
able and as such a substantial source of the finances under the 
control of the Labor Council officers, who saw their incomes 
menaced if Lang succeeded. Although formerly they had been 
ardent Lang supporters, these officials, together with the Left, 
succeeded in rallying a majority of unions to defeat the take-ovei; 
bid. The revolt against Lang’s leadership had now extended to 
reformist trade union executives, decisively weakening his position 
in the trade union movement.
Lang had used the Labor Daily to viciously attack the miners’ 
leaders and the union’s policy in the Federation Elections, and he 
was equally ruthless against the reformist officials in the 2KY 
battle. It is understandable therefore that the unions, with the 
Miners’ Federation playing an important role, now took measures 
to restore their control over Labor Daily. After a long struggle 
they succeeded, only to find that the paper, when returned to them, 
was so encumbered with debts that it was beyond the means of the 
unions to continue with its publication for more than a few months.
This brief outline of events illustrates the rapid process of dif­
ferentiation, of rejection of the Right-wing forces around Lang, 
that was going on among the workers andl also in trade union 
leaderships. Consultation and co-operation between the Com­
munists in the trade unions and the reformist union leaders who 
opposed Lang was developed. These started with the Labor Daily 
and 2KY struggles, but as the trend of the workers was to the Left, 
the reformist leaders also adopted a more radical position on other 
issues before the trade unions, such as on the handling of strikes, 
defence of democratic rights which was important because of a 
threat to the legality of the Communist Party as well as other 
infringements of the liberties of the workers, and also in the struggle 
against the danger of war.
The co-operation that had developed in NSW extended to other 
States as well. The union movement as a whole benefited and more 
militant policies and demands were adopted. The 1937 Congress 
of the Australian Council of Trade Unions came out in favour of a 
shorter working week, increased wages and improved working con­
ditions. It declared for a foreign policy of peace based upon a 
system of collective security and denounced Fascist aggression. 
The Labor Councils and State Trade Union Movement supported
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these decisions. In the industries unity in action was developing, 
and the shop committee movement was attracting more and more 
support.
In 1930 the Party had launched a campaign for shop and job 
committees, as organs of ‘independent leadership’ of the workers’ 
struggles, and committees were formed in the power and some other 
industries. Employers strenuously opposed shop committees, regard­
ing them as a threat to their authority in industry and to their 
unfettered control over production, and refused to recognise them. 
Likewise, the reformist trade union leaders, who saw the shop 
committees as a challenge to their union positions and as organising 
centres of work stoppages over which they would have little or no 
control.
When the situation in the trade union movement changed fol­
lowing the election of Communists to trade union positions, especi­
ally in the metal and rail industries where job organisation was 
developing, we re-examined our ideas on the role of the shop 
committees and their relationship with the unions. Because of the 
craft nature of the trade union movement in Australia the workers 
in any particular workshop, practically without • exception, were 
divided between as many as five, ten or more unions. We advanced 
the view that the main task of the shop committees was to unite 
the workers on the job, irrespective of the craft union they belonged 
to. The shop committees were not the organisations of one par­
ticular union (they could be this only if there was one union in the 
industry), but had responsibility to the unions as a whole. It was 
to the advantage of the workers, therefore, for the shop committees 
and unions to cooperate and work together instead of acting in­
dependently of each other.
The Party also raised the need for bringing union organisation 
into line with changes in industry which were undermining the 
craft basis of unionism. We urged consideration of the need for 
industrial unionism, in the event of which the shop committee 
would become an important part of the industrial union structure. 
The shop committee was to be responsible to all workers in a 
particular plant, and this feature of the shop committee, in our 
view, made it an admirable form of organisation to develop activities 
for workers’ control over production, an issue raised by the Comin­
tern. Unions were not in the same position to do this, because each 
union covered only a section of the workers on a particular job. 
The responsibility of the trade union was to extend the authority 
and the right of workers across industry as a whole, but in each 
workshop the shop committee had to contest the rights and authority
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assumed by the employer, fight to improve the conditions of the 
workers, and also to extend their rights and develop their control 
over production.
There were some exaggerated ideas about the shop committees
—  that they were ‘embryonic Soviets’ for example —  but this was 
jumping ahead of things. It implied the victory of the socialist 
revolution and the taking over of the capitalist enterprises by the 
working class in the name of all the people. In our conditions, 
under capitalism, the controls over production imposed by the 
workers through the shop committees were directed towards en­
forcing the right of the workers to be consulted about all changes 
in production, to protection from mass dismissals, victimisation, 
speed up and other methods of worsening conditions in order to 
swell employers’ profits.
By the end of 1937 the shape of the changes taking place in the 
trade union movement had emerged. The three trends outlined 
above —  the radicalisation taking place among the workers, the 
co-operation of the left in the trade union movement with a 
section of reformist leaders and the growth of the shop committee 
movement —  were major factors in the change. The conjunction 
of these trends contributed significantly to the growth of unity 
and struggle among the workers and to strengthening the trade 
union movement as a whole.
In August, 1935, the 7th World Congress of the Communist 
International took place, at which G. Dimitrov delivered his historic 
report on working-class unity and the struggle against war and 
Fascism. On the basis of the Australian experiences we had reached 
conclusions on unity in action and ways of achieving it, especially 
in the industries and unions, that drove home the importance of 
Dimitrov’s report. The theoretical and tactical ideas he advanced 
concerning the united front and the creation of a people’s front in, 
the fight against war and fascism, and the need, to search for 
transitional forms of approach to the socialist revolution, opened 
up wider perspectives and gave added meaning to our work for 
building working-class unity.
In 1936 the menace Fascism increased and was given new 
emphasis with the Spanish Civil War; the Second World War was 
approaching. In the trade unions and industries anti-Communist 
organisation was being developed that later was to  provide the 
basis for the industrial groups. These developments meant new 
problems and new tasks, which we were better able to handle at 
the time because of the growth, ideologically and organisationally, 
of the Communist Party and of the Left as a whole.
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Lloyd Churchward
An Early Alliance of the Left
TH E STATE LABOR PARTY (1940-1944) is seldom remembered 
these days. It gets only a passing reference in James Jupp1, while 
Alistair Davidson in his recent history of the Communist Party 
of Australia seems to regard it as little more than a convenient 
legal party for under-cover Communists*. A t a time when the 
CPA is actively seeking closer cooperation and alliance with 
various Left elements it is worth examining this earlier alliance 
more carefully. The following pages represent a brief and somewhat 
personal account of this story. I write it this way because my own 
political biography is a part of the story and because to tell it as a 
participant is perhaps better than to write it as an academic 
exercise.
The immediate origins of the State Labor Party —  or to give it 
its formal title of those days, the Australian Labor Party (State 
of NSW) —  was the ‘Hands off Russia’ Resolution which was 
passed at the Easter Conference of the Labor Party in March,
'•0^9]UeS Australian Party Poli tics , M elbourne University Press, 1964, pp.
2 A lastair D avidson, T h e  Com m unist  Party  o f  Australia ,  H oover In stitu te Press 
C aliforn ia, 1969, pp.78-81.
I .lo \d  Churchward is a reader in Political Science at M elbourne University.
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19403. This resolution, which expressed the determination of the 
Australian Left to oppose the switching of the war from Germany 
to the Soviet Union, brought about the intervention of the Federal 
Executive of the ALP into the affairs of the NSW Branch. On 
April 11, 1940, the NSW State Executive was forced to expunge 
the ‘Hands off Russia’ Resolution. However, the matter did not 
rest there. On June 15 the Communist Party was declared illegal. 
On June 18 a Special Federal Conference of the ALP adopted a 
new war and defence policy which offered cooperation with the 
Menzies Government in a national War Council. Consistent with 
this new policy the Parliamentary Labor Party voted for the 
Emergency Powers Bill brought down by the Menzies Government. 
Only four members of the Parliamentary Labor Party (E. J. Ward, 
Maurice Blackburn, Reg Pollard and Dr. Maloney) voted against 
this measure. For this act of defiance they were congratulated 
by the NSW Executive. This action riled the conservative Labor 
forces so much that they induced a second intervention of the 
Federal Executive. This time the State Executive was suspended. 
A majority of the Executive, including J. R. Hughes, W. P. Evans, 
W. Booth, A. Wilson, W. E. Gollan, E. A. Ross, E. Walsham 
and others, refused to accept dismissal and constituted themselves 
as the A.L.P. (State of New South Wales).
From the outset the SLP opposed the ban on the Communist 
Party and sought to have it repealed. Many Communists joined the 
SLP, participated in its deliberations and activities, and held office 
at all levels from local branch to the Central Executive. But the 
SLP was clearly not functioning as a Communist Party in these 
years. It continued to occupy the traditional office in the Trades 
Hall in Goulburn Street. Its organisation remained that of a Labor 
Party. In addition to having many locality branches, it also had 
some trade union affiliates. It maintained the same electoral 
organisation as the official Labor Party and it concentrated a 
great deal of its activity in the effort to win seats in parliament and 
to influence parliamentary and local council policies. In the 
federal election of September, 1940, the SLP polled over 100,000 
votes (in NSW) and later a sizable vote in the 1941 State election. 
Communists influenced the form of work, policy, party education 
and propaganda activities increasingly throughout 1942 and 1943, 
but they were not the major influence on the party at any stage.
I went to Sydney in January, 1942, to take up a school teaching 
post at Wahroonga. Prior to then I had not been very active 
politically. As a history student at Melbourne University in the
3 In early 1940 there was no fighting on the W estern Front opposite the Ziegfried  
Line but Britain and France were preparing an expeditionary force to  assist 
Finland against the USSR.
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pre-war years I had been stimulated by my study of fascism and 
socialism and by the anti-fascist struggle in Europe (above all 
Spain) to take a progressive stand. I joined the Labor Club in 
1938, during my second year at the University. Over the long 
vacation early in 1938 1 had worked as a fruitpicker in the 
Shepparton district and had witnessed the demonstrations of un­
employed. 1 read the Communist Manifesto for the first time sitting 
on an upturned fruitcase in an Ardmona orchard. In 1941, after 
completing an MA thesis and while doing an Education course, I 
joined the ALP and became a member of the South Carlton Branch. 
When I arrived in Sydney I sought to link up with the ALP, but 
my uncle (the late Dr. C. M. Churchward) was already an active 
member of the SLP and he persuaded me to go first to see Bert 
Chandler, then secretary of the SLP. An hour and a half discussion 
with Bert convinced me that the SLP was more progressive and 
more socialist than the Official Labor Party. Consequently I 
joined the SLP and became a member of the Gordon Branch, the 
chairman of which was W. A. Wood, then editor of the SLP 
newspaper Progress.
Gordon Branch of the SLP was an active branch numbering 
over 30 members. Its meetings were lively and it held regular 
classes on themes such as fascism, socialism and Labor History. 
The branch participated in local as well as national and state 
political campaigns and I quickly gained experience in a fair range 
of political activity. I was a delegate to the SLP Conference in 
April, 1943, and was elected to the Central Executive. I was 
elected to the Education and Political Committee at the first meeting 
of the new Executive on May 14, 1943, along with W. E. Gollan 
and W. A. Wood. Coopted members of this committee included 
Len Fox and George Farwell. I was thus in a key position during 
the crucial year of the United Front between the State Labor Party 
and the CPA.
The CPA was legalised on December 18, 1942. During the period 
of illegality (June, 1940-December, 1942) the CPA increased its 
membership from under 4,000 to over 15,000. It was still growing 
during 1943. The SLP on the other hand was clearly dwindling. 
Although it had over 40 branches and several industrial affiliates 
(mainly miners’ lodges) its membership had dropped to about 
4,500, concentrated mainly in the metropolitan area with some 
outlying branches at places such as Cessnock, Maitland, Lithgow, 
Portland, Gosford and the South Coast. Many members and sup­
porters had gone back to the Official Labor Party after the estab­
lishment of the Curtin Government in October, 1941.
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The situation at the beginning of 1943 was that an Allied victory 
seemed in sight, but the Australian war effort was still somewhat 
handicapped by the fact that the Labor Government was kept in 
office by the grace of two independents (A. Wilson and A. W. 
Coles). Anti-government forces were increasing their attacks and 
were soon to force the Government to resign. Early in 1943 the 
Communist Party proposed a limited united front agreement with 
both the OLP and the SLP. The offer proposed joint action to:
Promote a greater war effort.
Strengthen support for the Curtin Government and ensure 
its return to office with a clear majority.
Promote a strong campaign for a second front in Western 
Europe in order to hasten the defeat of the Axis Powers.
Promote policies of peace and freedom in the post-war 
world.
The OLP rejected the offer, but the SLP accepted it enthusiastic­
ally. A  joint Consultative Committee (four members of each party) 
was appointed to formulate a Joint Action Agreement along the 
lines suggested by the CPA. This agreement was worked out 
swiftly and without friction and it was adopted by the Easter 
Conference of the SLP late in April, 1943. The agreement pro­
vided for joint action by the two parties to:
Carry out propaganda explaining the character of fascism 
and the anti-fascist People’s War.
Achieve a greater war effort.
Unite the Labor Movement behind the Curtin Government, 
to work for its return in the Federal Election and to strengthen 
it by the election of Communist and SL members.
Campaign for unified allied strategy, a second front in 
Western Europe, a solution to the Indian problem, and 
supplies for China.
Combat attempts to weaken Allied Unity.
Support the Social Services Plans of the Curtin Government 
and its proposals for a referendum on federal powers.
The agreement carefully stipulated the forms of cooperation to 
be developed at the executive, federal electorate and local levels 
and contained a number of guarantees for the continuation of the 
separate identities of the two parties. For example, during the
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Federal Election in 1943 the parties operated an exchange of 
preferences agreement and did not stand candidates against each 
other. Joint campaign committees, joint election meetings and 
rallies, were held in several places. Joint central functions included 
the massive rally on June 22 at the Sydney Town Hall, the Novem­
ber Town Hall Ball and the November March and Domain meeting. 
The agreement facilitated the existing cooperation of members of 
both parties in Friendship with Russia work, in War Loan rallies, 
in the campaign for Joint Production Committees in industry, in 
election work, and in many other areas, including the struggle for 
improved treatment of Aboriginals. Notwithstanding the consider­
able effort put into the election campaign, and the extensive use 
of radio and leaflets, neither party secured a seat, although one 
SLP candidate, Sid Conway, polled over 10,000 votes in Cook. The 
only consolation was that both parties had played a major role in 
the devastating defeat of the UAP-CP coalition and in the return of 
the Curtin Labor Government in September, 1943.
The first public proposal to amalgamate the two Left parties 
was made by John Hughes, Vice-President of the SLP, at the 
Central Executive meeting on October 1, 1943. In a realistic report 
to the Executive. Hughes recorded the dwindling, support for the 
party and explained this as due mainly to the removal of the 
original cause for the appearance of the party, the lack of a strong 
anti-fascist foreign policy on the part of the ALP. Since the Curtin 
Government had taken office in October, 1941, the Labor Party 
had changed its foreign policy and consequently the anti-fascist 
Left in Australia had returned to the support of the ALP. Under 
these circumstances only two courses remained open to the SLP
—  to seek re-entry into the Official Labor Party or to merge with 
the CPA. The latter course was preferable, since the CPA had a 
clear socialist objective whereas the ALP did not. Hughes therefore 
recommended that an approach should be made to the CPA to 
sound out the prospects for early amalgamation. If the CPA sup­
ported the proposal the Consultative Committee of the two parties 
was to be entrusted with drafting the amalgamation agreement.
This report resulted in an extended debate. Only one member 
of the Executive (Mr. B. Anderson) opposed the suggestion out­
right, on the grounds that the State Labor Party was a valuable 
‘transition stage’ for disillusioned ALP members since it was less 
extreme than the Communist Party. Such people would join it in 
increased numbers when the OLP began to lose support, but few 
of these would join the CPA. Several members, including myself, 
suggested a more cautious approach to amalgamation with an 
interim period during which the executives of the two parties would 
work closely together, but the parties retain their separate identities.
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However, the merger went through with the utmost speed. The 
Joint Consultative Committee produced a resolution on amalgama­
tion before the end of October. After extensive discussion in the 
branches of the SLP this resolution (with some minor amendments) 
was adopted at a special one-day conference of the SLP on 
November 27. The amalgamation was then ratified by a special 
conference of the CPA on January 15, 1944, and finalised by a 
joint conference of the two parties on January 16.
The Amalgamation Agreement provided for the election of 
members of the SLP to various leading committees of the Com­
munist Party —  five members to the Central Committee, two 
members to the Metropolitan Committee and 15 members to various 
District Party Committees. In this way J. R. Hughes, W. E. Gollan,
H. B. Chandler, A. Wilson and E. A. Ross were elected to the 
Central Committee and June Mills and F. Graham to the Metro­
politan Committee. I was elected along with Ted Walsham to the 
North Sydney District Committee. Individual members of the SLP 
had to seek individual membership of the Communist Party — 
briefly re-named the Australian Communist Party (with which is 
amalgamated the State Labor Party, NSW). This caused no problem 
to most SLP members, of whom perhaps a third were already 
members of the Communist Party1. I joined at the end of January, 
1944. A minority of members of the SLP —  perhaps one in ten — 
found it impossible to join the Communist Party. Such persons 
sometimes rejoined the ALP, but many dropped out of political 
activity entirely. The influx of new members into the Communist 
Party brought a sudden inflation to NSW membership figures, but 
this was temporary. Membership wastage after 1945 soon brought 
it down again.
Three questions are worth raising at the conclusion of this brief 
record. Why was this United Front so successful? W hat impact did 
the former SLP members have on the activities and policies of 
the Communist Party in following years? How relevant is this story 
for the present and future of the party?
The United Front of 1943 was successful for a number of reasons. 
It brought into alliance two parties with broadly similar policies and 
with identical immediate objectives. The war had radicalised the 
SLP (and for that matter other sections of the Labor Party) and 
moderated the policy of the Communist Party so that the two 
parties met easily at a position to the Left of the Official Labor
4 D uring 1942-43 m ost C om m unists w ho were m em bers o f the SLP retained their 
m em bership of both  parties. Some however, w ithdrew  from the SLP w hen they 
joined  th e  CPA. T h is course was follow ed by W . A. W ood late in  1943.
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Party. The care with which the original alliance agreement was 
negotiated and the generosity of the final amalgamation agreement 
produced very friendly relations between the two parties at all 
levels. The overlap in membership, appreciable at the beginning of 
1943 and increasing steadily throughout the year, made cooperation 
between the two parties uncommonly easy®.
Did the SLP group modify Communist Party policy, attitudes 
and activities? It was widely assumed in 1944-45 and in later years 
that it did not. But perhaps this is inaccurate. Have former SLP 
members any different record as members of the Communist Party? 
We do not really know the answer to these questions. For my part 
1 felt I was catapulted into an intermediate leadership position in 
the Communist Party without the benefit of the usual apprentice- 
ship. For many years afterwards I felt that I was not fully a member 
of the Communist Party, but rather someone with one foot in the 
Communist Party and the other still in the Labor Party. I had 
certain reservations about the party’s underlying philosophy and I 
did not easily replace enthusiastic support for the USSR by uncritical 
adulation of it. The process of ‘political recruitment’ into the ranks 
of the Communist Party took three years at least.
I do not think that the record of the 1943 United Front between 
the Communist Party and the SLP has much relevance to the 
present. The conditions in 1943 were quite unlike those of today. 
The alliance was a radical reformist alliance designed to put ginger 
into the ALP. It was in no way a revolutionary alliance. The situa­
tion today calls for an attempt to build up an alliance of Left 
and Revolutionary Forces in the search for a revolutionary strategy 
suited to Australian conditions. On the other hand, the pre-conditions 
of success for a radical alliance are pretty much the same under 
all conditions. These include the existence of considerable overlap 
in policy and the determination to seek out these coincidences and 
to maximise them. It also illustrates the necessity for frank, open, 
sincere relations between the Communist Party and organised groups 
it is seeking to involve in common action. There are always two 
sides to any united action agreement.
On the other hand, m em bers of the industria l affiliates were often  unhappy  
about th e  am algam ation since the Com m unist Party organization d id  not provide 
for un ion  affilia tion . Several prom inent SLP persons (including the President, 
W . Booth and Dr. C. M. Churchward) supported  the am algam ation but were 
u nable to jo in  the C om m unist Party.
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Alec Robertson
C PA  in the Anti-W ar Movement
FOR M ORE THAN 20 YEARS, the anti-war struggle has been 
in theory and practice one of the over-riding preoccupations of the 
Communist Party of Australia. Throughout the period, the line of 
the Australian ruling authorites has been that the “peace movement” 
or “anti-war movement” has always been merely a “Communist 
front”, based on the capture of “dupes” by the wily Communists 
in the service of a “foreign power’ or, more recently, simply for 
“treasonable” motives.
The threadbare character of this tactical propaganda line should 
not be allowed to obscure the fact that the activity of the CPA has, 
indeed, been important in the anti-war movement which may be said 
to have grown on three elements: the deep-rooted unwillingness of 
the majority of Australians to be dragged into what are seen to be 
imperialist wars or great-power struggles; the conscious political 
work of the CPA; and the conscious effort —  for political, moral 
or religious reasons —  of other groups and individuals. In the 
past 20 years, both the first and third factors have greatly increased. 
The weight of the CPA (in any case reduced in numbers) has there­
fore relatively declined in this movement, though it remains im­
portant. On the other hand, changes in the CPA’s attitude to the 
anti-war struggle (as to many other concepts, aims and methods of 
action) may be advancing the quality of its influence in this move­
ment. Certainly the inception of the post-1945 anti-war movement 
in an organised form nationally, in 1949-50, owed much to the 
work of the communists, in practical partnership with a number of 
prominent non-communist individual citizens who had shown concern 
about the drift of the international situation at the time. The com­
munists, too, were reacting to the situation, in a quite specific way.
It is not possible here to examine the origins of the post World 
War 2 East-West military confrontation which burst on the world 
in the “Berlin crisis” of early 1948. Suffice it to say that the 
readjustment of Great Power relationships following the temporary 
elimination of Germany, Japan and Italy as powers and the upsurge 
of revolutionary activity in certain colonial and other areas, were 
quickly seen by the UK, US and French leaders as requiring 
emergency action in the interests of imperialist perspectives. Berlin
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heated the medium anti-Soviet tone in western official and press 
circles to a full-scale anti-Soviet campaign in the UK, USA, France 
and Australia. At that time, as the writer personally verified, US 
forces in West Germany were intensively preparing for war against, 
and talking about “occupation” of, the USSR. Behind all this was 
the fundamental fact of the US atomic weapons monopoly. The use 
of the A-Bomb against the USSR was being openly canvassed. At 
the same time, the USSR was in a difficult time of restoration after 
massive human and material sacrifices in the course of the victory 
over Nazism.
In this truly serious situation, the Stalin leadership in the USSR 
estimated that a major international political effort was required 
to delay the threatening new war by impeding US utilisation of its 
military superiority to serve the “containment” policy of the Truman- 
Dulles leadership. In late 1948 an international meeting of left 
intellectuals in Warsaw, initiated the “World Congress of the Parti­
sans of Peace” in Paris in April-May, 1949. An Australian delegation 
went to Paris, consisting almost entirely of communists. Delegations 
were stated to represent people of 72 countries. The Congress con­
cluded that:—
T here was a serious danger of war, fo llow in g  the betrayal by the im perialist 
powers o f the U N  Charter and other agreem ents, and their turn to rearm a­
m ent and m ilitary blocs.
T here m ust be a ban on atom ic weapons and other mass destruction weapons, 
international control o f the use of atom ic energy, and arms lim itation .
Peace and freedom required national independence and peaceful coopera­
tion of all peoples, w ith  self-determ ination.
Setting up  an International C om m ittee, the Congress launched an in ter­
n ational m ovem ent for “defence o f peace in  the w orld,” w hich w ould  set 
out to im pose peace on  those w ho w anted war, through “the perm anent 
threat o f popular force."
Soon after, a USSR Conference of Peace fully endorsed the Paris 
decisions, rejected western charges of Soviet aggressiveness and 
bluntly accused Anglo-American imperialism of preparing a new 
atomic war “against the entire human race” . Before 1949 was out, 
peace councils were being set up in some Australian states with 
the help of the activity of delegates back from Paris. CPA general 
secretary L. Sharkey calling for the extension of mass peace organ­
isations to all states said: “We Communists do not want to ‘boss’ 
such a movement or order it about, nor define its policy or dictate 
its tactics; we want to see a broad mobilisation of peace-lovers 
fighting on a broad programme, directed against aggression in the 
interest of the overwhelming majority of mankind. The Communist 
Party will take its full share of the work of such a movement and 
give its fullest support to it.” (Communist Review, Oct. 1949.)
The first half-year or so called for concentration of CPA effort 
literally on the convincing and mobilising of the communists them­
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selves, and large numbers of ex-communists and close supporters. 
However, the main activists including some of the numerous Com­
munist trade union officials threw themselves into the task with 
vigor and effect. There were obvious reasons for this. Firstly, the 
main cadre of party activists were people who despite the euphoria of 
the wartime alliance of forces had not forgotten the ’30s. War 
threats against the USSR, first land of socialism, were something they 
understood and responded to, in an almost automatic reflex. Second­
ly, the Chinese revolution, with its final success, had sent a wave of 
confidence in the future throughout the world communist movement. 
And at home in Australia, the election of the Menzies Government 
on an anti-communist policy gave Australian communists a sense 
of immediate crisis that was, to many, a spur to action.
An early instrument of mobilisation of communists into new mass 
contact for the peace movement was a 7-point Peace Ballot based 
on the Paris policies, for which scores of thousands of signatures 
were collected in organised drives. This purely Australian initiative 
was soon superseded by the world launching of the “Stockholm Ap­
peal” for the banning of nuclear weapons, a one-point demand from 
the new international committee of the peace movement. This led 
to an unprecedented world signature campaign which, before the end 
of 1950, had yielded some 600 million signatures. I t undoubtedly 
alerted far more millions of people to the danger of nuclear war 
than did the actual use of the Bomb itself on Hiroshima and Naga­
saki. In Australia, the extraordinary figure of 200,000 signatures was 
reached, very largely as a result of work by CPA members. In the 
same period, Australia had seen the first of its own mass, representa­
tive peace conferences. The Australian Peace Congress, held in 
Melbourne in April, 1950, with the attendance of that most contro­
versial of clerics, the Dean of Canterbury, long-time publicist for 
Soviet socialism, was a very big and successful operation under­
written by the CPA. One of its mass rallies drew 12,000 people to 
the Melbourne Exhibition Hall.
Yet the movement, having mobilised those in and near the CPA, 
was nevertheless politically narrow, and it was under hostile pressure 
which rapidly increased with the introduction of the Menzies Gov­
ernment’s Communist Party Dissolution Bill. The peace movement, 
was in effect, the conscious Left and at that time this consisted 
almost entirely of communists and their supporters. The savagery 
of the anti-communist campaign let loose when, in June, 1950, the 
Korean war broke out, came close te  isolating the CPA in Australia, 
though it did not prevent small groups of communists from staging 
defiant demonstrations against US and British imperialism on the 
streets of Melbourne and elsewhere, while communist-led seamen 
announced a ban on shipment of war materials to Korea.
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It was a defensive situation for the communists, both internation­
ally and in Australia. As the struggle around Menzies’ Red Bill 
developed, the CPA’s greatest need was for allies on any issue. 
Both the political movements for peace and for democratic rights 
were not unhelpful in this regard, but the ultimate defeat of the anti­
communist legislation in the 1951 referendum flowed mainly from 
the activisation of the non-communist left and centre forces of the 
trade unions and Labor Party, both of which had been crudely 
attacked by Menzies and the extreme anti-communist “grouper" 
forces in the labor movement.
A major effect of this experience was that the slogans of defensive 
success took deep root in communist thinking. The defence of peace 
became “the main task” of the communists. Unity of diverse forces 
around points of agreement —  and the conscious setting aside of 
points of disagreement —  became the principal method. There 
was intensive study and discussion by responsible communists about 
this. A 1952 world congress for peace in Vienna displayed notable 
success in the uniting of certain social-democratic and other non­
communist political forces with communists by means of prolonged 
negotiations between “people of goodwill”. The Australian delega­
tion which included communists, and non-party left people (also a 
middle-aged woman who, years later, publicly admitted she was 
a Security agent in the delegation) brought back this concept. Later, 
in 1953 the Convention on Peace and War in Sydney proved a con­
siderable turning point in uniting people in various labor and religious 
circles with communists and other militants of the trade unions, in 
a degree of agreement that was a genuine product of negotiation 
and mutual respect. The slogan of that Convention was “Negotiation 
must displace war.”
Another requirement of the search for unity for peace at the time 
was the deliberate setting aside by the CPA of revolutionary and 
class slogans or super-militant forms of activity that might impede 
the search for unity at any level, for peace. Such activity as selling 
or circulating communist newspapers or leaflets outside or inside 
any kind of peace meeting was strongly discouraged in the party 
as the worst kind of “sectarianism” —  the worst political crime of 
that period. When helping to formulate statements or slogans for 
peace organisations, communists avoided all reference to “class 
struggle” or other traditional militant terms, while the idea of striking, 
for peace was simply not discussed. With one or two exceptions, 
the activities of the mass movement for peace in the whole decade 
of the 1950’s comprised conferences, meetings, propaganda through 
films and, above all, words. In 1954, Sydney wharfies held up the 
Radnor over a cargo of barbed wire for French use in Indo China, 
but generally in these years there was much discussion and propa­
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ganda about self-determination but little talk and less action about 
“international solidarity” . This contrasted with the confident pre- 
coal-strike period of 1949 when Lance Sharkey had been jailed for
2 years for saying defiantly to the press that Australian communists 
would give support to Soviet forces if they entered Australia in pursuit 
of aggressors. Demonstration-type activity was confined to the small, 
defiant efforts of 1950 and some activities in the 1952 Youth Carnival 
for Peace and Friendship.
The CPA continued to discuss the problems of revolution in the 
context of marxist study classes of the classics, inevitably with 
emphasis on the lessons of the mid-thirties and the united front 
against fascism. In the earlier years, there continued some effort 
by some communist leaders to relate the struggle for peace with 
the revolutionary task of the party, in Communist Review articles, 
for example. There was even speculation on the potential of the 
then proliferating peace committees in localities and some jobs as 
future “soviets” . However, these committees were generally narrow 
groups consisting largely of communists and close supporters. In 
Tribune (1 6 /9 /5 3 ), J. D. Blake, in a very clear outline of the 
CPA attitude to “unity for peace”, wrote “Our view is that lasting 
peace and peaceful competition between different social systems 
will clearly establish the superiority of socialism over capitalism 
and this will aid our advance to socialism in Australia.”
Cumulatively then in very few years after the high levels of chal­
lenging militancy in the railway and coal strike years of 1948-49, 
the CPA became pushed into a defensive orientation to “unity in 
action for peace” at any level required, and —  to facilitate this —  
had in effect abandoned open discussion or projection of socialist 
revolutionary concepts in any but formal terms —  “the ultimate 
socialist aim”, etc. In recent years, it has become fashionable in 
some left circles to scorn this as the “lowest common denominator” 
policies of the CPA. In fact it was the highest common denominator 
that could be found between diverse viewpoints —  but it was never­
theless often very low-level at that, from the point of view of the 
social revolutionary.
There was, however, an aspect of policy on which the CPA never 
made a concession until as late as 1961. That was the refusal to be 
party to any statement which explicitly or by implication criticised 
the policies of the Soviet Union, China or other communist country. 
The fact that this position could be sustained for so long deserves 
more detailed study. Certainly some significant non-communist 
individual leaders in peace committees, in Melbourne for example, 
resigned when, at the onset of the Korean war, the communists 
refused to concede that any fraction of the blame might lie elsewhere 
but in Washington. But for a number of years there appeared to be
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no conflict between the words and actions of the communist governed 
countries, in contrast to those of the imperialist powers, so that 
the issue rarely arose. Things changed somewhat with Hungary, 
1956, and the breakdown in China of the “Let 100 flowers bloom” 
policy, in 1958. A number of individual communists active in the 
peace movement of those years refused to condone these respective 
Soviet and Chinese policies and took independent critical actions 
which usually led to their departure from the party’s ranks. However, 
the CPA itself conceded nothing on these issues, a fact which 
testifies to the continuance then in Australian communist minds of 
the monolithic concept of the world communist movement long after 
the CPSU 20th Congress exposures of the crimes and distortions of 
the Stalin era.
By the time a degree of US-Soviet nuclear balance had 
become apparent, another aspect of the threat of general war had 
developed. This was the US encirclement of China. This had, of 
course, been a growing element for several years from the victory 
of the Chinese revolution. The Korean war, the US-dictated Japanese 
Peace Treaty of 1951, the permanent stationing of the US 7th Fleet 
in the Taiwan Strait, Australian dispatch of troops for counter­
revolutionary duty in Malaya —  all were steps in this process, as 
was the Australian Government’s refusal to accord diplomatic recog­
nition to the Chinese revolutionary People’s Government.
These were all, to one degree or another, real political issues in 
Australian life; in a certain sense, they were more real than the 
general threat of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR. It is 
then hardly surprising that some signs appeared of tactical conflict 
over the two aspects of the war threat, inside the Australian anti-war 
movement. In 1951, for example, following the success of the world 
Stockholm Appeal against A bombs, the World Peace Movement 
tried again with a signature appeal for a Five Power Peace Pact. 
The CPA leadership fully supported an Australian Peace Council 
decision to campaign for this. However, some CPA activists pro­
minent in the peace organisations argued for priority to be given 
to a campaign against the Japanese Peace Treaty, which was seen 
as designed to consolidate Japan as a US strategic base country vis 
a vis China. But the CPA top leadership insisted on the priority of 
the world campaign which, in fact, was less effective than the Stock­
holm Appeal, because it was vague, unrealistic, and had less human 
appeal. Certainly it tailed off in Australia.
But meanwhile, in Melbourne, of three fulltime CPA activists who 
had argued briefly in favour of concentration on the Pacific war 
danger, one was transferred to Sydney and the second was sent into 
industry, thus dissipating what was seen by the then Victorian leader­
ship of the CPA as a potentially dangerous nationalist group. In
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Sydney, on the other hand, a new peace organisation was set up, 
the Committee for Peace in the Pacific, working parallel to the 
Peace Council which campaigned for the World Movement’s policies. 
Both these Sydney committees were actively supported by the CPA.
This was the first sign of an issue which slowly developed as a 
point of debate both within the CPA and in the peace organisations 
themselves up to, and including, the World Peace Council. It was 
variously expressed as world centralised leadership versus region­
alism; or a world movement based on a rigid formal structure versus 
a movement flexible in form and structure in accordance with condi­
tions. In retrospect it could be seen perhaps as a conflict between 
adherence to the Soviet viewpoint, and policies and methods arising 
out of national and regional conditions and needs. However, the 
issue did not become sharp. Behind all this, however, the move­
ment’s struggle against the US-British anti-China military policy 
inexorably developed.
The Australian Labor Party split in 1954 and the subsequent shift 
of the ALP federally towards some of the positions of the general 
anti-war movement led to a marked growth of interest in China’s 
international rights, among Australian Laborites of both industrial 
and political wings. Despite the immediate confusion in the CPA 
and among other peace movement activists over Hungary and 
China’s “ 100 flowers”, resistance to US policy on China and V iet­
nam grew and was a major factor in developing official trade union 
participation in the anti-war movement to a peak that has not since 
been equalled. This process, an important and interesting one in 
itself, expanded from the modest NSW Trade Union Peace Week 
of 1954 (when the slogan “Peace is Trade Union Business” was 
born) to the 1959 national peace congress in Melbourne, which in­
cluded a special trade union component conference sponsored and 
conducted by the ACTU, with the late Jim Kenny, then NSW Labor 
Council Secretary, presiding.
Side by side with the growth of the China Question in the sights 
of the anti-war movement came the influence of greater World Peace 
Movement stress on the “possibility of peaceful coexistence of coun­
tries with differing social systems”, and that movement’s reflection 
of the Soviet campaign for an agreement to prohibit atmospheric 
nuclear test explosions. It was a confusing period for Australian 
communists though the CPA officially sought to support all these 
policies. In fact, there were underlying conflicts between Krushchov’s 
“Camp David” version of peaceful coexistence and the traditional 
revolutionary approach to it, which both the Chinese and Australian 
parties tended to favor. Further, the Soviet and Chinese disagree­
ment over deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons which climaxed in 
the late ’fifties and led to an urgent Chinese nuclear program was
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in sharp conflict with the test-ban campaign for a ban of nuclear 
testing which had become a major theme for the movement. How­
ever, what made possible a certain Australian rationalisation of all 
this was that, from the Australian people’s viewpoint, all three issues 
were realistic: no war on China, peaceful coexistence, and a nuclear 
test ban. Few Australian communists at the time would have realised 
(about 1958-59) that already their practice in the anti-war movement 
was heading towards a position independent of both the two main 
communist powers.
However, in this regard, the real tests of CPA integrity were still 
to come. The first and least known came in November 1961 when 
the Soviet Union violated the atmospheric test ban treaty with a 
series of Arctic test explosions, that were explained as a warning 
to the west in connection with a temporary crisis in Germany. This 
brought a crunch in peace organisations in Australia, as doubtless in 
many other countries. In the NSW body’s executive, two communist 
members debated the matter for hours with other (non-communist) 
members who insisted that there must be a statement including a 
criticism of the Soviet act. The debate had to continue a second 
night, by which time the two members had convinced the CPA 
leadership that such a statement would have to be accepted or 
“unity for peace” would suffer a profound setback. The statement 
issued in the name of the Peace Committee scarcely caused a ripple, 
yet foreshadowed for the Party, too, the end of automatic defence 
in public of Soviet —  or Chinese or any other policy formulated 
overseas.
Progress by the CPA towards a position of independent marxist 
judgment of the international situation was temporarily delayed 
(but fundamentally accelerated) by the open outbreak of the China- 
Soviet dispute and, in the same period, the US-Soviet confrontation 
over rockets in Cuba which imperatively demanded internationalist 
support of the Cuban and Soviet positions, against US imperialism, 
irrespective of definite reservations felt by many about some aspects 
of Soviet tactics and great power methods in the crisis. The CPA’s 
early tendency to judge the Pacific war danger through the ideas of 
the Chinese leadership also was ended. The pre-eminent questions of 
the slowly increasing Australian involvement in Vietnam and the 
rapid expansion of the Menzies Government’s war program (e.g. the 
1963 order for the F i l l ’s) were becoming the starting point of 
CPA anti-war thinking. It needed only the US-Australian decisions 
for big-scale combat intervention in Vietnam in early 1965, together 
with Australian conscription for service abroad, to culminate that 
process.
That intervention, historic for all Australians fundamentally 
changed the situation of the Australian anti-war movement, which
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thenceforth was operating in a country with a military combat in­
volvement in a clear-cut, imperialist, counter-revolutionary war. 
The “theoretical” anti-war struggles of the previous 15 years were 
finished. And because Vietnam also brought with it the spread of 
dissent, youthful scepticism and radicalisation, and the emergence of 
significant left groups other than the CPA itself, 1965 also meant 
that the long night of CPA defencism was ending.
No longer were words the main form of struggle. The first Viet­
nam demonstrations began, at the US Consulate, the first draft cards 
were burned —  in both cases the initiators included the young com­
munists of the then Eureka Youth League. Other groups joined in 
and soon bigger and bigger street demonstrations and sitdowns were 
occurring. The CPA found that new, young groups (e.g. Vietnam 
Action Campaign, precursor of Resistance) mainly student based —  
were raising revolutionary slogans in the anti-war movement, and 
were criticising the limited “pacifist” slogans still common in demon­
strations. To some extent prodded by these groups, the CPA’s re­
examination of its own basic revolutionary task began, both because 
this was required by the struggle against the Australian counter­
revolutionary war and because the proliferating left and anti-war 
movements made more offensive action a realistic perspective. The 
other, even more basic element of the same situation was that for 
the first time the movement began to expand in a spontaneous way. 
It began to become genuinely a mass movement.
Its leadership and impetus continued to depend largely on the 
political left but now this was a plurality rather than a CPA mon­
opoly. The experience of the most recent phase, the Moratorium 
Movement of 1970, suggests that the interaction of these left forces
—  despite the difficulties and antagonistic relations that have some­
times existed —  is helping to carry the movement forward.
Recent experience has shown, conflict of views on the left and 
sometimes vigorous debate in anti-war committees on how to advance 
the mass anti-war movement towards a conscious anti-imperialist 
and revolutionary position. Leninist concepts elaborated in 1915 
of struggle against any government waging imperialist war by the 
revolutionaries in that country —  including the concept of trans­
forming military defeats into defeat of the government and revolu­
tionary defeat of the capitalist system —  have particular force 
today in countries, such as Australia, committed to extended counter­
revolutionary, imperialist war of intervention in Vietnam and other 
parts of S.E. Asia. Furthermore, the kind of proletarian internation­
alist solidarity in words and deeds, legal and illegal, that helped the 
struggling Bolsheviks to maintain power against the interventionists 
of 1918-21 is called for today in support of the Indo-China revolu­
tionaries.
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While these issues have already been raised as a political line and 
in material action by the communists and some others, it cannot 
be said that any of the Left forces have squarely faced up to their 
responsibility in this respect. Debate has tended to centre on whether, 
at a given point of the anti-war movement’s development (e.g. in this 
year’s Moratoriums), this or that explicitly anti-imperialist policy 
formulation or slogan can be imposed on the whole movement. 
Some left individuals or groups are concerned with accusing others 
of being inconsistent anti-imperialists if they oppose such imposi­
tion.
Of course, any anti-war movement in a country waging an imper­
ialist war is objectively anti-imperialist. The Moratorium move­
ment, particularly as seen in September, is a genuine mass movement 
of a quality not seen before in the Australian anti-war movement. 
It is uniting in militant action around common aims a really large 
number of people with diverse views on many political and other 
questions. This is raising sharply new problems of leadership of 
such a movement in effective, advanced forms of action. The left 
forces, including the communists, may already be restricting the 
development of this movement because of tendencies to cling to 
political attitudes, tactics and forms of action that were appropriate 
to the narrower, pre-Moratorium movement which consisted of 
more like-minded people. If so, this needs urgent correction since 
it is the Left, in the first place, that must ensure that the movement 
is well-led and that it develops rapidly.
Although there is a significant radicalisation of large new forces, 
particularly of young people as a result of the more clumsy steps 
by the Establishment towards use of coercive arms of the State 
against the movement, the rapid physical growth of the mass move­
ment means that the CPA and other conscious, organised Left 
groups are becoming a relatively smaller part of the anti-war forces. 
The fact that they may have a clear, or clearer, anti-imperialist and 
revolutionary view unfortunately does not mean that the mass 
Moratorium movement will yet accept the view for its slogans, 
which are at present: withdrawal of all foreign troops, withdrawal 
of all support of the Saigon regime, abolition of conscription. (To 
these must now be added as a major element the assertion of the 
democratic right of the movement to use the streets to demonstrate 
for the achievement of the aims.) These slogans have succeeded in 
uniting large and diverse forces in militant, demonstrative and — to 
a degree —  strike action in some industries, universities and schools. 
However, only the blind would say that the possibilities of mass 
mobilisation in support of these slogans, and the slogan “Stop Work 
to Stop the W ar” have yet been even adequately tackled, let alone 
exhausted.
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The Left vanguard forces are, and should be, at the same time 
explaining the imperialist and counter-revolutionary character of 
the war, the nature of the imperialist system giving rise to it, and 
the need and possibility of overthrowing that system in our own 
country in order, finally, to end Australian involvement in any 
such predatory wars and to build a socialist society. Further, it has 
been shown that various forms of demonstrative action around 
explicitly anti-imperialist slogans can usefully be mounted by the 
advanced forces, even by quite small groups or individuals, provided 
that these are designed so as to serve a useful ideological purpose 
(e.g. various Vietnam demonstrations, July 4 actions, Stock Ex­
change raids, some occupations of National Service departments, 
some courtroom denunciations etc.). Despite the cries of “adventur­
ism” from more conservative parts of the Left, and “anarchy” from 
the Establishment and the reformist Right, most of these efforts 
are useful and need to be extended, while ensuring that they do not 
degenerate into violent provocation or pointless confrontation that 
damages the mass movement or is rejected by the entire mass 
movement because it is incomprehensible.
But such advanced activity and propaganda is not able to be 
adopted by a mass movement that is still in the process of rapid 
growth outward among quite new and inexperienced forces —  still 
learning, for example, that Australian policemen are really capable 
of planning to unleash violence and to be excessively brutal in the 
process. The Left’s concepts, slogans and advanced actions should 
influence and involve greater and greater sections of the mass 
movement, and should be freely discussed and canvassed in the 
mass movement’s gatherings, but should not be allowed to impede 
mass discussion of widening effective action around more limited, 
but objectively anti-imperialist slogans. For it is only such effective 
mass action that will actually end the imperialist war and imperialist 
system, when experience and political conviction lead the movement 
to the necessity of going beyond present slogans. The vanguard 
forces have got to be able to judge the political needs and capacity 
of the whole mass movement at a given time, and not just its leading 
or sponsoring committees which are invariably composed of the 
relatively advanced. The recent (September) experiences, encour­
aging as they are, point not to a judgment that the present scale of 
movement could adopt explicitly revolutionary slogans and race 
to victory, but rather to the great need to bring a much larger 
mass of people, particularly of the workers, into united, more varied 
and more effective activity around approximately the present slogans, 
while greatly improving the quality of the ideological influence and 
the mutual collaboration of the various elements of the revolutionary 
vanguard.
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Gordon Adler
Communists and Art
WHAT, MANY PEOPLE ASK, has politics to do with art? What 
right has the Communist Party to meddle in the realm of imaginative 
literature? Surely the function of books is to provide entertainment. 
Surely the reader ought to derive from literature some solace in this 
unhappy world, some means of temporary escape from the vicissi­
tudes of real life.
It is true that the best works of literature give satisfaction to the 
educated reader. In a sense, all great art is produced for enjoyment. 
But it is the kind of positive sensation aroused by the discovery 
of new insight into human life, the development of a deeper apprecia­
tion of the feelings of one’s neighbours and a fuller understanding 
of the unity of the human race. And since man does not live in a 
void, serious literature has, necessarily, a social character. It may 
not always deal with recognised social problems, it may be con­
cerned entirely with matters of an intimate, personal nature, but 
any literature that tends to make people think and to question the 
underlying assumptions on which the habits of social life depend, 
has political consequences regardless of its outward appearance. 
Anything that challenges established prejudice, that exposes hypoc­
risy, that tears away the veneer of culture from a fundamentally 
barbaric social order and replaces its false values with new ideals 
may give a satisfaction to the reader that transcends mere pleasure. 
Here let it be said that humanist art may not necessarily be realistic. 
The most improbable fantasy may carry a great spiritual force just 
as abstract painting may be profoundly moving. It all depends on 
the aim of the artist. Realism, as such, has no special virtue. The 
artist must express himself in his own way. Non-realist art cannot 
be identified with counter-revolution, any more than realist art can 
be said to be always revolutionary.
Gordon A dler is a D octor of M edicine, and has had short stories published  in  
O verlan d , Sou therly  and R ealist.
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The genuine artist, however, is always motivated by a concern 
for the fate, of man, regardless of the means he finds to express this 
concern. Most artists have felt, in some way or other, a sense of 
involvement in the social movements of their time. Many have been 
led, by this feeling of being involved, to identify themselves with 
radical social forces, and to take political action on their own 
account. In the years immediately following the second world war 
a number of the most talented writers and artists joined the Com­
munist Party. The war had shattered many illusions about bourgeois 
society, and the victories of the Soviet Union aroused a new interest 
in socialism, especially among the young. A new generation of 
writers emerged, with a strong sense of political commitment. 
Socialist ideas had a major influence on the course of Australian 
writing over the next two decades, and some of these writers produced 
their best work while members of the Communist Party. And yet, 
with certain notable exceptions, almost every one of these writers 
later left the Party. Some stopped writing altogether.
This process of change was complex, and to understand its 
causes requires an appreciation of the work of these writers, the 
activities of the Communist Party and its relations with the Com­
munist Party of the Soviet Union, the influence of the cold war, 
the cultural isolation of Australia, and the changes in Australian 
society itself. What was characteristic of the period before 1956 
was the enthusiasm and the diversity of talent among the socialist 
writers and artists. They all had a belief in the value of their own 
particular contributions. There was, at that time, no sense of 
coercion in any way by the Communist Party.
Overland
In this atmosphere of intellectual ferment and artistic activity the 
emergence of the literary journal Overland was an event of far- 
reaching significance. Originally appearing as The Realist Writer 
in 1952 the journal began as the organ of the Melbourne Realist 
Writers’ Society, edited by Stephen Murray-Smith. Taking Joseph 
Furphy’s woids “Temper Democratic, bias Australian”, Stephen 
Murray-Smith and his associates produced a journal of a new type 
that quickly aroused wide interest among the reading public. Over­
land was the most tangible expression of the new, progressive 
literary movement that arose from the efforts of the considerable 
body of writers centred in Melbourne. The enthusiasm it engendered 
derived from its high quality, from the variety and talent of its 
contributors, and from the imagination, the cultural background 
and the political commitment of its editor. Adopting a policy of 
encouraging new writers, Stephen Murray-Smith was responsible for 
publishing the work of a number of writers of undoubted ability 
who later achieved considerable distinction. Literary soirees, social 
activities, fund raising parties, informal meetings with authors
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created a sense of elan among writers, a belief in themselves, a 
conviction that their work was important. It would be difficult to 
overestimate the significance of Overland in developing Australian 
literature between 1950 and 1960. Anyone associated with the 
journal in those years will have experienced the encouragement given 
by Stephen Murray-Smith to writers who showed any promise, 
and the ideological influence of the journal was considerable.
The work of the socialist writers
Frank Hardy’s spectacular rise to fame through the publication 
of Power Without Glory opened a new chapter in Australian writing, 
and has been told in detail in his book The Hard Way. Eric Lambert, 
in his novel The Twenty Thousand Thieves showed a keen perception 
of the strength of anti-militarist sentiment among Australian troops 
during the war, and contrasted this democratic mood with the 
ideology of many of the officer class. Walter Kaufmann, in Voices 
in the Storm created a vivid picture of life in Nazi Germany. Ralph 
de Boissiere brought to Australia the rich talents he demonstrated 
in his West Indian novels Crown Jewel and Rum and Coca Cola, 
Judah Waten established his reputation with a collection of stories 
about migrants in Alien Son. John Manifold made an outstanding 
contribution to Australian cultural life as poet, musician, inventor 
of musical instruments, collector of bush songs, and literary critic. 
Aileen Palmer and Laurence Collinson both, in different ways, 
produced poetry of high quality in a more private and reflective 
style, writing on the universal themes of love, death, war, and loneli­
ness. John Morrison became widely known for his waterfront stories. 
Vance Palmer, James Aldridge, Dymphna Cusack, Jean Campbell 
and Alan Marshall, while not members of any political party, were 
close to the socialist movement, and formed a literary school 
that was essentially realist, politically progressive, socially oriented 
and conscious of its democratic heritage.
Not all of these writers chose to express their political ideas 
directly in their art. Some, like Judah Waten, achieved their finest 
moments in works that had ostensibly no political theme whatever. 
The enlightenment of the isolated Australian community about the 
culture of immigrants and the struggle to break down racist pre­
judice must be at least as important as depicting the militancy of 
Melbourne waterside workers.
There were some, however, who did set out to use their creative 
ability in a highly partisan manner. One of the most successful 
in this respect was David Martin. David Martin, the Hungarian 
born Jewish journalist who served in the International Brigade in 
Spain, came to Australia and achieved renown as a poet, novelist 
and short story writer. He was not a better artist than writers
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like Katharine Prichard, but he succeeded in expressing the aims of 
the Communist movement in his writing in a way that few others 
have done.
Katharine Susannah Prichard
Katharine Susannah Prichard was thirty four at the time of the 
Russian revolution in 1917. In 1920 she joined others in forming 
the Communist Party, and remained a member of it for over fifty 
years until her death at the age of eighty six. She wrote twelve 
novels, several books of short stories, poetry, drama, and many 
political articles. In her time she won a number of literary prizes. 
She devoted herself wholeheartedly to the cause of communism, 
and sought to develop her art in the service of what she firmly 
believed to be a great cause. More than any other Australian 
writer she set out to use her art to win support for communism 
through her stories and novels.
“All my life,” she declared, at the Communist Writers’ Conference 
in 1959, “I have been guided by Marxism-Leninism, and I have 
tried to express this in my work.” To Katharine, this was not cause 
for apology. She said this with pride, and was as frank as she was 
when she boldly proclaimed her party membership in her pamphlet 
Why I am a Communist. It was this unashamed declaration of 
loyalty that was one of her finest qualities. Yet in 1956 she was 
more understanding of the writers who became disillusioned and 
left the party, and she was more genuinely distressed than almost 
anyone else. She was particularly grieved by the loss of David 
Martin, whom she regarded as one of the most gifted of the party 
writers.
Despite her efforts,, however, it was not in her more tendentious 
novels that she achieved her highest artistic level. Her finest work 
derived from her insight into the lives of women, and in 1930, 
with Haxby’s Circus she reached the summit of her creative endeav­
ours. “I wrote this novel,” she said once, in reply to criticism, 
“because I wanted to show how hard life uses women.” In this 
novel, as in her aboriginal stories such as The Cooboo and the novel 
Coonardoo, she writes with tremendous conviction, yet none of 
these works is political in character. She appeared to realise that 
great art is profoundly revolutionary, and that its influence trans­
cends the limits of polemical writing. She seemed, at this time, 
to be completely free of the restrictions that later plagued the 
socialist movement and in time affected even her own work. It 
was only later that her work became to a considerable extent 
stultified and artificial. Though still a writer of importance, and 
unquestionably sincere, her work became influenced by the ideas 
of Zhdanov without her knowing it. She tried very hard to be 
worthy of inclusion in the school of new socialist writers, but she
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never again succeeded in creating the profound and moving stories 
of her earlier years.
Socialist Literary Theory
At this point, socialist literary theory requires some consideration. 
For many years, the contentious matter of partisanship in art aroused 
much heated debate. There were those, on the one hand, who 
claimed that literature was of value only to the extent that it 
propagated ; evolutionary ideas, while others denied the validity 
of writing that expressed any political aim at all. These two divergent 
trends became very marked in the late sixties, and in their most 
extreme forms were regarded by most Communists, and indeed by 
the great majority of other people, as the true expression of “socialist” 
and “bourgeois” ideas in literature. The traditional values by which 
the art of many centuries had been judged, and by which it had 
established its worth were obscured, and this whole process was 
accentuated by the cold war. Realist art became identified with 
socialism, and abstract art with bourgeois ideology. And in this 
period of sharp controversy Soviet views on art dominated the 
Australian scene, at least in left circles.
After the founding of the Union of Soviet Writers under the 
influence of Maxim Gorki in 1934 the philosophy of Socialist 
Realism was adopted as the only legitimate basis for writers in the 
Soviet Union. This had a profound influence in the Communist 
movement throughout the world, especially in Australia. As the 
ideas of Socialist Realism became interpreted in an increasingly 
narrow sense, following the pronouncements of the Soviet theorist 
Zhdanov, the work of almost every Communist writer in the world 
became affected in one way or another.
The elements of the theory of Socialist Realism were simple. 
The literature of any society was considered to be determined by 
its class character. With every revolutionary upheaval in history 
and the birth of a new social order, literature changed accordingly. 
Human conflict resulted from the contradictions of class society. 
Hence with the elimination of classes there could be no conflict. 
Human conflict was a survival from the past, and the duty of the 
writer was to point the way to the future. Every story must have 
as the central character a positive hero, every novel had to end on 
an optimistic note. Tragic love affairs no longer occurred in socialist 
society. In the capitalist countries, of course, the mission of the 
writer was to portray society in decay, and to show the inevitability 
of its replacement by socialism. The highest form of society, 
socialism, released the creative power of the people and established 
the basis for the greatest literature of all. The task of the Soviet 
writer was to give expression to the noblest aspirations of man 
under the conditions of the new society.
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Whilst there was some validity in this analysis, and whilst it is 
undoubtedly true that much fine literature has been produced by 
Soviet writers, the narrow, rigid application of Socialist Realist 
theory by people in positions of authority with little knowledge of 
literature did great harm, and the claim that nineteenth century 
realists like Pushkin, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky were less important 
than modern Soviet writers was patently absurd. These officials 
were suspicious of every new idea, they feared dissent in any form, 
and they did much to stifle creative initiative. Conformity became 
the order of the day, and the Soviet Union acquired a literary 
establishment with a similar mentality to the literary establishment 
of the West. Those who conformed were rewarded with prizes and 
mass publication, those who could not conform found their work 
suppressed, many were imprisoned, and some were punished by 
death. It was the ideas of these myopic bureaucrats which became 
the model for literary criticism in the socialist movement in Australia, 
with quite tragic results.
The Party Crisis of 1956
The Hungarian uprising of 1956 created a profound crisis in 
the Communist movement, even though most parties emerged with­
out serious organisational divisions. The causes of the uprising 
were complex, and reactionary forces certainly took advantage of 
the opportunities presented by the chaotic situation. The Khrushchov 
party had not long been in power, and had only a marginal control 
of the leadership of the CPSU. There were major divisions in the 
CPSU leadership on the question of military intervention, and it 
was only when, after ten days of heavy fighting, it appeared that 
the Hungarian government would be overthrown, the Soviet govern­
ment decided finally to intervene. In retrospect the Soviet govern­
ment of 1956 appears as a model of prudence and restraint when 
compared with the Brezhnev-Kosygin government of 1968!
In the storm that followed, the CPSU leaders were able to con­
vince most Communists that they had no alternative, at that critical 
moment in the fighting, if socialist power was to be preserved in 
Hungary. On the more fundamental causes of the crisis, and the 
responsibility of the Hungarian Communists under the Rakosi 
leadership, however, they had little to say. Many Communists held 
reservations about the causes of the rebellion, but in the face of 
the onslaught of international reaction they closed ranks and made 
no criticism of the CPSU. On the whole, the CPA suffered relatively 
small losses, but the casualties were particularly heavy among the 
intellectuals. In the bitter polemics that followed, most of the writers 
and artists were driven out of the party. The official view was that 
their vacillation reflected their petit bourgeois class origins, and
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that the party had done well to purge itself of opportunists elements. 
For many, the problem of whether it was possible for a person to 
be both an artist and a Communist was posed in very harsh terms 
by the march of events, and a number of the most gifted writers 
resolved this question in the negative. It was a time of conflicting 
loyalties, and there were no simple answers to any question.
That the relationship between communism and art is complex, 
however, is shown by the fact that among the artists who remained 
with the party some produced their most mature work in the years 
that followed. Noel Counihan moved away from the more formal 
realism of his earlier years, and continued to develop his art, 
expressing his most profound ideas in the mural in the Healy 
Memorial Hall. Judah Waten produced his best novel Distant Land 
and won the Volkswagen prize in 1965 while an active member of 
the party. The claim that artistic integrity and fidelity to the Com­
munist movement are incompatible has been clearly disproved, but 
it cannot be denied that many artists of outstanding merit found 
it impossible to reconcile their party membership with freedom 
to develop their art in their own way.
Those who left the party because they would not accept the 
majority view about Hungary were all grouped together in the eyes 
of the party under the banner of revisionism, though there were 
important differences among the “revisionists” themselves. This 
term having been applied by others to Lenin, Khrushchov, Dubcek 
and the present Soviet leaders, it is a hat that might well have 
been worn with pride, but in 1956 it was freely bestowed on those 
regarded as having crossed into the enemy camp. The final test 
of political integrity that was ultimately applied was the ability of 
the individual concerned to express agreement with the views of 
the leaders of the CPSU.
In 1959 the Australian and New Zealand Disarmament Congress 
was held in Melbourne, with a section devoted to the arts. It was 
attended by the English dramatist J. B. Priestley and his wife 
Jacquetta Hawkes, who on the final night received a standing 
ovation from an audience of 800 for resisting intimidation and 
pressure from the Federal Government and the daily press. In 
this rousing atmosphere the Arts conference could very well have 
been the rallying centre of the Congress, with considerable influence 
in widening its appeal. Yet very soon it became a battleground over 
the action of the Soviet government in Hungary, with the debate 
centring on the case of the writer Tibor Dery, at that time imprisoned 
by the Hungarian government. Dery’s associate Tibor Meray was 
visiting Australia, and his presence in Melbourne provided the poet 
Vincent Buckley with the opportunity to use the Hungarian events 
to attack the Congress.
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The Communist writers at the conference refused to allow any 
criticism of the Soviet government to be incorporated in the resolu­
tions of the meeting, they formed a solid phalanx, and rejected the 
appeal for Dery’s release. The majority group at the conference 
used their numbers to defeat all resolutions dealing with artistic 
freedom and the final statement merely acknowledged that “in some 
countries” writers did not enjoy the freedom to write as they chose. 
At the conclusion of the conference Stephen Murray-Smith described 
the resolution as “chicken-hearted” because it said nothing important 
about this question. The Indian novelist Dr. Mulk Raj Anand 
expressed the opinion that the Communist writers were too rigid. 
Although the Congress was, in the main, a success, it was marred 
by the generally negative effect of the Arts conference, which 
resulted from a fear of real discussion of the great issues of the day.
Cultural Exchange Visits With The Soviet Union
In 1959 the Soviet Writers’ Union invited the Fellowship of Aus­
tralian Writers to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. James 
Devanney, Judah Waten and Professor Manning Clarke were elected, 
and the following year a return visit by Oksana Krugerskaya and 
Alexi Surkov opened up the possibility of a general improvement 
in cultural relations between Australia and the Soviet Union. A 
number of exchange visits followed, with considerable success. 
Peaceful coexistence appeared to be strengthened. But, like the 
albatross that followed the ancient mariner, the Soviet visitors 
were dogged wherever they went by the Pasternak affair.
Boris Pasternak had been generally acclaimed in the Soviet Union 
as a great poet and translator of Shakespeare. His novel Dr. Zhivago 
was in the process of being published in the Soviet Union when 
Pasternak was awarded the Nobel Prize. The Soviet Writers’ Union 
saw this as an act of the Cold War, and the novel was suppressed. 
The Italian Communist publisher Feltrinelli, however, had already 
agreed to publish the novel, and insisted on doing so, as a matter 
of principle, when the Soviet Writers’ Union urged him to reverse 
his decision. Surkov travelled to Italy in a vain attempt to persuade 
Feltrinelli to change his mind, and when he visited Australia he 
was credited with being the instigator of the whole affair. He was 
followed everywhere by an army of press men and photographers, 
all asking the same question. Why? “If I were paid for every 
question I answered about the Pasternak case,” said Surkov, “I 
would be a millionaire.” But no answer he could give would satisfy 
any of his interviewers. He described Pasternak as a great poet, 
a gigantic figure, a man with a vast imagination, one of the really 
good writers of our time. Why, then, was the novel banned? Surkov’s 
task was unenviable, and he performed it with dignity, but he had
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no success in accomplishing his chief mission in Australia. The 
fate of Pasternak was by no means as grim as that of other writers 
like Solzhenitzin or Daniel and Sinyavskv, but it was more significant 
as it came at a time when it seemed that artistic freedom in the 
Soviet Union was rapidly extending.
Australian Communists did their best, in the following years, to 
explain what Surkov had been unable to explain. They stoutly 
defended the action of the Soviet Writers’ Union in expelling Paster­
nak, and campaigned vigorously against those who criticised the 
official Soviet viewpoint. Issue No. 14 of Overland, containing two 
views on the Pasternak affair, one by Katharine Prichard supporting 
the Soviet action, and an opposing view by Maurice Shadbolt, aroused 
the most intense and bitter accusations against Overland. By pub­
lishing the opinions of both sides Stephen Murray-Smith had proved, 
finally, that he had defected to the camp of the class enemy. In a 
full page article in Tribune headed “Overland —  Where the Hell’s 
it being Taken?” Rex Chiplin expressed the official view of the 
CPA at the time, with the clear implication that Overland was party 
property. A new journal, The Realist Writer, described as “militant, 
partisan, and aggressive,” was launched to counter the defection of 
Overland.
Whilst early issues of this new journal were by no means dis­
creditable, it did reveal, at that time, a marked tendency to judge 
literature on political rather than literary considerations. The think­
ing of Zhdanov dominated the outlook of very many of the pub­
lishers of left journals and books of fiction, the most notable being 
the Australasian Book Society. The ABS, having earlier published 
a number of fine novels, now turned out a long line of Socialist 
Realist books, the chief result of which was a steady loss of sub­
scribers and a decline in interest in literature altogether. Later, 
the wheel turned full circle, and in a reaction against this earlier 
trend the ABS became more influenced by the values of commercial 
publishers, with the tendency to judge books largely on their con­
formity to prevailing literary trends.
The socialist writers were not the only ones influenced by the 
polemics of the sixties. Just as left literary criticism became 
intemperate, so did the judgments of the more officially recognised 
critics. Despite the recent awards of literary fellowships to Judah 
Waten and Frank Hardy, Communist writers are still not readily 
accepted in official literary circles. McCarthyism still casts its long 
shadow over the scene. There are, however, other reasons as well 
for the rejection of the work of these writers.
Firstly, there has been a catastrophic decline in the publishing 
of novels and short stories, due to the economics of mass culture,
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take-overs of publishing houses, and the changing cultural values 
of society. Secondly, humanist-realist literature has become un­
fashionable. Thirdly, the legacy of the conflicts of the last decade 
has rendered all forms of social commitment suspect in the eyes 
of publishers, who seek more and more the writers with something 
shocking or sensational to say. This craving for spectacular litera­
ture blinds many to the fact that the most profound truths often find 
expression in the simplest writing. The sharp polarisation of 
literary criticism that developed in the late sixties had done much 
harm to Australian culture, as is well illustrated by the case of 
Patrick White. For a long time condemned by the left as the 
exponent of reactionary ideas in literature, his work was just as 
blindly hailed by the literary establishment with lavish, uncritical 
praise. His work was denied the balanced, objective criticism it 
deserved. In view of White’s consistent stand against the Vietnam 
war, a further study of his work would be appropriate for socialist 
literary scholars.
What conclusions can be drawn from these experiences? Through 
an understandable reluctance to make the mistake of interfering 
in cultural matters the Communist Party could neglect to engage 
in the debates and conflicts occurring in this important field. Indeed, 
there are some communists who feel that literary polemics are too 
complicated and better left alone. Others no doubt believe that it 
may not matter at all what happens in this neck of the woods. But 
the struggle for the acceptance of humanist ideas by the Australian 
people does matter. It is as vital as the struggle for one’s daily bread. 
This struggle will continue, and the progressive forces will draw 
sustenance from the growing strength of the new generation of young 
writers and artists who have rejected the values of bourgeois society 
and who have been inspired by the heroism of the people of Viet­
nam.
Australian literature has proved very hard to kill, and there are 
great reserves of artistic talent and idealism among Australian youth. 
The Communist Party would do well to give them its full encourage­
ment. The mistakes in the past arose from the unqualified acceptance 
of the views of the CPSU in all matters of art, from the view 
that literature was of value only as polemic, and from the rejection 
of art that did not conform to the narrow concept of Socialist 
Realism. The fact that Australian Communists gave their unflagging 
loyalty to the people of the world’s first socialist state is no cause 
for shame. The shame lies with those in positions of power who 
used this loyalty cynically, brutally, and stupidly for unworthy ends, 
and who answered this self-sacrifice and devotion with secret trials, 
suppression of honest criticism, and the gaoling and even murder 
of some of the most talented and sensitive writers of this century.
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Eric Aarons
As I saw the Sixties
IT IS DIFFICULT to describe events and struggles with which 
one has been intimately associated. The memory can be very 
selective even with ‘neutral’ incidents. Nevertheless it seems worth 
trying to outline how my own thinking developed in the CPA in the 
'60’s, even if only to provide a point of reference (or a chopping 
block) for others who may be able to set the record straighter.
The question arises: since we have now been examining many 
questions that should have been followed through in 1956, why 
was this not done at the time? Without attempting a complete 
analysis, two things particularly weighed with me at the time. The 
exposure of many of the crimes of stalinism was undoubtedly a 
very bold step. It both opened up great possibilities for advance 
and appeared as evidence of good intentions on the part of the 
CPSU leaders, given time and sympathetic understanding, to make 
a break with all that had been wrong and restore the ideals and 
norms we believed in, at the same time arming us against the 
pitfalls1.
1 That the ‘secret report' was m ore or less au th en tic  I had little  doubt, and that 
we had shared an outlook which w ould have led to sim ilar harsh treatm ent of 
dissidents had  we been in  power seemed evident to m e, and I said so at a Central 
C om m ittee m eetin g  in 1956. However, since we had not been in  power, no one 
in Australia had suffered in such a way, and that the dangers w e had to avoid 
were revealed seemed m ore or less sufficient.
Eric Aarons is a m em ber of the N ational C om m ittee o f the C om m unist Party, 
and a m em ber of the Editorial Board of A I.R .
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Reinforcing this readiness to ‘get on with the job’ was the in­
fluence of the Chinese views at the time. Their analyses2 were 
against an emotional and simplistic negation of Stalin and of all 
that had transpired, and were posed in very reasoned terms3. The 
three years, 1951-54, I and others spent in China made a deep 
emotional and intellectual impact. To experience, even if only by 
proximity, the creative energy, spirit of self-sacrifice and mass 
involvement of a great revolution, and hear at first hand analyses 
by people who had taken part, is to add a new dimension fof 
people from a country like Australia where nothing like that has 
ever happened. The Chinese lecturers we had, and the cadres we 
met, evidenced considerable flexibility of thought and non-dogmatism 
(or anti-dogmatism), especially when compared with the Soviet 
lecturers (we had both). One incident in particular springs to mind. 
Our Soviet lecturer on political economy was very lucid in explain­
ing the main ideas traditionally held of Marxist political economy. 
But on actual economic issues thinking was very narrow. For 
example, we came into conflict over the question of living standards 
in post-war Australia. Readily responding to Chinese exhortation 
to ‘study the concrete situation’ and ‘seek truth from the facts’, we 
had set about combing through the materials (year books, some 
history books and party publications) we had brought with us. 
These materials drove us, against dogma and inclination be it said, 
to the conclusion that some increase in material living standards had 
been won in the post-war period4.
Anyway, our Soviet lecturer insisted that the bourgeosisie and 
the reformists were very cunning and that we had fallen for their 
propaganda. We stuck to our guns, and he finally asked for the 
evidence, so we spent a large part of one vacation documenting it 
all, allowing for price rises, hours of work, etc., and coming to the 
same conclusion. We handed in the report, but nothing was said, 
and only after continual prompting and pressure did we get a reply 
some months later: “I’m glad that you have studied the circujn-
2 T h e H istorica l E xperiences of th e D icta torsh ip  o f th e  P ro le ta ria t, and M ore  
on th e  H istorica l E xperiences of th e  D ic ta torsh ip  o f th e  P ro le taria t, published  in  
A pril and Decem ber o f  1956.
3 W hether these statem ents represented the full views of the C hinese, or con­
tained som e elem ent o f tactics and calculation as now  seems possible, o f  course 
one cannot know  for sure. B u t the view  that vast historical changes involve  
mistakes and suffering as a m ore or less inevitable by-product, and other argu­
m ents advanced were pow erful considerations w ith me.
4 T h is was even m ore evident upon our return to Australia. It took m e a long  
tim e indeed to get used to the outlook  and scale o f  spending that I now  found  
prevailing even after on ly  3A years.
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stances in your own country and hope you will continue to do so 
when you return.” No discussion of the issues involved or the 
‘principles’ that had been rammed down our throats before. On the 
other hand, while rather cautious about openly disagreeing with 
the Russians at that stage, our Chinese lecturer on political economy 
had readily agreed that such a thing could occur, and that it did 
not contradict what Marx himself had said (of course the Russians 
knew this too, but said it couldn’t happen in the period of im­
perialism).
Particularly noticeable, though hard to specify precisely, was the 
‘culture’ and its differences from ours. Not so much the outward 
differences, which are of course very striking, but, for example, the 
emphasis on things of the mind and emotions. This is hard to 
define also, but it stood out in marked contrast to our Australian 
brashness, lack of consideration for dignity and feelings, and over­
riding emphasis on ‘objective causes’ with much playing down of 
‘subjective’ ones, which we had thought to be one of the main 
hallmarks of ‘Marxism-Leninism’.
From such Chinese sources came a deepening of knowledge and 
an expansion in the range of thought which was entirely necessary 
and beneficial. But at the same time this took place (or appeared 
to take place)5 within the already accepted framework of what was 
recognised as ‘Marxism-Leninism’, and thus, by another door, re­
inforced the more or less closed system of ideas then accepted as 
constituting it. Errors —  or creative additions —  were thought of 
as occurring within an essentially known, correct and basically com­
plete system of ideas into which everything could be either fitted 
(good; proletarian) or excluded (bad; bourgeois). Thus the Chinese 
experience, while tremendous in impact and on the whole positive 
and liberating of thought, in another way served to reinforce the 
concept of Marxism-Leninism as a set of established and final 
truths and thus acted as a delaying force for the re-thinking that 
had eventually to get under way. This ambivalence is, I believe, a 
key to some apparent inconsistencies in developments in the 60’s.
5 T o  w hat exten t the Chinese then accepted the prevailing (Stalinist) conception  
of M arxism -L eninism ’, and to what extent they just w ent along w ith  it in  the  
circum stances o f the tim e w hile having their owrn ideas (subsequently developed) 
is problem atical, and to say this is neither to condone nor condem n. For a useful 
exam ination  see M arxism  & Asia  by d'Encausse and Schram.
T h e  C hinese position  was, in m any cases, really  creative, even if  not sufficiently 
rationalised in  traditional m arxist or other theoretical terms. B ut it is not good  
enough to force things in to  a m ould because that is what peop le expect, or 
because to do otherw ise w ould in itia lly  p lace one at a disadvantage in  polem ics. 
T h is is on e o f  the factors w hich has been at work to transform m arxism  into  
dogm a and religious-type m ystification.
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This also coloured greatly consideration of the real relations 
between the CPSU and the CPC. ‘Marxism-Leninism’ made a 
fundamental division between socialist countries and such com­
munist parties impossible. Thus many of us were still naive enough 
to see in the final document of the 81 parties conference in 1960 
a proof that, despite differences, there could be no final split. The 
fact that almost immediately this wishful thinking was exposed 
forced a deeper consideration. When things came to something of 
a head at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1962 (when the 
Chinese walked out, and paid ostentatious tribute to Stalin) it 
seemed to me that, although errors of both could be pointed out, 
the CPSU was acting more reasonably, still attempting to do the 
right thing about ‘de-stalinisation’ and giving proper emphasis to 
avoidance of nuclear war which the Chinese seemed to treat in 
cavalier fashion.
But much more important were the issues mainly affecting our 
perspectives, policies and practices in Australia. These having been 
brought from China, through Hill and his supporters, to the stage 
of “you must choose one or the other”, did the great service of 
posing fundamental questions as to what it was that we, as com­
munists, really stood for.
For example there was a great deal of argument about two peace 
organisations existing in Melbourne, and as to whether we should 
work for their amalgamation. From this apparently trivial argument 
it gradually became clear that the central issue was whether our 
prime consideration was to have a peace organisation of such a 
nature that ultimately we could be confident of the decisions it 
would make (a particular case being whether or not the peace 
movement should criticise the Soviet H-bomb tests in 1961). Thus 
the issue was were such mass movements (however wide in them­
selves from time to time) to be regarded as essentially ‘front’ 
organisations in the manner described by some of our critics; or 
were we, while participating in and doing all we could to influence 
policy in the direction we thought best, to do this in recognition 
that there were other views that had to be respected, and that ours 
had no special claim to recognition beyond their cogency and the 
respect, earned on the basis of performance, in which our members 
were held6.
Similar issues emerged in regard to our own organisation. For 
example, was it right that a (or the) leader of an organisation 
should exercise the right of selection of people for positions, irrespect­
0 T h e  same issues cam e lip increasingly also in regard to in ternational organisa­
tions (trade u n ion , youth, w om en, peace).
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ive of the views of others, on the grounds of ‘loyalty’?7 This in turn 
raised further questions as to the existing form of organisation of 
the Party. Whether actively sought or not, there was an inbuilt 
disposition to give rise to an entrenched group whose position could 
not really be challenged short of an upheaval of the whole organisa­
tion, with the actual tendency being for all to regard direction from 
the top and conformity as ‘correct’. Underpinning this were various 
theoretical and political propositions which had to be (or were) 
accepted as irrefutable axioms an d /o r starting points and as not 
open to questioning. This in turn led to the fundamental question 
of the approach to marxism itself, put still more clearly at a 
later date by Hill: “Marxism is a set of propositions (concerning 
the Party, the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, violence, 
philosophy, etc.), you either accept them or you don’t.”8 No room 
for science here, no room for a marxist approach in the spirit of 
Marx himself or of Lenin, no room for a genuine theory indispens­
able to a revolutionary movement.
There was the problem of ‘peaceful transition to socialism’ and 
how it might be conceived of in Australian conditions. Orientations 
on this can be varied, including a Labor Party type parliamentary 
road such as is taken up, I believe by the present ‘opposition’." 
This is nonsense, but to open up one’s mind to the question of 
transition to socialism without civil war is not. The problem was 
repeatedly discussed from many angles, including the structure of 
the modem capitalist state, questions of ‘hegemony’ and ‘counter­
hegemony’, and the tactics of mass struggle and so on, resulting in 
the analysis in the Statement of Aims adopted at the 22nd Congress 
of the Communist Party (see pages 21-24 of this statement).
There was the attitude to the Labor Party, admittedly a very 
complex question which it is impossible to examine to any great 
extent here. But perhaps this complexity is part of the basic 
point. The Hill opposition at that time wanted to confine the whole 
of it within the narrow framework of the discredited ‘main-blow’ 
theory developed by Stalin at a certain stage.10 The present oppo­
7 O ne such issue was H ill's “appointm ent" of Vida L ittle as M etropolitan Sec­
retary in  Victoria, despite almost unanim ous opposition  from others, including  
from H ill supporters.
8 From an early publication  of the CPA (M arxist-Leninist).
!» “ . . . the decision to w ithdraw  the troops m ust be m ade, in  the final washup, 
by a governm ent and not by som e queer form  o f workers’ control.” — from 
A u stralian  Socialist N o. 2, in  an articlc condem ning the leftism  o f the anti-war 
m ovem ent.
10 See for exam ple F oundations of L en in ism  Chapter 7, and T h e O ctober R e vo lu ­
tion  an d  th e  Tactics of the R ussian C om m unists.
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sition tends to confine it in the limits of tailing behind the Labor 
Party in the name of the ‘united front’, foregoing any really inde­
pendent revolutionary initiative and acting as though a Labor 
Government elected on this basis in present circumstances is the 
main content of socialist activity (see footnote 9).
At this period it appeared to most observers and probably a 
considerable proportion of Party members, that the struggle was 
in essence one of choosing whom to follow, whom to regard as the 
fountain head of Marxist-Leninist wisdom and the main architect 
of world socialist strategy and main force for ending imperialism—  
the Soviet Union or China. Though I know of no-one who can 
claim to have known what was to come, what we were really doing 
was facing up to the need to think out our position for ourselves. 
This was a slow process because, as I have pointed out, the previous 
framework was still accepted; but there was now an inner prepared­
ness to go beyond it should experience or rational thought so 
indicate.
It was in this spirit that publication of the Communist Review 
ended in May 1966 and the Australian Left Review was initiated. 
Improvement had to be fought for step by step, but there was now 
no issue put beyond the pale of discussion as too ‘difficult’ or 
‘inconvenient’ either before or after a number of non-communists 
joined the editorial board.
The fact that the struggle did represent at bottom a turn to 
independent thought and an independent position on socialist 
strategy in Australia and internationally, also became clear in 
relatively small ways at this time in our relations with the CPSU< 
The Jewish question arose once again, and although there was more 
in it than I for one was conscious of at the time, there was readiness 
to consider the facts, so far as they could be ascertained, though 
there was also the readiness and disposition to give a generous 
benefit of the doubt on the basis that the CPSU was working, against 
difficulties, to overcome the legacy of problems it had inherited from 
Tsarism and Stalinism. There was the criticism of the way in 
which Khrushchov was removed and ‘unpersoned’. There was 
criticism on the basis of the evidence of reversal of a previous trend 
and strengthening of an an undemocratic and unsocialist attitude on 
the question of freedom in the artistic and intellectual spheres, 
and on democracy in general.
Nevertheless, speaking for myself, I then still believed that the 
CPSU was basically on a course which was going in the right 
direction. It was in this frame of mind that I visited the Soviet
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Union in 1965 on my way to Cuba and Chile together with Pete 
Thomas to attend the 13th Congress of the CP of Chile. This was 
the period in which the long discussion on the economic reforms 
was coming to a climax, and we aimed to get further clarity about 
it, and if possible to interview Professor Liberman, one of the main 
proponents of the reforms.
Experiences were mixed, but not altogether unfavorable. It 
proved possible to visit Kharkov to see Professor Liberman, with 
whom we had a long, interview, in the presence of a battery of 
‘watchdog’ party officials, which restricted the range of the dis­
cussion though it was valuable nonetheless. There were useful 
discussions with factory managements, but an exasperating inability 
to get answered key questions, particularly on the ‘whys’ of the 
past position and the implications of the reforms beyond the purely 
economic. There was apparently quite free discussion among and 
with the interpreters and officials we met on freedom of the arts, 
with quite different opinions being given (how meaningful these 
differences were is hard to say). I expressed the view on return 
that although problems of democracy had in no way been resolved, 
nor was the orientation in the direction we felt necessary, the 
economic foundation required political democratisation. For the 
economic reforms involved decentralisation of authority, and the 
drawing into meaningful consultation and control of the rank and 
file on the job as Lenin had strongly emphasised, and the discussion 
of real issues instead of sloganising and rhetoric. (I think the main 
reason why the reforms have run into something of a bog is because 
these consequences are unacceptable to the leadership.) Such 
changes at grassroots level, while not automatically bringing any 
changes at political level, would nevertheless, I believed, build up 
such pressures that these would come in time. Later events have 
shown that these hopes have not materialised, and that the course 
is a different one. (The pressures still exist, and are slowly building 
up, but there is no evidence I know of to support hopes. Sor any 
substantial change in the immediately foreseeable future.)
There was one important incident prior to leaving. We returned 
to the Soviet Union after a month spent in Cuba and Chile, and 
were almost immediately read the long statement of the Chinese 
issued in November 1965.11 There followed a special discussion 
with a leading figure of the International Department, who suggested 
that our Party might consider making an extensive reply to and 
criticism of this attack on the CPSU. We replied that our party
l l  “R efu tation  of the N ew  Leaders of the CPSU on  ‘U nited  A ction’,” by the 
editorial departm ents o f People's D aily  and R e d  Flae, published  in P eking  R eview  
N o. 40, N ov. 12 1965.
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policy on the question was that renewal of polemics on an interna­
tional plane at that time would serve no good purpose; that the thing 
to do was to continue to press for concerted action against imper­
ialism in Vietnam and elsewhere, and that we did not think our 
Central Committee would agree to depart from this standpoint.
After much argument back and forth we finally expressed the view 
that although our policy on this question was unlikely to be altered, 
there was room within it for some discussion on the situation —  the 
events in Indonesia for example — which would permit some refer­
ence to some of the issues raised in the Chinese blast. This, was 
brusquely dismissed, and it became clear that what was proposed 
was that the CPSU would supply us with the article they wanted— 
a ‘big’ article, which would ‘earn us a big reputation in the inter­
national movement’. The way in which the proposition was ap­
proached left the clear implication that this was not an unusual way 
of doing things, and that other ‘big’ international articles had often 
been arranged in the same way.12 (The Duclos article on Browder 
in 1946 springs to mind.)
So it was becoming increasingly clear that we were ‘on our own’ 
in grappling with the actual problems we were encountering, and 
that no succour was to be expected from bold new deeds or theoreti­
cal generalisations from, the Soviet Union, or the ‘International 
Movement’.13 At the same time social and political developments 
proceeded apace throughout the world-, including in Australia where
12 B eing hard-headed about it, one supposes that it is only to be expected that 
the CPSU (not it alone o f course) w ould regard such a proposition  as being  
‘worth a try’, particularly since they felt that we ‘supported them  against China'. 
However there was m ore to it than that. Besides the fact of having other parties 
lire the bu llets the CPSU had m ade, it was unacceptable to them  to have the 
party concerned m ake its own statem ents. W e were treated to len gthy  discourses 
on the long friendship betw een our two parties, in  an u navailing attem pt to 
get us to be m ore com pliant. And. although it was 18 degrees centigrade below  
freezing w hen w e left M oscow a day or two later, the social atm osphere was 
even more frigid. T h is was perhaps not the beginn ing of the dissatisfaction of 
the CPSU w ith  the new  leadership of the A ustralian party, but I believe it was 
a long step on  the road. A nd there was increasing evidence subsequently of 
pressures and sallies against the leadership, w hich increased further as issues 
becam e clearer to us, and w e becam e m ore outspoken anil as w e began to tackle 
som ewhat m ore deeply the theoretical and strategical issues facing us. T h e  
above incident was o f course fu lly  reported on to the Political C om m ittee, w hich  
unanim ously endorsed the stand w e had taken.
13 W e were encountering (and were to continue to do so) the problem s of 
inertia, bureaucracy and of ‘vested interests’ by individuals and groups of 
people in  their ow n jobs', ‘em pires’, etc., in  trying to reorganise on a more 
lim ited  and m ore realistic basis, and get our financial and property affairs on  
an even and efficient keel. Such experiences on our tiny scale gave som e apprecia­
tion of how  enorm ous such problem s m ay becom e w hen m u ltip lied  by a m illion  
or ten m illio n  . . .!
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a new wave of political dissent and activism was beginning, affect­
ing particularly students and intellectuals. If the scale of this was 
small compared with the United States and other countries, it was 
nonetheless very noticeable, not to say welcome in the Australian 
context, after quiescence which, with a few interruptions, had lasted 
so frustratingly long.
Escalation of the Vietnam war by US imperialism in 1965 made 
a worldwide impact on the revolutionary movement, and in Aus­
tralia too. That this was a ccntral issue was recognised right from 
the outset (and even before this), and at times in those early days 
the communists were almost alone in their campaigning, which 
deserves a recognition it seldom gets. But as other forces, especially 
the students, increasingly entered the struggle, the limitations of 
what the party was able to do in its existing ideological and organi­
sational state became increasingly apparent.
The industrial field, main focus of activity of the communists 
over the years, was also now arousing dissatisfaction on account of 
narrowness, conservatism and timidity, and those problems were 
highlighted as the mass movement over living standards, democratic 
rights and the Vietnam war developed. Probably the penal clauses 
issue illustrates this best. Already in the metal trades struggle 
of 1967-8 it was being urged that the penal clauses be defied. In 
February 1969 the National Committee estimated that the situation 
was ripe for a challenge. This fell largely on deaf ears among 
communist union officials, yet in May one of the greatest mass 
movements Australia has seen erupted. Most of these officials 
showed great resistance to any new ideas or even the revival of 
interest in traditional Leninist ideas of ‘workers’ control’. Obsolete 
union structures, authoritarian outlooks and bureaucratic procedures 
were grimly held on to. This situation —  a product of the party’s 
outlook and practices, not a specific of union officials14 —  thus also 
began to be subjected to prolonged scrutiny, debate and struggle, 
which both benefited from and contributed to the general re­
assessment (see the 22nd Congress document Modern Unionism and 
the Workers’ Movement).
Internationally, also, a new complicated upheaval was affecting 
China —  the cultural revolution —  while in May 1968 the great 
upheaval in France showed that revolutionary potential in modern 
capitalist society could not be written off as some were suggesting, 
while also exposing still more fundamentally the Unsolved problems
H  M any factors contributed  to this, a key on e b eing em phasis on  the im portance  
of official positions, often  irrespective o f  the q u ality  o f  the work done and rank 
and file  developm ent.
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of theory, strategy and organisation of the communist parties.15 
Such new social and political currents in the capitalist and socialist 
world posed additional knotty problems of theory and orientation. 
The relatively quite few active minded critics in and outside the 
party did considerable service in pressing those questions. And 
even if their strictures were often argued against in a way that 
probably appeared as rejection, this was mainly because answers 
alternative to the traditional ones were not readily forthcoming at 
the time, while our own thinking still revolved mainly in the same 
framework; nevertheless they were listened to more seriously than 
they themselves perhaps thought.
In this period, in party discussions, such critics or those who 
took their cue from them, would often say: we should make a study 
of class changes, the quality of life, or what have you. Because the 
need for this was already accepted, this became rather off-putting 
after a while. I used to think to myself, and sometimes say, “Well, 
why don't you bloody well do it; who's stopping you?”, for the 
number of serious studies of the issues (as distinct from opinions, 
correct or not, taken ‘off the top of the head’) was small indeed. 
Of course this basically constituted a severe criticism of what the 
party had come to be. We were inwardly quite prepared to grapple 
with issues without setting uncrossable lines in advance as we had 
previously. But precisely because of this past tradition we were 
neither well-equipped ourselves to actually do so, nor more than 
marginally in touch with those who were, even if only within par­
ticular fields.
A number of us therefore, quite independently forced to the same 
conclusion, determined that we must bend ourselves to the task, 
however daunting. It was in fact discussed at meetings and a 
decision made, though no doubt many would have regarded it as 
merely another of innumerable pious resolutions to ‘study more 
deeply’. For myself, I set out to make some study of philosophy, 
which was of great interest to me in general, besides inevitably 
sticking its tousled head at some stage or other into all the other 
subjects.
During 1966 I had discussions with a number of academic philo­
sophers about trends and (if any) their relation to marxist philo­
sophy. Naturally these discussions did not go very deep but, 
besides reinforcing my views on the narrow, inward-looking nature 
and consequent barrenness of much of philosophy treated purely as
15 W e were by no m eans satisfied w ith  the stand o f the French CP, and also  
took issue w ith  those w ho, often  in  an anti-com m unist spirit, sloganised about 
revolutionary situations instead o f  analysing. In betw een these stools w e som e­
tim es lapsed in to  the previous stand o f  b lind  solidarity betw een com m unist 
parties.
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an academic discipline (whereas for me ‘philosophising’ should be a 
human activity bound up with all other —  especially revolutionary, 
activity) were most beneficial.
They (a) made me confront the question of defining (or re­
defining) for myself what marxist philosophy actually was10, (b) 
showed that marxist philosophy as understood from its Soviet devel­
opment was not taken very seriously —  and not just mainly because 
proletarian pearls were rejected by bourgeois swine; (c) led me to 
read many more books (a number of them recommended by my 
philosopher acquaintances) than for many years past, and to do so 
both more critically and more open-jnindedly than is the wont of 
those who feel they already know, basically at least, the answers 
to the problems they are reading about; (d) along with rejection 
of a good deal, aroused great interest in a number of lines of 
thought, and gave rise to the reflection that, although one could 
rationalise to oneself that non-marxists were often ‘forced to think 
in a marxist way’, this did not settle what ‘a marxist way’ actually 
was. And, most importantly, led me to the conclusion that there 
was no likelihood that the burgeoning knowledge in this and other 
fields could be squeezed without damaging surgery into any glass 
slipper, however elegant, and that the easy mental divisions into 
‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarian’ ideology we were in the habit of making 
was a major aspect of confining thought within old pre-determined 
bounds and could no longer be accepted in that form.17
!6 T h is  re-exam ination  could not o f course be confined to philosophy, but had  
to be extended  to m arxism  as a w hole. A sprinkling of people in various cou n ­
tries had realised this long before and produced valuable works o f which  
m ost o f us were b lissfully ignorant at the tim e. T here is now  an increasing  
num ber engaged in  the task, and this holds out the prospect that a new stage 
in the endeavour m ay be reached in  the not too distant future.
17 T hese view s (w hich were not necessarily on ly  m ine) were raised at CC m eet­
ings and incorporated in the docum ents o f the 21st Congress. T h ey  m ay not 
seem m uch, and in  them selves are not, but are crucial in the context o f the  
traditions o f com m unist parlies. T o  a degree at least the CPSU and those now  
clearly iden tified  as conservatives in the party felt som e unease about these 
sorts o f things. By their own lights they were thus m ore discerning about the  
‘w inds o f change’ than some other critics w ho, from right and left were 
insisting that ‘n o th in g  was changed’.
I also undertook som e re-study of Marx's p olitical ideas for the centenary celebra­
tions o f th e  publication  of the first volum e of " C apita l” (1967), study for the  
dialogue w ith Christians which look place about this tim e, o f class structure 
for a projected book of essays (1908), a re-study of Chinese developm ents fo llow ­
ing the  end  of the C ultural R evolution  (1969) , and o f  L enin ’s works for the  
centenary of his birth (1970), and work on the ‘Aims' docum ent for the 22nd  
Congress (1970)) .
All these studies confirmed in  general term s the conclusion outlin ed  above, 
and heightened  appreciation o f  the fact that the problem s had to be tackled  
m ore deeply  yet. T h is was the m ain reason I have taken ‘sabbatical leave’ to 
do w hatever I can to contribute to this further study.
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At the same time other key issues related to the party came under 
scrutiny. For example, one party rule and ‘the leading role of 
the party’ connected with it. Secrecy; it was brought home to us 
that we had spent an enormous amount of time guarding non­
existent or unprotectable ‘secrets’. This was connected with our 
view of the 1917 revolution and bolshevik experience as the basic 
model, and our onesided approach to the state and the way 
capitalist rule is maintained (later linking up with the discussion 
of Gramsci and counter-hegemony). Party organisation related to 
the above. The significance and nature of changes in the economy 
and the progress of the scientific and technological revolution, 
changes in class structure, etc.
The 1967 (21st) Congress dealt with all these and other questions, 
although our treatment was only beginning to penetrate the surface, 
since understanding was still superficial. But, perhaps for this 
reason, the lack of understanding displayed throughout the party 
of what was really involved —  no particular surprise this —  and 
the difficulty of reorientating thinking and action, brought home once 
again the sterility of many previous practices and approaches and 
realisation of how great the problems of renovation and renewal 
were.
Perhaps the key question over-all was that of democracy. This 
was raised from everything we touched. Questions of bourgeois 
and proletarian ideology in the sense described above; free discussion 
of theoretical, scientific and artistic ideas; questions of the one 
party state, and one ‘official’ state ideology; of secrecy and the 
necessary limitation on democracy that accompanies it; free dis­
cussion of political issues, etc. The pre-congress discussion was 
completely free, and this upset the CPSU particularly, because things 
previously unsaid in communist publications could be said about 
them as well as us. Even with all this emphasis on democracy 
there was still room for a rank and file delegate at Congress to 
propose that we set out to define our attitude to democracy in a 
charter of democratic rights, and for such a proposal to raise all 
sorts of controversy from that Congress through to the next.
There were some who were misled by the emphasis on democracy 
into concluding that concentration on these issues meant a turn in 
the direction of ‘rightism’ and even ‘liberalism’. It may be that 
there were elements of this, but the essential point was that a 
changed attitude on intellectual freedom and democracy in the 
party and in the future socialist society was a basic precondition for 
breaking out of the old conceptions and practices, which in their
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totality were actually ‘stalinism’. And following through the issue 
of democracy has led increasingly to more radical and revolutionary 
conceptions concerning participatory democracy, workers’ control, 
etc., and prompted re-examination of attitudes to ‘leadership’ and 
bureaucracy both within the party and the mass movement. These 
and other issues were taken still further at the 22nd Congress.
From the above it will be evident that the issue of Czechoslovakia, 
while indeed a fundamental turning point, in no way caused the 
developments in Australia, but only put the seal on what had already 
been basically accomplished internally. That is why there was 
no hesitation and why few members of the executive had any doubts 
about the outcome of the repeated discussions that took place. 
Nevertheless the Czechoslovak issue certainly forced the pace, deep­
ened the appreciation of problems and make inevitable the de facto 
split now existing. It also drove home the barren circularity of the 
argumentation and thought within which we had allowed ourselves 
to be confined for so long. This is difficult to describe, as there 
are many points on the wheel, and wheels within wheels, but 
essentially it goes something like this:
* The CPSU wouldn’t do it unless it was right; they must have 
had a good reason, they are closer, they know more (including 
from intelligence reports they can’t discuss); they have the most 
experience and they are best versed in marxism-leninism.
* Marxism-leninism teaches that the central question in the 
period of imperialism is the dictatorship of the proletariat; 
enemies must be crushed; democracy is a class question; it is all 
a matter of class stand; class stand entails that the Soviet Union 
be supported at all costs.
* Internationalism is a fundamental aspect of class stand; we 
must unite to fight the class enemy; they (five Warsaw pact powers) 
have united so they are fighting the class enemy; fifty parties 
can’t be wrong; it is nationalism to oppose the views of the 
majority of communist parties.
* The CIA is always active; they would like to see Czechoslovakia 
separated from the Soviet Union; Dubcek and Co. are criticising 
the Soviet Union and won’t accept their ‘advice’ and leadership, 
therefore they are doing objectively what the CIA wants.
* The past proves that the Soviet Union was right; they defeated 
fascism; fascism was raising its head again in Hungary in 1956; 
If you supported them then, you should now; if you don’t now, 
you are putting the integrity of your own past in question; you
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have always adopted marxism-leninism and a class stand before;
don’t take a step back now.
And so on, and so forth, without getting to the substance of issues. 
It will be apparent that any one of the points or sub-points on 
the circle can serve as starting points to get on the same old exercise 
in circularity. And while put baldly as above it may seem singu­
larly unconvincing, there is no doubt that this argumentation has a 
very compelling quality for those who have spent half or more of a 
lifetime fighting self-sacrificingly and passionately, if often mistak­
enly, along these lines for what they believed. One of the main 
points about it is that it is circular —  that is, it can only be 
escaped from by refusing to stand within that circle. And this of 
course is difficult; firstly because things are never completely black 
and white and individual facts can be found to support one or 
other of the points. Secondly and mainly because it requires a 
qualitative step in outlook as a whole —  both a return to and bold 
development of the revolutionary content and spirit of marxism.
The Communist Party of Australia has decisively, if by no means 
completely, broken out of its old circle and habits of thought, and 
set out on a course which is clear enough in its main outlines, 
though incomplete, lacking in theoretical depth, and suffering from 
the opacities of the present complex stage of capitalist and world 
developments.
Which are the most basic and lasting currents in world processes 
and politics is not something to dogmatise about, but I have the 
feeling that the next few years, and fairly certainly the 70’s, are 
likely to crystallise things again after the present period of ‘solution’ 
or ‘fluidity’. All sorts of new movements, political formations 
and theoretical developments are possible, probably very different 
from the past.
Some see in this present stage the dissolution of ‘a way of life’ 
and the overturning of ‘all that we hold dear’, with catastrophe as 
the inevitable outcome of such a course. There are even not a few 
others on the left who from a pro-Chinese, ‘new left’ or nihilist 
position also want to confine thought in (somewhat different) closed 
circles. But we feel that what we hold dear are our ideals for the 
future development of society into a fundamentally more human 
state than exists anywhere at present. That this requires revo­
lution in capitalist society and far-reaching change in most existing 
socialist societies we have no doubt. And we believe that this 
cannot be accomplished without considerable theoretical development 
and powerful practical action —  to which we will contribute all we 
are capable of.
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Alastair Davidson
Writing the History of a C.P.
NO HISTORY CAN BE W RITTEN without a conscious or un­
conscious philosophy or world-view underlying it, because it is the 
philosophy of the author which will determine what he understands 
by a historical fact; how he will order these historical facts in a 
pattern; and, finally, how he will give more importance to some facts 
than to others to establish a pattern or hierarchy which enables 
him to discover what is significant and deserves the most emphasis 
in his work. This generalisation applies to the writing of the history 
of communism as much as to any other sphere of history.
The adequacy of a historical work is determined first by the 
validity of its philosophical base and then by its “facts”, for what 
are “facts” and what is “correct” is something which can only be 
established in philosophical terms. It may be that in time there 
will be general agreement that there is only one valid philosophical 
criterion to decide the adequacy of “facts”, but at present there 
are at least three philosophical positions of major importance in 
historical scholarship whose theories of knowledge differ so much 
that there can never be agreement between them as to what consti­
tutes a “correct fact”. The truthfulness of this proposition is more 
evident in disputes over macrocosmic facts like a revolution than 
microcosmic facts like what is understood by the notion of a date 
but it holds for all “facts”.
Alastair D avidson is a lecturer in  Political Science at M onash U niversity, and  
a m em ber o f  the E ditorial Board of A L R . H e is author of the book T he
C om m u n ist P arty  o f A ustralia , a Short H isto ry , published  this year.
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The three major philosophical schools which rule in historical 
scholarship today (not that the historical practitioners are always 
conscious of it) are the idealist school, the empirical or positivist 
school, and the historicist school. The first have a theory of know­
ledge which maintains that facts are the product of men’s minds; 
that knowledge or understanding is antecedent to the facts; that 
consciousness precedes material and sometimes, that God made 
the world. The second group maintains the contrary: that material 
precedes consciousness; that the concept of the fact lies in the fact 
itself, and that facts produce men’s minds. The third school maintains 
that material and consciousness are two faces of the one coin, 
neither being precedent to the other, both being inconceivable with­
out the other, and that the development of knowledge is not by 
production but by a dialectical process.
The first two are fundamentalist schools who merely reverse 
each other’s propositions, and the third a historicist school. The 
first two have ideological origins and not historical origins. The 
idealist school maintains that the validity of ideas (and ideas are the 
most tricky of “facts”) can be determined according to a criterion 
outside history, outside the ideas themselves, a revealed or trans­
cendent criterion (e.g. God, the Bible, intuition). The second do 
exactly the same by returning to First Causes, though in their case 
they claim the ultima ratio for material rather than God. For them 
dispute is solved by returning to the “facts”, understanding facts 
in a crude raw sense, and failing to distinguish between facts and 
the concept of facts, assuming the unknowable, the existence of the 
facts independent of men’s consciousness of them. Only the third 
school starts from the existing historically structured environment 
instead of looking for first causes, and accepts the presence of the 
individual consciousness and the environment of facts as the condi­
tions precedent for establishing the theory of knowledge, and that 
ideas can be tested for their validity by the application of human 
rationality which can compare them against the real.
The three philosophies emerged in a succession and developed 
from each other; they constitute a progress in understanding. The 
first we can find already present in the writings of the Church 
fathers; the second was the vogue from the eighteenth century on­
wards and had its heyday late in the nineteenth century and the 
third was a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All 
have exponents among contemporary historians. We can place 
Butterfield and Manning Clark among the first school, Lewis Namier 
and Ian Turner in the second, and Benedetto Croce and Antonio 
Gramsci in the third. Not a single notable Anglo-Saxon historian, 
much less an Australian, comes to mind as an exponent of the 
third philosophical method —  the only one which is not obsolete.
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In the Anglo-Saxon world we are faced with an atrophy of historical 
research, in its ideological stage. We are faced with pre-historicist 
history.
This lag of historical practice is not inevitable, as it is not present 
in European historical research, where, as I have pointed out, major 
historians have a historicist philosophical base, either in theory, as 
with Croce, or in theory and practice, as with Gramsci, but it is 
explicable in terms of Anglo-Saxon failure to keep up with philoso­
phical developments made “in foreign parts”.
Within the insularity of Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship (Aus­
tralian scholarship belongs within this too), the idealists are regarded 
as old-hat, if not as nuts. The ruling vogue is the pragmatic empir­
icism of the positivist group, who periodically savage the idealists 
(usually mistaking historicists for idealists because they know 
nothing of non Anglo-Saxon developments). Recently we were 
treated to an example of this in the attack on Manning Clark’s his­
tory in Australia, but a running battle has been conducted for many 
years in England against Toynbee and Butterfield by the pupils of 
Namier. The Namier school of history epitomises the style of Anglo- 
Saxon historical scholarship. Carrying one side of Ranke’s teaching 
to a ridiculous conclusion, they claim to have eliminated great 
theories and philosophy from history by going back to the facts. 
Massive detail is used to demolish attempts to understand. What 
none of this school seems to understand is that they too belong to 
a philosophical tradition; they are not writing objective history but 
positivist history. They cannot attack the idealists without attacking 
themselves as their position is merely idealism stood on its head.
I can almost hear a sigh of relief from marxist historians at the 
mention of Namier, who was nothing if not an enemy of marxism.
I reply, most Anglo-Saxon and Australian marxist historians also 
belong with him through their positivist understanding of marxism. 
An economic determinist who believes in writing history in whch 
institutional developments are always explicable in terms of economic 
and social developments has more in common with Namier than 
with marxism because he shares the same philosophy which is not 
only passe but ideological in its origins.
We can get no guidance for writing a communist history from 
Anglo-Saxon historical scholarship and the criteria it uses, as it 
is almost without exception, marxist or non-marxist, positivist in 
its orientation and therefore both out-of-date and ideological. Its 
theory of knowledge and world-view is inadequate to its own object. 
To understand how to write any history we should look at European 
historical scholarship in the historicist tradition, as here we have a 
methodology adequate to its object.
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II
The practical differences in approach of the Anglo-Saxon school 
and the Continental school, which is so much in advance of it 
philosophically, can be gauged by the recent criticism of Paolo 
Spriano’s massive three volume Storia del Partito Comunista Italians, 
recognised generally as the best history of a communist party ever 
written. Spriano is a communist, an activist and a scholar, and one 
of Italy’s leading historians. Essentially, his history is a history of 
the leading groups of the party, their relationship with the Comintern 
and the policies thrashed out on the dialectic of that relationship.
International critics were asked three questions:
1 This history of the PCI is essentially the history of a national 
section of the Communist International. As such, how far is it indica­
tive of a general process?
2 As Gramsci asked himself, is it possible to write the history 
of a political party? To what extent must it also be the history 
of a country? The problem is particularly difficult, because it is a 
question of a Party which is part of a centralised international 
movement and because it lived almost from its inception in condi­
tions of illegality.
3 Spriano seems to share the thesis that the history of a party 
is in the first place the history of its directive groups. Is this method 
correct and what novelty does it introduce?
Giuseppe Berti (leading historian of PCI, non-communist) pointed 
out that anti-communists were critical of Spriano’s history because 
it emphasised too much the positive aspects of the leadership but 
“in this world it is really difficult to make everyone happy”. Berti 
went on to say that the harshest criticism had come from communist 
leaders. He replied to the first question in the affirmative:
W ithout com m itting the  sin o f patriotism , w e could  even say that from this 
poin t o f view  the PC I’s history offers an optim um  positive quality  and can 
therefore be told  w ith  least d ifficu lty  by a m ilitan t. W hat there is in  it which  
is negative is ow ed (not com pletely, but prevailingly) to the coefficient o f  sub­
ordination of the policies o f the PCI to those o f Moscow . . .
In reply to the second question Berti said:
T o  m e there seems no foundation  to the objection  (that it  is insufficiently  
inserted in to  the history o f  the country) and that this seems a false problem  
from a historiographical p o in t o f view. T h e  history of a country can be 
w ritten from various perspectives, as econom ic history, as d ip lom atic history, 
as the history of p o litica l parties and religious com m unities (think o f the 
R eform ation and the C ounter-R eform ation) and so on, and, in  m odern  
history, th e  horizon has a tendency to extend  to problem s o f  European and 
world history. M oreover, this characteristic is particularly evident in  the  
history o f a m ovem ent like the com m unist m ovem ent w hich  is in ternation­
alist. T h u s there arises the suspicion that he w ho insists a great deal that 
greater stress should  be la id  on general developm ents o f Ita lian  history, has
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n o  great desire to go deeper into and discuss the burning questions (national 
and international) o f the com m unist m ovem ent in  its totality, and w ould  
prefer to drown everything in  a wave of historical happenings. T oday the  
writer o f  the history of com m unism  in  reality faces a m ore d ifficu lt task 
than that presented to historians o f  the n ineteenth  century, when they tried  
to write the history of Jacobinism  w hich was the history of France from the  
E nlightenm ent to the R evolution, but w hich was also the history o f som e­
th in g  else . . .  as the historians w ho tackled this question  from different 
points o f view  from Barruel to A lbert Sorel, from M athiez to m ore recent 
historians: realised the history of a country and o f the m ovem ent o f  European  
ideas.
In response to the third reproach, Berti said that it was banal:
Let us take for exam ple a subject w hich is a little  less heatedly contested: 
the history o f the Action Party in  the R isorgim ento. I belong in  fact to 
the group of historians which sought patiently  (and above all) to bring to 
light the class links o f that leading group w ith  the substratum of young  
in te llectuals and workers w hich foretold  the working class, o f the peasants 
w hom  in  certain cases the A ction Party tried to lean on certain m ovem ents. 
W hat cam e from it? Enriched, certainly by new  facts (or rather facts w hich  
were know n in more detail and position) what cam e from it was precisely  
th e  h istory of th e  d irec tive  group . And it  should be noted that the enrich ­
m ent itself was possible not in one of the first reconstructions o f historical 
scholarship, but in the latest in  order o f tim e, a century after the first 
attem pts to write a history o f  th e  Action Par tv.
Milos Hajek (Czech historian of the Comintern) said that linking 
a party’s history with that of the country was much less important 
in the case of a propagandist party than a strong ruling party. In 
the case of parties related to the Comintern, the Comintern was 
probably much more important than anything that went on in the 
country of origin. He pointed out furthermore that the study of 
communist parties was in its initial stage and that in the case of of­
ficial histories tracing connection of party and the masses, they 
started from a falsified and a priori view of history of the country. 
He agreed entirely that the CPI and he added the Soviet, French, 
Polish, Czech and German parties should be studied above all at the 
directive level. “A history of a Communist Party would be vulgarly 
deformed if it did not single out the real development of its policies, 
arid how far they were determined by its leaders (as well as by the 
Comintern).”
Robert Paris (French militant intellectual):
Certainly the choice o f Spriano . . . w ithou t doubt w ill seem embarrassing  
to those w ho w ould  like to find , in  the evolu tion  of an organism  lik e  that 
of the PCI, the equivalent o f that ‘h istory of the subaltern classes’ w hich  
Gramsci hoped for, or, to cite Jaures, ‘a fresco o f  a w hole im m ense m ultitud e  
of m en w ho are finally com ing in to  the light': to those, in  sum , w ho w ould  
like a substitu tion  of th e  history o f the class struggle for that o f ru ling groups 
or classes. But it is certain that the history of a com m unist party of the  
classical type like the PCI, cannot be w edded, or at best in  an extrem ely  
indirect and m ediated  way, in to  w hat w e call social history.
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Paris went on to say that the history of communist parties belongs 
in the history of sociology of organisations. Paris agreed too that if 
the scenario was Italian the direction was elsewhere, in the Comintern 
and the international movement.
Eric Hobsbawm (guess what, we know him!), the only Anglo- 
Saxon marxist and economic determinist to boot, was the only dis­
senter. He said:
In general, no peculiar aspect and no institu tion  of any country can be 
separated from their context w ithou t som e deform ation or lack. L ife cannot 
be divided  up  w ithou t losing life.
W e can criticise Spriano for not having em phasised the (national) context 
adequately.
He went on:
As to the history of a party seen in  terms of its d irective groups, it is evidently  
insufficient, because it neglects the activity, the  attitudes etc. o f  the masses 
which — often  for reasons d ifferent from those adm itted by the  leadership  — 
support it . . . It is to be hoped  that in  the third  o f  Spriano’s volum es, the  
history o f the com m unist party w ill be w ritten  from below  as w ell as from  
on top.
The clear opposition between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
critics, the first claiming that history is a totality whose parts cannot 
be considered separately and the second asserting, the contrary and 
indeed claiming that more is lost than gained by the global approach 
is explicable only in terms of their philosophical positions. Although 
all are marxists, and I stress here that being a marxist is not all- 
important in understanding history, (what is crucial is what sort of a 
marxist you are), Hobsbawm still subscribes to the pre-humanist 
economic determinist variety of marxism in both his theory and his 
practice, where two of the others, Berti and Paris are “humanist” 
marxists. (I am not able to comment on Hajek beyond noting that 
in his practice he is the “humanist” variety of marxist too).
The positivist version of marxism espoused and maintained by 
Hobsbawm accepts the notion of production and therefore the 
notion that superstructural phenomena like political parties are 
caused by conditions in certain social classes whose existence is 
owed to a certain division of labour stemming from the prevailing 
mode of production within the society. Thus one is not explicable 
without the other. A communist party and its history cannot be 
studied independent of the conditions within which it arises, these 
conditions being stated a priori according to a positivist view of 
marxism, to be matters like the economic and social history of the 
society. In turn, because Hobsbawm understands the progress of 
history in the positivist way, Theory (marxism) itself becomes an 
expression of the working class; the study of revolution and how to 
make it becomes the study of the progression of common sense
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among the masses to a refined level, something viewed as an auto­
matic process in which no mediation of an extraneous sort is present. 
The practical preoccupations of Hobsbawm testify to this assertion. 
He is interested in the history of Gramscian “common sense”, not as 
a part of history, but as History. In doing so he, of course, ignores 
what is implicit in Leninism, that is the notion of the party as 
something extraneous to the masses which brings Theory from the 
outside and whose history is not history of the masses though it may 
be related to it.
The humanist marxist, because he does not subscribe to the 
notion of the establishment of any institution according to a theory 
of production, is prepared at least to accept the Gramscian proposi­
tion that:
W e do n ot consider sufficiently that m any p olitical acts are owed to internal 
organisational needs, tied to the need  to give coherence to a party, a group, 
a society. T h is, for exam ple, is clear from  the history o f  the Catholic Church. 
W e w ould  not succeed if  w e attem pted to find the im m ediate explanation  for 
every ideological struggle inside the Church in  the developm ents in  the  
base: m any econom ic and p olitica l novels have been w ritten on  these lines. 
Indeed, it is clear that the greater part o f  these struggles are for organisational 
and sectarian needs. In the discussion betw een Rom e and Byzantium  on  
the nature of the H oly Ghost it w ould  be ridiculous to seek the cause of 
the claim  that the H oly  Ghost derives from  the Father only, in  the econom ic  
base o f Eastern Europe, and in  the econom ic base o f the W est the cause o f the  
claim  that the H oly Ghost derives from  the Father and the Son. T h e  two 
churches, whose existence and in fluence depend on  the econom ic base and 
on history, have adopted positions w hich provide distinct principles and  
in ternal organisational cohesion for each, b u t each could have chosen the  
position  adopted by the other; the d istinct principles and conflict w ould  
have been  m aintained  just the same, and it is this problem  o f d istinct p rin ­
ciples and conflict w hich constitutes the real historical problem , not the  
arbitrarily chosen flag o f each of the parties.
Instead, accepting the historicist philosophy according to which 
the will of men and rationality, understood as a dialectical result 
of application of the consciousness to the material, are responsible 
for the creation of the “superstructure” in all its manifestations, he 
admits that there is not an a priori relationship between political 
parties and base. This is not the same as denying that there may be a 
relationship if the evidence shows that there is. This brings me to 
some issues facing an author of a history of the Communist Party 
of Australia.
I l l
When I completed the substance of my History of the Communist 
Party of Australia in 1966 (the bulk was written in 1965) I certainly 
did not know much about the developments in historical methodology 
in the European countries and I had a noli me tangere respect for 
the practitioners of history in this country and the Anglo-Saxon world
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generally. The intellectual hegemony exerted by the Canberra school 
of labour historians over me was great and difficult to escape. How­
ever, even before embarking on the doctoral research which was the 
base of the part of the book from the CPA’s beginnings to the end 
of the Second World War, I had rejected in my practice, even if not 
on a formed theoretical level, the notion that marxism was economic 
determinism. I will not single out by name the men who insisted 
from the ivory towers that labour history was marxist history (a 
populist distortion) and that the explanation for practically all poli­
tical developments were to be found in the base. I do remember 
rejecting out of hand the value of this notion as it did not conform 
to my experience of reality, which unlike theirs consisted of a con­
siderable period working in the working class in a highly class­
conscious society. Not surprisingly in an environment like that of 
“marxist” scholars in Australia, this led to their believing that I 
was not a marxist. Unlike them I believe that there is some relation 
between theory and practice and that it is real experience which 
determines the validity of a theory.
In the Short History of the CPA I continued what was then a 
heretical viewpoint for marxists in Australia, a belief that the raw 
material would dictate what was significant. I note here that this 
is not the same as the positivist method and that an unconscious 
philosophy is not necessarily less coherent than a conscious one. 
Indeed, the true philoophy can most often be found in the practice. 
The net result was, that after reading everything which I had listed 
in my bibliography and more (it is not necessary to throw Namier 
out the window as his methodological canons are as relevant to 
marxist historians as elsewhere) I came to the conclusion that the 
central theme in CPA history was the dialogue between local exigen­
cies and central orders. I did not assume a rigid theoretical schema 
according to which there must be some connection with the develop­
ments in the working class and the economic base and torture my 
facts to suit my theory. To borrow from Freud, on occasion the 
economic situation provided the same environment as illness or 
tiredness does for slips of the tongue, but it did not explain the slip 
of the tongue. Even in the great depression men’s rationality and 
their wills decided what would be done; the economic base decided 
nothing, it never does; it produced nothing, it never does.
Naturally, because I am as intellectually lonely as anyone who 
makes his way against the mainstream (it is no consolation that I 
believe the mainstream to be ideological in its origins and to have 
dubious populist overtones whose nature could be best discovered 
by comparative studies of the national-socialist roots of fascism) 
I have been overjoyed to discover: 1) that the most advanced schools 
of marxism are anti economic determinist and refuse to admit the
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arrant totalitarian nonsense that an institution must be examined 
in a social and economic context before it can be explained and, 2) 
that the most acclaimed history of a communist party, while infinitely 
superior to my stop-gap effort, also took the same partial approach 
(history is a totality only in the non-imperative sense) which has 
been applauded as the only way to study a communist party.
I have this to say to those who wish to write a definitive history 
to follow my “stopgap” history. First; the history should not auto­
matically be a history of the “rank and file” or the working class 
masses as Doug White demanded for this would be to lapse into 
the old populist error which confused the history of revolution with 
the history of common-sense. Critics of his ilk have learnt nothing 
from the Leninist distinction between spontaneity and consciousness. 
I believe the Arena group has accepted bastard theories to shore up 
its own petty-bourgeois romanticism (neither White nor any of the 
supposed supporters of Mao Tse-tung’s theories or those of Althusser 
are either Maoists or Althusserians). Second; the history should not 
automatically be set against the socio-economic background, as this 
is the practice of a economic determinist (pace Rex Mortimer who 
made several other valid criticisms of my book). Third; the author 
should prepare himself by boning up on the latest marxist philosophy 
and its historical practitioners and this means leaving Anglo-Saxon 
shores and going to Europe. I have only this to say in conclusion 
to those horrified by their lack of tools enabling them to do this. 
If Louis Althusser decided that he had to learn German before he 
could study Marx, surely a few years learning Western European 
languages is a condition precedent for keeping up with contemporary 
marxist philosophy? And if Althusser considered his ignorance of 
what went on over the mountains a disgraceful chauvinism, surely 
Australian marxists are just as offending and had best look at their 
own theoretical paraphernalia before they embark on either writing 
or criticism. Finally, one warning about short-cuts: Those who 
popularise a contemporary marxist sociology like that of Althusser 
on the basis of the Allen Lane translation of less than half his 
preliminary work do a disservice to Althusser, to themselves, and to 
the working-class movement. The same moral applies to those who 
wish to write a history of the CPA.
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G. Tighe
Entrism and Revolution
FOLLOW ING THE LENGTHY PERIOD during which their past 
perspectives and tradition have been examined, the CPA has 
emerged with a detailed analysis of Australian society as it sees it. 
It is not my intention to analyse these documents, rather I wish 
to comment on the issues raised by Eric Aarons in his statement 
“The Congress and After” (Australian Left Review No. 25). The 
question concerns the CPA attitude to the ALP. Eric Aarons goes 
to considerable effort to establish that the Trotskyist concept of 
entrism “remains unexplained, while its failure to produce significant 
results over a period of over thirty years is not analysed.” As one 
who has upheld the validity in the past of “entrism sui generis* , 
it seems necessary that I should spell out in clear terms what is 
entailed by the above term.
Entrism sui generis is a totality of several modes of work 
and stems primarily from a realisation of the overall low level of 
political consciousness in this country at present. Inherent in this 
realisation is an acknowledgment of the hold exercised over the 
proletariat by the ALP and the consequent limitation of the likely 
success of an independent revolutionary movement. The ALP is 
a party that was created by the proletariat in a period of relative
G. T igh e is the pen-nam e of a m em ber of a 4th International group in Sydney. 
A lthough it is a discussion piece on an earlier contribution  to A L R , this article  
is connected w ith  issues raised by a consideration of C om m unist Party history.
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struggle (the 1890-1 strikes); it achieved their support in the 
succeeding years, so that by 1910 it was able to form majority 
governments federally and in N.S.W. In this early period, when 
the A LP promised limited reforms and was largely in a position to 
deliver these goods (pensions, basic wage, Commonwealth Bank, 
etc.), not only did these reforms reinforce the hold of this mass 
Party over the working class, but it also had considerable influence 
over the thinking (and direction) of the working class. I do not 
wish to labour this point unnecessarily, but later .developments only 
further demonstrate the centrifugal pull of the ALP (e.g. National 
Labour— 1916, Lang Labour— 1931 and the DLP— 1955); not one 
breakaway group has managed to survive or develop a party capable 
of taking the place of the ALP.
Viewed in this sense, it can be seen that the ALP is a mass 
reformist party that has the loyalty of a majority of the proletariat 
and in turn the working class expects something of their party. I 
will return to the reasons for the failure of breakaway groups later. 
Stemming from the very ease with which the ALP is capable of 
canalising working-class support, even if a militant stand is required 
(refer Victorian ALP on the non-compliance issue), it is inadequate 
for revolutionaries just to remain outside the ALP and expose it 
(or scream abuse at it). The validity of entrism is contained in the 
entry of conscious Marxists into this mass milieu to develop a 
significant revolutionary wing in the ALP, to ensure that a more 
socialist direction is taken.
However, despite the value of a more leftward-leaning ALP, 
entrism sui generis involves much more than just entrist work into 
the ALP. Concurrent to work in the ALP there is involved in­
dependent outside work, e.g. the anti-imperialist struggle, union 
activities. The activities normally undertaken (or talked about) by 
the CPA would generally fit into this context of independent work, 
as would the publication of revolutionary material, the establish­
ment of centres such as Resistance and Liberation. Unless revo-i 
lutionaries approach independent sector work with the realisation 
of the ALP hegemony, then they run the risk of falling into two 
major traps. These are (a) the development of a ghetto mentality 
and. subsequent over-estimation of the possibilities, leading on to 
adventurist actions; and (b) disillusionment of the revolutionary 
cadres who are unable to give effect to even the most mild of their 
propositions.
On the other side, independent work is essential and can be of 
aid to those carrying out entrist work. Independent work is essential 
to ensure that revolutionary work is carried out in the basic pro­
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duction units of capitalism; it is also necessary because it is a 
simple fact that many revolutionaries could not stomach work in 
the ALP at any price. The value of struggles against the bourgeois 
mode of society within factories, schools and universities cannot be 
stressed enough, but it is also a fact that after contributing to some 
such struggle the workers will turn around at the appointed time 
and vote ALP. Independent work has its value because it raises 
the level of demands that the ALP has to comply with (it also of 
course produces additional cadres), it does not have great value in 
exposing the ALP.
Few revolutionaries would dispute that the ALP has been integrated 
into the system of bourgeois domination in this country; even fewer 
would deny that the ALP as a mass reformist party is a positive 
hindrance to the development of a mass revolutionary party. An 
understanding of the two arguments is essential to comprehend 
the pattern of work in the ALP, by any person adhering to entrism 
sui generis. It is a primary task of revolutionaries to develop a 
significant revolutionary sector in the ALP; the independent work 
assists this by providing an outside pressure and preventing revo­
lutionaries succumbing to the opportunist dangers. At the present 
level of the Australian proletariat and their industrial organisations 
this is obviously a major task. A hard slogging job needs to be 
done in the branches in opening up revolutionary perspectives for 
rank-and-file members of the ALP. Progress will be minimal for 
years, although there are openings that present themselves.
It is necessary to elaborate on the method of entrism into the 
ALP. Any one individual working in a branch, unless he can build 
up a local force working with him, will almost invariably succumb 
to opportunism of one sort or another. Past experience suggests 
that revolutionaries should colonise a branch, i.e. plan and con­
centrate their activities in particular areas. The colonisation is 
carried out by the independent sector and should be subject to 
constant review to determine its direction and immediate per­
spectives. Entrism sui generis then is not a sloppy process involving 
the isolation of scattered revolutionaries in various remote ALP 
branches.
Inside those branches that are heavily influenced by revolution­
aries every effort should be made to link up with and aid any 
local actions. The experience of direct action, in political affairs, 
needs to be passed on to the ALP rank-and-file and its working- 
class base. Direct action here means literally anything from public 
meetings, collecting petitions through to street blockades. These 
are activities that revolutionaries have the ability to suggest and
85
organise effectively, but it is an ability that would be much more 
valuable in the hands of the working class than in an isolated 
revolutionary clique.
In addition to what I have already stated there is another essen­
tial component of entrism sui generis. Because of the inadequacies 
that are inherent in a mass reformist party such as the ALP it is 
the eventual aim of revolutionaries to take any significant revolu­
tionary wing with them together with as large a working-class base 
as possible. Careful attention to detail would be required in any 
such differentiation inside the mass party. In the eyes of those 
workers who had faith in the ALP (at present a very large number) 
it' would only be justifiable after the ALP had failed to fulfil those 
hopes, i.e. some period after an electoral victory. The result of 
such a differentiation is not necessarily (and is most unlikely to be) 
the revolution: it is designed to break the present isolation of the 
revolutionary Left from the masses in this country, to provide a 
milieu that will go past the ALP when considering its political 
options.
Even after such a differentiation, which would be accompanied 
by extensive political work, it is almost certain that the workers 
would continue to have some illusions about the “parliamentary 
path to socialism” and electoral work would need to be continued 
and its limited possibilities exploited to the full. However, revo­
lutionary Marxists should be with the class —  not sharing their 
illusions but identified with a struggle that the masses understand, 
so that every opportunity to utilise frustration can be seized and 
mass political consciousness brought to a higher level.
Before going on to an analysis of the past period I will make a 
brief summary of the postulates of entrism sui generis as I see them.
(a) Acknowledgment of the political primacy of the ALP.
(b) The emphasis on independent work designed to assist entrist 
work into the ALP.
(c) Realisation of the basic reformist nature of the ALP and 
low political consciousness of the Australian proletariat.
(d) Realisation that in its present form the ALP is part of the 
capitalist system of domination and a hindrance to the de­
velopment of a mass revolutionary party.
(e) That the ALP is seen by workers as adequate for their needs.
Why has entrism sui generis failed as a tactic over the past thirty 
years? This is the second part of the question posed by Eric Aarons.
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A number of alternate answers pose themselves. It would, however, 
take a much larger work to fully examine them. I will attempt to 
do justice to the major answers however. First there is the small 
number of revolutionary cadres devoted to this style of operation. 
This answer is obviously inadequate; Aarons would argue that if 
the tactic was valid it would have gained a large number of 
adherents. The additional cause of seeming lack of success lies with 
the independent sector itself.
For many years the CPA acted as a brake on the development 
of a revolutionary movement in Australia. Leaving aside its alliance 
with Stalinist states, work was carried out that had little real 
relevance in the development of socialist consciousness in the 
working class. Bernie Taft in his article “The Working Class and 
Revolution” (ALR No. 25) states: “Today, economic demands can 
generally be absorbed and integrated. In fact today, unlike the 
past, economic militancy often goes hand in hand with support for 
the existing system, as the one which makes such a struggle for a 
greater share possible. Militancy has become quite respectable.” 
Until the last several years there has not been so much as a glim­
mering of a realisation of this in Tribune (and still it is not pre­
dominant). All the past strategies have tended to reinforce bourgeois 
ideology in the Australian proletariat. Proceeding from this basis 
it is logical to state that very little real pressure has been applied 
on the ALP from a revolutionary proletariat, i.e. the ALP leaders 
have not had to respond to a militancy going beyond “fair shares” .
The two arguments so far are (1) the scarcity of revolutionaries 
working in the ALP and (2) the incorrect policies and attitudes of 
both the CPA and union leadership generally. Also to be added to 
these is the fact that during the 1950s and early 1960s capitalism 
had a virtually unchallengeable hegemony. In the late 1940s a 
strong force was carrying out entrist work of a classic nature from 
the Right —  the National Civic Council. The effects of their 
white-anting are still obvious both inside and outside the ALP. The 
development of the cold war externally, and the 1954-55 ALP 
split internally, have kept even the reformists from power. Several 
developments have now started to operate to counteract that long 
period of bourgeois triumph; the approaching victory of the social 
revolution in Vietnam and the growth of educational institutions 
are but two. That the situation is now changing does not alter the 
fact that during the previous twenty years objective conditions were 
not favourable.
Any analysis of actual results achieved by entrism sui 
generis must take into account the fact that the ALP has been out
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of government federally since 1949, that no senior personnel in 
NSW (e.g. parliamentarians) had a revolutionary perspective and 
were prepared to pressure the State Government from the Left. All 
through this period it was not possible to cause a differentiation 
in the ALP that would have opened up mass support for a new 
socialist party. There is, however, one example that does demon­
strate the type of thing I mean, that is the example of Leichhardt 
Municipality. Aldermen Origlass and Wyner in the Balmain ward, 
by breaking Caucus on an important issue, were able to gain con­
siderable local support and were in fact seen to be more Labor 
than the Labor Party. What in fact they did was to pick an issue or 
issues that directly concerned people and to mobilise people on 
•those issues. The whole range of issues (chemical tank farms, 
container wharves, etc.) demonstrated to people who automatically 
voted Labor in the past that something was wrong with the system. 
Important forms of direct action were used, e.g. a street blockade 
against trucks, and recently a strike by container workers whose 
cars had been damaged by local residents. This is not to claim that 
Balmain was an earth-shattering victory; put in its perspective it 
shows how traditional Labor voters can be won over from passive 
acceptance of bourgeois democracy to support for militant action, 
and it demonstrates no more.
However, the situation in Balmain further highlights an earlier 
problem that I mentioned —  how to overcome the continued cen­
trifugal pull of the ALP. Given that a substantial (majority if pos­
sible) number of Labor supporters can be won away from the ALP 
by entrist tactics it is not just sufficient to carry on the traditional 
style of Left-wing politics. It would be necessary to mobilize this 
mass political base in the same way that revolutionaries are able 
to work in certain trade unions and on certain university campuses, 
i.e. to “raise such questions and demands as will bring the workers 
up against the system, that can’t be absorbed or fully absorbed, 
that involve them, develop their initiative and awaken their revo­
lutionary potential.”
In other words, unlike National, Lang and Democratic Labor, 
it would be our aim to organise a mass party so as to involve people, 
not just to get them to vote away their involvement every three 
years. Because of its short length this article is necessarily sketchy 
in places. However it does, I feel, describe what is meant by entrism 
sui generis and also gives a justification of that concept at this period 
in Australia.
G. TIGHE
8 8 A U STR AL IA N  LEFT REVIEW — OCT.-NOV., 1970
M. Frydman
Issues in the Middle East
THE ANTI-FEUDAL and anti-colonial revolutions of Egypt and 
Syria of the early 1950’s which came in the wake of the defeat 
of the feudal Arab armies, were the starting point of the still develop­
ing socio-political revolution in the Arab world. Today this revolu­
tion has reached in some Arab countries the stage of expropriation 
of big landlords and nationalization of foreign and big Arab-owned 
enterprises. The changes of the progressive Arab states, notwith­
standing their weaknesses and harmful crosscurrents, are an im­
portant factor in the developing countries’ struggle for liberation 
and in mankind’s struggle against neo-capitalism. The Western 
powers, to safeguard their huge oil profits, strove to strangle the 
Arab revolution by the use of coups, direct military intervention and 
military actions by the Middle East pro-Western countries. These 
policies have time and time again failed because of the opposition 
of the Arab, neutral and socialist countries, and the Soviet assistance 
to the progressive Arab states.
It is a well known fact that, prior to the Balfour declaration of 
1917, the Jews lived for centuries peacefully alongside the Arabs in 
Palestine. The Zionists’ endeavour to create a state in Palestine 
and the British use of Zionism for their own purposes ended these 
amicable Arab-Jewish relations. Zionism was born in the last 
quarter of 19th century. It remained a minority tendency in 
Jewish communities until the second world war. This reactionary 
bourgeois movement claimed that the only solution for anti-Semitism 
was to create a Jewish state and for the Jews to emigrate to this 
state. This Zionist proposition was in contradiction to the attitude of 
the progressive Jews who were advocating, as an answer to anti- 
Semitism, a close cooperation of Jews with the working class and the 
progressive elements of each country in their common struggle 
against discrimination against Jews and other national minorities.
At the inception of the Zionist movement its top leaders were 
seeking the support of the Turkish sultan and the European monarchs
M. Frydman is a Jew ish progressive activist, w ell know n in  the Jewish com ­
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for Zionism, and promising them in return a support for their colonial 
policies in the Middle East. After 1920 the Zionists supported 
the British in their denial of independence to the Palestinian Arabs. 
After the 1948/49 war the Israeli Zionist leadership denied the 
Palestinian Arabs their right to return to their homes, although the 
Palestinian Arabs “kept in 1948 in their overwhelming majority aloof 
from the struggle” (Ben Gurion's statement in 1948). Since 1950 
the Israeli Zionist leadership has tied itself to the West, and in 
UNO has supported the Western Powers against the aspirations of the 
developing countries. This was accompanied by the statements of 
the top Israeli leaders, that “Israel is part of the West”, and that 
"a neutral policy is not for Israel” . In 1956 Israel, France and 
England invaded Egypt. And in 1967 Israel occupied large tracts of 
Arab lands, which she has held for over three years, without declaring 
her willingness to return them as the price of a genuine peace.
It can be seen from the above that the basic Zionist conception 
of an ingathering to Palestine and Israel of Jews living all over 
the world was the forcc which was driving the Israeli leaders to 
expansion and cooperation with the Western powers, and this 
brought the Jews of Palestine and Israel, time and time again, into 
collision with the Arabs. This state of affairs suited the Western 
Powers, who endeavoured to exploit it by encouraging Israel to 
take actions which would lead to overthrowing the progressive Arab 
governments. This doesn't mean that the Arabs behaved correctly 
all the time in the past. Thus for instance since 1956 up to 1967 
the Palestinian Arab leaders and almost all Arab states propagated 
the idea of the liquidation of the state of Israel and the deportation 
of all Jews who came to the country after 1917 as claimed by some, 
or after 1948 as claimed by others. This Arab attitude caused much 
harm. It strengthened the support of the Israelis for their reactionary 
Zionist leadership, and this strangled the socio-political development 
of Israel itself.
It would also be wrong to claim that all Israelis are Zionists, 
There are communists, anti-Zionist students and people like Uri 
Avenery, the non-socialist, who sees the root of the trouble in the 
domination of Israel by Zionism. There are also Israeli masses who 
have shown on many occasions their support for progressive causes 
and ideas and their longing for peace. Neither is it true that all 
Zionists are of the same mould. Thus today in Israel Mr. Riftin, 
the leader ot fhe left wing in Mapam, many Zionist professors, 
students and intellectuals and even some leading Zionist personalities 
are criticizing the chauvinist policies of the Israeli government. In 
general it can be said that so far as the Zionists are upholding the 
Zionist conceptions, to this extent they are chauvinist and reactionary, 
and so far as they are under the pressure of the class struggle or
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the reality and are acting against these conceptions, they may 
behave in a progressive way.
The leadership of all Israeli Zionist organizations and all Ministers 
of the Israeli government however, are taking a strong chauvinist 
line. Thus some of them, as the right wing Heirut, are advocating 
the incorporation of all occupied in 1967 lands into Israel, while 
others, including the Labor Alignment, are claiming that for security 
reasons a major portion of the occupied territories should not be 
returned. In conjunction with this I would like to quote the former 
Israeli Defence Minister Mr. Pinchas Lavon, who says: “The question 
of topography, which in conditions of modern warfare is of relative 
value, is not the fundamental question” (Information Bulletin of the 
Communist Party of Israel 3 /4 /6 9 ). What Israel should claim is 
not the occupied lands, inhabited by Arabs hostile to Israel, but a 
permanent and a genuine peace, which is the main pre-requisite 
for the security and socio-economic development of Israel. What 
Israel is entitled to claim in exchange for the recognition of Arabs’ 
legitimate rights, is the Arab recognition of Israel, its borders of 
May 1967 and of her navigation rights, also the incorporation of 
these rights into peace agreements. However, Israel’s demands go 
much further than these legitimate rights.
The refusal by Israel to state its willingness to return the terri­
tories occupied in 1967 and settle the refugee question as the price 
of a genuine peace was causing an increasing opposition of the 
population of the occupied Arab lands and the condemnation of 
Israel by world public opinion. In these circumstances many 
justly regarded the struggle of the Arabs to regain their lands as 
justified, although they were critical of the Arab guerrilla groups 
which were committing acts of terror against the civilian population. 
On the other hand, not only in the reactionary Arab states and 
circles but also among the progressive Arabs, policies are advocated 
which are harmful for the solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Thus 
not only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but also Syria, Irak, Algeria 
and some other Arab states are demanding the liquidation of the 
state of Israel. The various Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine 
take a similar stand. Some of them are calling for the establishment 
in the place of Israel of “a democratic Arab Palestinian state, in 
which all citizens, Moslems, Jews and Christians will enjoy the 
same rights and duties” (platform of A1 Fateh), while the others 
advocate a Palestinian state “on the basis of the coexistence of two 
peoples, the Arab and the Jewish” (platform of the Democratic Front, 
from A1 Hurriyeh of Sept. 1, 1969).
The propositions of these Arab groups are unreal and harmful. 
Whatever were the wrongs in the past, Israel and the two and a half 
million Jews who live in this state have become irreversible historical 
facts. These Jews became an Israeli nation with a common language,
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culture, economy and territory. The differences which still exist 
among the Jews, who came to Israel from many countries, are fast 
disappearing, especially among the second generation Jews. As a 
nation the Israelis are thus entitled to a state of their own. Moreover, 
they will never give up their national state. One should also recall 
Lenin’s remark that the national peculiarity and the striving of a 
nation for a state of their own, either as a separate, independent 
entity, or as a member of a federation, will continue to exist for a 
long time. This doesn’t exclude the existence of a substantial Arab 
minority, living alongside the Jews in Israel.
What about the Palestinian Arabs? To avoid many decades of 
armed clashes in the Middle East, one should solve the conflict by 
taking into account the irreversible facts. Return of a proportion 
of the Palestinian refugees to Israel, compensation for the others 
who prefer to stay in Arab lands, and the recognition by Israel of 
the right of the Palestinian Arabs to form a state of their own, 
consisting of the Gaza strip and the West bank, and which possibly 
would include the Transjordan where the Palestinian Arabs form 
a substantial section of the population, will solve the tragic situation 
of the refugees and preserve the identity of the Palestinian Arabs. 
This seems to be the only realistic solution of the Israeli-Arab con­
flict in the present historical conditions.
Sections of the communists and left socialists give all-out support 
to the Arabs who preach the liquidation of the state of Israel. They 
claim that Israel is a settlers’ state, that its elimination is needed 
to restore Arabs rights and to prevent the imperialist intervention 
in the region. The liberation of Palestine —  they say —  would 
stimulate the masses and assist the development of the Arab revolu­
tion.
The Communist Party of China pursues a similar policy. It calls 
for the application of Vietnam’s and Algeria’s solution to the situa­
tion in the Middle East, notwithstanding the vastly different condi­
tions. Its attitude to the Middle East is also prompted by its general 
criticism of Soviet foreign policy and the desire to gain influence 
among the Arabs. Basically, the CPC’s policy is the result of its 
undialectical method of advocating the same solution to problems 
occurring at different places and times, and in conditions which 
greatly differ.
But Israel is not a typical settlers’ state. The Jewish people of 
Israel became a nation. They are not directly attached to any 
metropolitan country. Unlike other settlers they are engaged in 
all fields of country’s life and rely exclusively on their own military 
forces, although they get most of their finance and military equipment 
from abroad. The Israelis, if faced with the prospect of liquidation 
of their state, would fight to the last man, which would mean the 
extermination of the Israeli nation, while the Western Powers are
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certain to assist pro-Western Israel with finance and military equip­
ment, if Israel is faced with such a disaster.
The liquidation of Israel is thus an unrealistic task which would 
involve many decades of bitter struggles and could lead to a military 
clash between the great Powers. If the course of liquidation of 
Israel is adopted by the Arab world, this would play into the hands 
of the imperialists. It would cause new wars, much destruction 
and suffering and the strengthening of militarism and bureaucratism 
in the progressive Arab states. It could cause new Arab defeats 
and serious setbacks for the Arab revolution.
Fortunately a substantial section of the Arab world is opposed 
to such a harmful and adventurous course. The assumption that a 
long lasting Israeli-Arab confrontation is needed to promote the 
Arab social revolution is false. The need for a socio-economic 
advancement, the realization that the imperialist interference bars 
the advancement and that the developing countries can achieve it 
only by the adoption of the non-capitalist road are sufficient for 
the development of the social revolution, as the events in other 
developing countries have shown. The progressive forces should 
be opposed both to the chauvinist attitudes of the Israeli government 
and to the wrong conceptions of the extreme section of the Arab 
world. This is the platform on which the progressive forces of both 
nations should unite, because this is the only basis for peace and 
a healthy socio-economic development for the Middle East.
On the other hand, one should welcome Egypt’s and Jordan’s 
acceptance since May 1968 of the Security Council’s resolution of 
22nd November 1967 “in full” and as a “package deal”, and their 
willingness t o . discuss its provisions point by point, but in indirect 
negotiations (Jerusalem Post Weekly 4 /6 /6 8 , New York Times 
Weekly 1 4 /7 /6 8 ). Nasser has subsequently specified in clearer 
terms that he will “accept the reality of Israel in recognised and 
secure borders”, “make a declaration of non-belligerency” , and 
“provide freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Akaba and the 
Suez Canal”, in exchange for the “evacuation of all territories occu­
pied by Israel in June 1967” and “a settlement of the Palestinian 
refugee problem” on the basis of “the right of return or compensa­
tion” (Newsweek 1 0 /2 /6 9 , Time 1 6 /5 /6 9 ). And in May 1970 in 
his interview in Die Welt Nasser said that he supports a peace agree­
ment with Israel in the spirit of the Security Council resolution of 
November 1967 (CPI’s Bulletin, July 1970). In these circum­
stances the insistence of the Israeli governments on direct negotia­
tions was justly regarded by world opinion as an excuse for the 
occupation of Arab lands. Israel was also considered to be largely 
responsible for the dragging out and failure of Dr. Jarring’s mediation 
efforts.
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The escalation since last December of the undeclared war activities 
in the Middle East and the extreme gravity of the present situation 
makes it imperative for both sides to seek a genuine settlement of 
the conflict, and to use any opportunity to achieve it. The only 
solution of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the acceptance of UNO’s 
resolution on the Middle East by both sides. This means that 
Israel should return all territories occupied in June 1967, recognize 
the right of the Palestinian Arabs to form a state of their own, settle 
the question of the refugees on the basis of a generous compensation 
or right to return, and ensure a complete equality of rights, duties 
and languages for all their citizens, Jews and Arabs alike, and on 
the other hand the Arabs should recognize Israel, its borders of 
May 1967 and Israel's navigation rights.
The settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict on this basis represents 
the maximum length to which both sides will go in the present 
historical conditions, and therefore it is a realistic basis for peace. 
We should welcome the acceptance by Egypt, Jordan and Israel of 
the American plan for peace, as a basis for indirect negotiations 
under the auspices of Dr. Jarring.
We should however, warn against both an inadequate settlement, 
which would not fully recognize the legitimate rights of both nations, 
and an intentional prolongation of the negotiations for many months 
and even years caused by the desire to leave things, in the main, as 
they are at present.
The progressive forces should energetically work for the success 
of the negotiations, because there are great obstacles barring the 
road to a genuine peace. The Palestinian Fronts For Liberation 
and some of the Arab states are opposed to the very existence of 
the state of Israel and are still thinking in terms of conducting guer­
rilla activities for the purpose of liberating the whole of Palestine. 
In their activities they can count on the support of the People’s 
Republic of China. This support, however, would be only of a very 
limited character.
The Israeli government is still determined to keep some of the Arab 
lands occupied in 1967 for “security reasons”, and it still rejects a 
solution of the refugee problem, based on compensation or return. 
And does the U.S.A. intend to implement fully the UNO resolution 
on the Middle East? In my opinion this is not the case. In his letter 
of June 19 to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Rogers spoke about 
carrying out the resolution in all parts” and the “Israeli withdrawal 
from territories occupied in 1967” (leaving open whether this means 
all territories). And by leaving many contentious issues including 
the refugee problem open, he tried to create an impression that he 
came “close to the legitimate aspirations of Arab countries” .
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And while Mr. Rogers was waiting for the reply, President Nixon 
on July 1st issued a statement which is described by Newsweek 
as “most pro-Israeli” . In his statement the president said that “the 
Middle East is now terribly dangerous”, that “once the balance 
of power shifts to where Israel is weaker than its neighbours, there 
will be a war,” and that “Israel must withdraw to borders that are 
defensible” . Simultaneously the US was pressing Israel to scale 
down her territorial claims. What was the purpose of all these 
manoeuvres? Mr. Nixon speaks with many tongues while pursuing, 
in the main, his imperialist line. Mr. Rogers’ peace proposals or 
2 8 /1 0 /6 9  (in which he claims some spoils for Israel) and of 
19 /6 /7 0 , were made to strengthen the position of the pro-American 
Arab regimes and to raise faith in American intentions in 
quarters which were critical of US policies. Mr. Nixon’s speeches 
however aimed to impress upon the Soviet Union and the Arabs 
that there is a danger of “confrontation between the two super- 
Powers”, and that a compromise solution which would leave some 
spoils to Israel is a necessity.
The US tried in the past on several occasions to reverse the Arab 
revolution by giving aid to Egypt and by supporting her claims 
against Israel. Thus for instance the US supported Nasser and his 
claim to Negev in 1952-1955, and requested the withdrawal of the 
Israeli troops from Sinai and the Gaza strip at the end of 1956. 
These attempts repeatedly failed. Instead the Arab revolution spread 
to Sudan, Libya and the Yemens, and this already endangers the 
American oil profits. Today the Egyptian revolution has gone too 
far for the US to rely primarily on these tactics which proved to 
be of little value in the past. The US intends therefore to impose a 
settlement which would encroach on some of the legitimate Arab 
rights, and to use Israel in the future also as a cat’s paw. The 
purpose of this policy is to prevent further development of the 
Arab revolution in the Arab countries near Israel and their closer 
ties with the Soviet Union.
President Nasser, in line with his policy since 1968 of acceptance 
of the UN resolution in toto and his statement in Die Welt of support 
for a peace agreement with Israel, was the first to accept the Ameri­
can plan for peace, and by doing so he started the ball rolling. By 
this act Egypt aims to expose the true character of Israel’s inten­
tions and create divisions in the Israeli government, force Washing­
ton to state clearly where it stands on the question of the Israeli- 
Arab conflict, and give a chance of reaching a peaceful settlement 
which would recognize the legitimate rights of the Arabs. By the 
acceptance of the US plan Nasser was running risks, because by 
doing so he antagonized many sections of the Arab world, while 
the chances of reaching a genuine settlement are as yet quite slim.
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Nasser was prompted to the acceptance of the American plan by 
the Soviet Union which, supporting Israel’s claims for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, was requesting all the time and also lately, 
that “Israel should unequivocally recognize the need to withdraw 
its troops from all Arab areas it occupied in June 1967”, and that 
“the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs” should be met. (New 
Times of 12/ 8/ 70 and 19/ 8/ 70). An Israeli-Arab peace agreement, 
meeting fully the just rights of the Palestinian Arabs, would soon 
deprive the Palestinian Liberation Fronts of their mass support. 
The question is, can the steadfastness of Egypt and other Arab states, 
with the help of the Soviet Union, cause the US to force upon 
Israel the recognition of full legitimate Arab rights? The chances 
are not too bright, because the US still intends to use Israel as a cat’s 
paw.
Notwithstanding all this, there is still another possibility —  namely 
that the Soviet Union, prompted by her desire to conclude with West 
“just agreements, relaxing tensions and promoting peaceful co­
existence” in as many fields and areas as possible, and confronted 
with American blackmail, may come closer to the American com­
promise solution. Can Israel’s neighbours be pressed into accepting 
a solution which would not settle adequately the refugee problem, 
and would leave some of the occupied territories with Israel? I 
doubt it. The Arab masses are likely to revolt, especially the Palestin­
ian Arabs of Jordan, if the rulers dare to accept such solution.
But even if the Arab rulers should succumb to the pressures and 
manage to survive, the inadequate solution would still leave the 
Israeli-Arab conflict unresolved. Sabotage, guerrilla activities, 
reprisal acts, an Israeli policy acting from strength and tied to West, 
and a danger of new wars both hot and cold, would inevitably 
re-emerge in these circumstances.
Progressives should therefore insist that legitimate rights of both 
nations should be fully recognized and incorporated in the peace 
agreements. The failure of the negotiations to produce an adequate 
solution of the conflict could bring in time many calamities for the 
people of the region. In such a case the main hope for a genuine 
peace would be that the Israelis, under the impact of class 
contradictions, world public opinion and grim reality, will reject 
the reactionary Zionist leadership and accept the need for the 
recognition of legitimate rights of the Arabs and the integration of 
Israel in to the Arab Middle East. The process in this direction, 
involving intellectuals, students and some other sections of the Israeli 
community has already begun, but it is hindered in its development 
by the insistence of some Arab quarters on the liquidation of the 
state of Israel.
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ROGER G A R A U D Y  
IN  A U S T R A L IA
In response to numerous requests, Australian Left Review will pub­
lish four of the main addresses given by Professor Garaudy during his 
outstandingly successful Australian visit last month:
Socialism's Unanswered Questions —  
Europe 1968
The main public address given in all capital cities (except 
Perth), dealing with the problems posed and the possibilities 
opened up by the new developments in capitalism, and 
analysis of the existing models of socialism.
Marxism and Structuralism
An analysis of the ideas of Levi-Strauss, Althusser and 
others.
French Students in May 1968 and After
The motives and aims of the student revolt and their signi­
ficance for socialist strategy.
The Dialogue Between Christians and 
Marxists
Developing further some of the ideas first advanced in the 
book From Anathema to Dialogue.
These papers will be available for 30 cents each, or $1.00 for the 
set of four.
Advance orders to Australian Left Review, Box A247 Sydney South 
Post Office, 2000.
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